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INTRODUCTION

In 1993, New York City began implementing the quality-of-life
initiative, an order-maintenance policing strategy targeting minor
misdemeanor offenses like turnstile jumping, aggressive panhan
dling, and public drinking. The policing initiative is premised on
the broken windows theory of deterrence, namely the hypothesis
that minor physical and social disorder, if left unattended in a
neighborhood, causes serious crime. New York City's new policing
strategy has met with overwhelming support in the press and among
public officials, policymakers, sociologists, criminologists and polit
ical scientists. The media describe the "famous"1 Broken Windows
essay2 as "the bible of policing" and "the blueprint for community
policing."3 Order-maintenance policing has been called the "Holy
Grail of the '90s."4 "There is little dispute that the theory works,"
says the ABA Joumal.5 It has sparked "a revolution in American
policing," according to the Christian Science Monitor, in an article
captioned "One Man's Theory Is Cutting Crime in Urban Streets."6
1. See Robert Jones, The Puzzle Waiting for the New Chief, L.A . TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at
Bl ("[T)he now-famous magazine article 'Broken Wmdows"'); John J. Diiulio, Jr., 'Win
dows' Puts New Light on Crime-fighting Efforts, Ideas, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at BS.
2. James Q. Wiison
Mar. 1982, at 29.

&

George

L.

Kelling,

Broken Windows,

THE ATLANTIC MoNTIILY,

3� Kevin Cullen, The Comish, BOSTON GLOBE MAa., May 25, 1997, at 12.

supra note 1.
Safer Streets at What Cost?: Critics say the homeless and substance
abusers are most likely to suffer when police crack down on petty offenses, A.B.A. J., June
4. Jones,

5. Patricia G. Barnes,

1998, at 24.
6. Christina Nifong, One Man's
MoNrroR, Feb. 18, 1997, at l.

Theory Is Cutting Crime in Urban Streets, CHRISTIAN Sci.
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U.S. News & World Report cover

story on crime -

a cover story that debunks nearly every hypothesis for the national
decline in crime - makes a passing curtsy to the quality-of-life ini
tiative:

"Clearly, smarter policing was spectacularly decisive in

some cities like New York."7 Former Police Commissioner William
Bratton, the principal architect of the quality-of-life initiative, cred
its the broken windows theory with falling crime rates in New York
City. "These successes didn't just happen," Bratton contends.
"They were achieved by embracing the concept of community po
licing."8 Wesley Skogan, a political scientist at Northwestern Uni
versity, has conducted an empirical study of the broken windows
theory and concludes that "'[b]roken windows' do need to be re

Broken Windows
Fixing Broken Windows, contends

paired quickly."9 George Kelling, co-author of
and of a recent book entitled

that Skogan "established the causal links between disorder and seri
ous crime - empirically verifying the 'Broken Windows' hypothe
ses."10 In this euphoria of support, it is today practically impossible
to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the quality-of
life initiative.11 It stands, in essence, uncontested - even in the
legal academy.
7. Gordon Witkin, The Crime Bust, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 25, 1998, at 33. The
one hypothesis that the cover story does not debunk is the crack hypothesis, namely the
theory that the decline in crime is due to decreased crack consumption.
8. William J. Bratton, Editorial, New
19, 1997, at A27.

York's Police Should Not Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND TiiE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AND DECLINE].
10. GEORGE KELLING & CATIIBRINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 24 (1996).
9.

AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 75 (1990) [hereinafter SKOGAN, DISORDER

11. I have in fact found no published scholarship, with the exception of forthcoming,
though as-of-yet unpublished, papers delivered at a recent conference convened by the Jour
nal of Criminal Law and Criminology on the topic, Why is Crime Decreasing? See Jeffrey
Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (No. 4, forthcoming 1998) (discussed infra, text accompanying notes 170-173
and 189-197); Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner City Neighborhoods:
Crime, Violence, Dmgs and Use in the 1990's, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (No. 4, forth
coming 1998); Fox Butterfield, Reason for Dramatic Drop In Crime Puzzles the Experts, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, § 1, at 14 ("Professor Curtis gives Mayor Giuliani's police little credit
for this transformation, viewing their repeated sweeps through Brunswick and arrests of its
residents as largely angering the young people."). A very recent student note in the Yale
Law Journal also criticizes the broken windows theory. See Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes
and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107
YALE L.J. 2249 (1998). To date, the principal published writings critical of the quality-of-life
initiative consist of a handful of New York Times articles. See Michael Cooper, You're Under
Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, § 13, at Al; Robert Lipsyte, From Sidewalk Skirmish to
Main Event, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, § 14, at Al; Matthew Purdy, In New York, the Hand
cuffs Are One-Size-Fits-All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, at Al; Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry,
Challenge to Authority: Disrespect as Catalyst for Bmtality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at Al;
see also Michael Massing, The Blue Revolution, THE NEw YoRK REVIEW OF BooKS, Nov. 19,
1998, at 32 (criticizing the broken windows theory and the quality-of-life initiative in relation
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Dan Kahan, a leading social norm proponent in the area of
criminal law,forcefully advocates order-maintenance policing and,
in particular, New York City's quality-of-life initiative.12 Kahan re
ports that order-maintenance policing "has been used with star
tlingly successful results in New York City."13 He contends that the
social influence conception of deterrence "makes it plausible to be
lieve that order maintenance has in fact reduced crime in New
York."14 Kahan also suggests that "[t]he work of criminologist
Wesley Skogan supplies empirical support for the b
' roken windows'
hypothesis."15 Other social norm proponents rely heavily on the
broken windows theory and essentially endorse order-maintenance
policing.16
In fact,order-maintenance policing is one of the leading recom
mendations along what Kahan calls "the new path of deterrence."17
The new path is a loosely grouped set of initiatives in the area of
crime and punishment,ranging from order-maintenance policing to
curfews,gang-loitering laws,informal public-space zoning,reverse
stings, and shaming penalties.18 The new path seeks to revitalize
to the drug problem). Even the civil libertarians are hedging their position on the quality·of·
life initiative. Norman Seigel, executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, very
cautiously remarks that "[t]here is a dark side to this quality-of-life issue. In some New
Yorkers' minds, this city is becoming increasingly authoritarian." Norimitsu Onishi, Giuliani
Crows as Theft Suspect Is Caught as a Jaywalker, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at Bl (quoting
Seigel).

See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence,
L. REv. 2477, 2488 {1997) [hereinafter Kahan, New Path]; Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 367-73 (1997) [hereinafter
Kahan, Social Influence].
13. Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2488.
14. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 372.
15. Id. at 369; see also Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2488 n.62.
16. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan
dlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171-73, 1177-79, 1182
12.

95

MICH.

(1996) (discussing the broken windows theory and advocating informal public-space zoning
administered by trustworthy police officers with significant discretion); Debra Livingston,

Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 551, 581-91 (1997) (discussing the broken windows theory and
advocating measures to manage police discretion in the context of the quality-of-life initia
tive); cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1039-40
(1995) (discussing one aspect of the quality-of-life initiative to illustrate a change in social
meaning; however, he does not indicate one way or the other whether he supports that spe
cific regulation of social meaning).
17. Kahan,

New Path, supra note 12, at 2479.

18. See Ellickson, supra note 16 (advocating informal public-space zoning administered
by trustworthy police officers with significant discretion); Kahan, New Path, supra note 12
(advocating curfews, gang-loitering laws, order-maintenance policing, reverse stings, and
shaming penalties); Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12 (arguing for order-maintenance
policing, gang-loitering laws, and alternative sanctions); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996) (advocating alternative sanctions like shaming
penalties); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
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the argument for deterrence by infusing it with cutting-edge social
science. Social norm proponents locate the new path of deterrence
between economics and sociology.19 The new path represents,ac
cording to Kahan, "a third way, one that combines the virtues of
both economics and sociology without succumbing to the vices of
either."2° From economics,the new path appropriates the idea that
individuals are rational actors maximizing their utility. From sociol
ogy,the new path appropriates the idea that individuals are influ
enced,and their conduct is shaped,by social phenomena. The new
path of deterrence is presented as an application of social norm the
ory to criminal law.21
Inthis Article, Icritically examine the empirical evidence and
the social influence explanation supporting New York City's experi
ment with order-maintenance policing. At the empirical level, I
replicate the principal social scientific study that has attempted to
establish the disorder-crime nexus,namely Wesley Skogan's Disor
der and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neigh
borhoods.22 Iconclude that Skogan's data do not support the claim

that reducing disorder deters more serious crime. As a preliminary
matter, the data are missing a large number of values (thirty to
forty percent,on average,of the relevant dependent and independ
ent variables) for such a small sample of neighborhoods (at most,
forty neighborhood observations). But even setting aside that
problem,my replication of Skogan's study establishes that (a) cer
tain types of crime like rape,purse snatching,and pocket-picking
are not significantly related to disorder; (b) other types of crime
like physical assault and burglary are not significantly related to dis
order when neighborhood poverty,stability,and race are held con
stant; and c( ) although 1robbery remains significantly related to
Procedure, 86 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1160-66 (1998) (advocating "the new co=unity policing,"
including anti-loitering laws and curfews); Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections,
31 VAL. U. L. REv. 579 (1997) (advocating strengthening interdependent social networks and
collective supervision of the co=unity).
19. See Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2477; see also Lessig, supra note 16, at 951
(social meaning "marries two traditions in social thought, one that we might call interpretive
(anthropology, sociology) and the other, traditionally, noninterpretive (economics)"); cf.
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an Interdisciplinary Dis
course on Law, 1997 Wrs. L. REv. 389 (1997).
20. Kahan, New Path,

supra note 12, at 2477.

21. I will refer to the "new path of deterrence" and to "the social influence conception of
deterrence" interchangeably, as does Kahan. However, I distinguish both of these terms
from social norm theory. The new path of deterrence is an application of social norm theory
to the crinrinal law. The distinction is an important one.
22. SKoGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 75; see also Wesley G. Skogan,
Disorder and Co=unity Decline: Frnal Report to the National Institute of Justice (Mar. 31,
1987) (hereinafter Skogan, Frnal Report].
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disorder, a cluster of five Newark neighborhoods exert excessive
influence on the statistical findings. When those five Newark neigh
borhoods are set aside, the relationship between robbery victimiza
tion and disorder disappears. Accordingly, the data do not support
the broken windows hypothesis.
Social norm proponents advance a second empirical argument
in support of order-maintenance policing, namely the precipitous
decline in crime rates in New York City.23 The conventional expla
nations for the drop in crime, they argue, do not account for the
magnitude of the drop in relation to other large cities.

As we

speak, however, there is a hotly contested debate raging among
criminologists, legal scholars, policy-makers, journalists, and other
experts over the causes of the decline in crime in New York City
and nationally.24 I review the various leading explanations and ar
gue that it is far too simplistic to suggest that the quality-of-life initi
ative explains the extent of the decline of the crime rate in New
York City.
The social influence conception of deterrence also does not
withstand scrutiny at the theoretic level. The theory relies on a
traditional sociological approach that does not sufficiently question
the categories underlying the sociological analysis, or the relation
ship between its prescriptions and those categories. The theory's
approach is similar to that of Emile Durkheim,25 but ignores, I ar
gue, some of the most insightful intellectual developments of the
twentieth century. As a result, the set of policies emerging along
23. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 369.
24. See 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 11 (containing articles discussing de
clining crime rate); Butterfield, supra note 11 (reporting on the conference). As a recent
cover story in U.S. News & World Report acknowledges, "the national causes of the improve
ment remain mysterious." Witkin, supra note 7, at 28. The cover story rehearses the differ
ent explanations that have been offered for the national decline in crime - the economy,
crime prevention programs, decline in battered wives, increased prison populations, new po
licing strategies - and ultimately argues that the decline in crack use is the leading factor
contributing to the national decline. See also Geoffrey A. Campbell, Putting a Crimp in
Crime: Experts Differ Over Reasons for Falling Rates of Serious Offenses, A.B.A. J., May
1997, at 24.
25. The strong resemblance between the social influence conception of deterrence and
Durkheim's sociology is by no means accidental. Social norm proponents explicitly trace the
notion of constructivism that underlies social meaning to modern social theory and the work
of Emile Durkheim. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 16, at 949. (Lessig appends the following
footnote: "It is constructivism that defines modern social theory." Id. at 949 n.19. The foot
note continues, "Emile Durkheim is one start: '[S]ocial reality is constructed by the opera
tion of the society itself. . . . Social facts are the product of the group life of the total
operation of a society.'" Id. (quoting Jos EPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, CRAFT AND
CONSCIOUSNESS 157 (1973) (alteration in original))). See also Kahan, supra note 18, at 59496 (discussing the expressive dimension of punishment which explicitly traces back to the
work of Emile Durkheim).
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the new path of deterrence are too limited. The policies do not
sufficiently challenge our narrow way of conceptualizing crime.
Running through the social influence explanation and the bro
ken windows theory is a recurrent and pervasive dichotomy be
tween, what we could call in vulgar terms, honest people and the
disorderly; between "committed law-abiders"26 and "individuals
who are otherwise inclined to engage in crime";27 between "families
who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confi
dently frown on unwanted intruders"28 and "disreputable or ob
streperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts,
rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed."29
Hand-in-hand with this set of categories is another ubiquitous di
chotomy between order and disorder; between "norms of orderli
ness "30 and "[p ]ublic drunkenness, prostitution, aggressive
panhandling and similar behavior";31 between a "stable neighbor
hood"32 and "an inhospitable and frightening jungle."33
The social influence conception of deterrence is grounded on
these categories. The mechanisms of social influence assume these
fixed identities because disorder operates on honest people and on
the disorderly in

different ways.

Neighborhood disorder influences

honest people to move out of the neighborhood or to lock them
selves in their homes, but it influences the disorderly and especially
criminals to move into the neighborhood and commit crimes.
These categories, however, do not have a pre-existent fixed real
ity, independent of the techniques of punishment implemented by
the quality-of-life initiative. In other words, they do not pre-date
the policing strategy. To the contrary, the category of the disor
derly is itself a reality produced by the method of policing. It is a
reality shaped by the policy of aggressive misdemeanor arrests. It is
the product of a technique of punishment that combines several dif
ferent historical modalities, including classical strategies of exces
sive force and modem disciplinary mechanisms like surveillance
and spatial control. Michel Foucault's study,
26. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 371.
27. Id. at 371.

28. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 31.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 371.
31. Id. at 370.
32. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 31.
33. Id. at 31-32.

Discipline and Pun-
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ish, 34 details these techniques of punishment, and it is there, I sug
gest, that we should turn to overcome the problems with the
Durkheimian approach - first, by rehearsing Foucault's analysis,
but second, and more importantly, by refining his analysis.
The techniques of punishment that comprise the quality-of-life
initiative create the disorderly person as an object of suspicion, sur
veillance, control, relocation, micromanagement, and arrest. Ac
cording to the unwritten rules of a Newark police officer enforcing
order, "[d]runks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not
lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at the main
intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to, bothering,
or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbid
den."35 The fine art of policing creates the disorderly as a person
with a full biography of habits, inclinations and desires. It simulta
neously creates the disorderly as an object of surveillance and
control.
The disorderly is closely analogous to the delinquent, in Fou
cault's work, the end product of the penitentiary system. But the
disorderly also differs in important ways from the delinquent. He is
not coddled, he is not reformed, he is not part of the psychothera
peutic project of rehabilitation. The disorderly is, instead, watched,
controlled, relocated, and, ideally, excluded from the neighbor
hood. The disciplinary techniques captured by the quality-of-life
initiative operate on an axis of order and disorder, rather than on
the axis of psychotherapeutic rehabilitation.
Order-maintenance policing helps create the category of the dis
orderly and this, in turn, facilitates the very policy of aggressive ar
rests for minor disorderly conduct. Once the category is in place,
there is little else to do but crack down on the disorderly. Who in
their right mind, after all, would side with people who urinate in the
street, break windows, aggressively accost passers-by, or vandalize
other people's property? The category triggers an aggressive re
sponse, even absent evidence supporting the broken windows
theory.
At the same time, the category overshadows the numerous costs
associated with the new policing strategy. Order maintenance in
New York City has been achieved, in large part, by means of a fifty
percent increase in misdemeanor arrests - up from 133,446 in 1993
34. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979) (transla
tion of MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR (1975)).
35. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 30.
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to 205,277 in 1996.36 Those arrests can be quite an ordeal: being
arrested, handcuffed, transported, booked, often strip-searched,
and spending the night in jail is an experience that many of us, read
ers of this Article, have had the good fortune to avoid.37 The
quality-of-life initiative has been accompanied by a significant in
crease in the number of complaints of police brutality. The Civilian
Complaint Review Board in New York City received 5,550 and
4,816 complaints of police brutality for 1996 and 1997, respectively,
up from 3,580 complaints in 1993.38 Moreover, a law enforcement
strategy that emphasizes misdemeanor arrests has a disproportion
ate effect on minorities - not necessarily in relation to the racial
composition of misdemeanor offenders but simply in relation to the
racial composition of the community. The brute fact is that the de

cision to arrest for misdemeanors results in the arrest of many mi
norities. In cities in the United States, for example, 46.4% of
persons arrested for vagrancy and 58.7% of persons arrested for
suspicion in 1995 were black although the population inside metro
politan areas was approximately 13% African-American.39 Order
maintenance policing may also delegate the power to define order
and disorder to police officers and designated community members
in a manner inconsistent with our conception of democratic theory
or constitutional principles. And the costs of arrest and prosecution
of minor misdemeanor offenses may add up to a considerable in
vestment.40 These are some aspects of order-maintenance policing
that are not being heard in today's euphoria, in large part because
of the category of the disorderly underlying the social influence
conception of deterrence. They suggest that a much stronger em
pirical showing is needed before we proceed down the new path of
deterrence.
36. See Letter from Michael Farrell, Deputy Commissioner, New York Police Depart
ment, to Jenna Karadbil (Apr. 13, 1998) (on file with author).
37. The ordeal of arrest has been described in Cooper, supra note 11; Lipsyte, supra note
11; Purdy, supra note 11; Sontag & Barry, supra note 11.
38. See Fax from Sherman Jackson of the CCRB to Author (June 17, 1998) (including
statistics from the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board).
39. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMI
NAL JusTICE STATISTics-1996, at 386 tbl.4.12 [hereinafter SouRCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL Jus
TICE STATISTics-1996] (listing racial breakdown of arrests in all cities, including cities with
less than 10,000 inhabitants, see id., app. 3 at 595); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
CoMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
UNITED STATES, at 7 tbl. 5 [hereinafter 1990 CENsus OF POPULATION] (listing racial break
down inside metropolitan areas, defined as including urbanized areas with a minimum popu
lation of 50,000, see id. at A-8).
40. See Deborah L. Rhode, Who is the Criminal?, NATL. L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at A22.
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I should emphasize at the outset that I am extremely sympa
thetic with the motivation behind the new path of deterrence. Its
primary motive, Kahan explains, is political, not conceptual. "By
focusing on how law can be used to regulate norms, the new deter
rence scholarship can be used to identify morally acceptable and
politically feasible alternatives to the severe punishments that dom
inate contemporary criminal law."41 I share Kahan's motivation.
New York City's quality-of-life initiative, however, does not fulfill
that aspiration.
This Article is part of a larger project, a project with at least
three important goals. The first is to explore critically the current
application of social norm theory to the criminal law and offer an
alternative to the new path of deterrence. My purpose here is not
to critique social norm theory

tout court.

That would be a much

larger enterprise. Instead, my more limited goal is to critique the
specific application of social norm theory to the criminal law that
characterizes the new path of deterrence.42 My second goal is to
integrate social and political theory into the discussion of public
policy. One of the great contributions of social norm proponents
has been to integrate sociology into the public policy discussion of
crime. What is still missing is a discussion of the theory underlying
that sociology. Kahan's sociology, in my opinion, is not adequately
theorized, and this accounts for the dissonance between his desire
to find alternative policies to incarceration and his endorsement of
41.
42.

Kahan,

New Path, supra note 12, at 2478.

I should say, in this context, that I have agonized over the question of whether to
refer to Kahan as a "social norm proponent" and thereby to group him together with
Lawrence Lessig, Robert Ellickson, and others. On occasion, I have been tempted to sug
gest, instead, that Kahan's writings on order-maintenance policing are simply at odds with
social norm theory - that Kahan misappropriates the theory of social meaning by turning
societal order into a natural, or necessary, or uncontested social understanding. As Law
rence Lessig has written, "The more they appear natural, or necessary, or uncontested, or
invisible, the more powerful or unavoidable or natural social meanings drawn from them
appear to be." Lessig, supra note 16, at 960-61. I have been tempted, at times, to argue that
social norm theorists, such as Lessig, would reject Kahan's argument about order-mainte
nance policing because it fails to appreciate the contingent and constructed nature of societal
order, as well as the way in which the social meanings associated with societal order construct
the population into law abiders and criminals, thereby naturalizing order-maintenance polic
ing. But, for better or worse, I have resisted that temptation. I am not prepared to impute to
Lessig or others, without a text, any opposition to the quality-of-life initiative and its policy of
aggressive misdemeanor arrests. See id. at 1039-40 (Lessig discusses one aspect of the qual·
ity-of-life initiative to illustrate a change in social meaning. He does not, however, indicate
one way or the other whether he supports that specific regulation of social meaning.) For
that reason, I have instead respected the self-identified boundaries of the social norm move
ment and interpreted Kahan as applying social norm theory to the criminal law. Thus, I am
not arguing here that Kahan is unfaithful to social norm theory. Nor am I critiquing social
norm theory writ large. I am, instead, addressing the narrower issue of Kahan's application
of social norm theory to crime and punishment. In other words, I am addressing the social
influence conception of deterrence.
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a straightforward policy of aggressive misdemeanor arrests and de
tention - between his aspiration to use social norms to regulate
criminal behavior and his endorsement of police enforcement of
misdemeanor laws. This Article seeks to remedy that deficiency by
initiating a debate on the underlying social and political theory and
relating that debate to concrete public policies. Third, this Article
seeks to deploy constructively the writings of Michel Foucault. I
suggest that he offers the most perceptive critique of Durkheim and
a path to reconstruct public policy. Foucault's work is often vilified
in the legal academy because of its association with the moment of
deconstruction. This Article is a corrective. I propose here a read
ing of Foucault that affirmatively helps to transcend the limitations
of the new path of deterrence. It is Foucault's critique of the socio
logical approach underlying the social influence conception of de
terrence that exposes its limits and paves the way for a thicker
concept of the subject. With this thicker concept, I propose an al
ternative approach to thinking about criminality and I suggest spe
cific policy implications. My last goal, then, is to deploy Foucault
for a positive public policy agenda.
l.

0RDER-MA1NTENANCE POLICING: A CRITICAL DESCRIPTION

A.

Background

Order-maintenance policing is a law-enforcement strategy that
seeks to create public order by aggressively enforcing laws against
public drunkenness, loitering, vandalism, littering, public urination,
panhandling, prostitution, and other minor misdemeanors. It is one
variation of community policing,43 a variation that emphasizes po43. "Community policing," at its most abstract or general level, stands for the idea that
police officers can prevent crimes by integrating themselves into the community, rather than
by merely responding to emergency calls. Community policing comes in a number of differ
ent variations, ranging from the type of order-maintenance policing that emphasizes arrest
(discussed in this Article) to the style of community policing that withholds enforcement as a
way to build community contacts. See WESLEY SKOGAN, CoMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO
STYLE (1997); Jonathan Big, Eyes on the Street: Community Policing in Chicago, 29 AMEru.
CAN PROSPECT 60 (Nov.-Dec. 1996). Community policing writ large has revolutionized polic
ing both in the United States and abroad over the past fifteen years. In a recent National
Institute of Justice survey of police departments, more than 80% of police chiefs polled
stated that they were either implementing or intended to implement some aspect of commu
nity policing. See TODD McEWEN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JusTicE, NATIONAL AssESs
MENT PROGRAM: 1994 SURVEY RESULTS 27 (1995); see also Sean P. Murphy, Community
Policing Gaining Popularity, BosroN GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1992, at 1 7. The popularity and suc
cess of community policing is attributable, in part, to the vagueness of the definition. Not all
experiments with community policing, however, have met with equal success. See Wesley G.
Skogan, The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents, in THE CHALLENGE
OF COMMUNITY POLICING 180 (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994) ("There are ample examples
of failed experiments and cities where the concept has gone awry.").
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lice presence and arrests. Order-maintenance policing traces its ori
gins to the broken windows theory, first articulated in James
Wilson and George L. Kelling's article, Broken
peared in the

Atlantic Monthly

Windows,

Q.

which ap

in 1982.44 The hypothesis of the

broken windows theory is that minor disorder in a neighborhood, if
left unchecked, will result in increased serious crime, and, there
fore, that eliminating minor disorder will have a deterrent effect on
major crime.
Order-maintenance policing has been implemented in New
York City during the administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
and has come to be known as "the quality-of-life initiative." It is a
policy of zero tolerance toward minor misdemeanor offenses, or
what are called "quality-of-life crimes." Former New York City Po
lice Commissioner William Bratton, the principal architect of the
quality-of-life initiative, cites the

Broken Windows

article as the

main source of his ideas.4s
Order-maintenance policing is also one of the principal policy
recommendations emerging along the new path of deterrence.46
Social norm proponents specifically endorse New York City's
quality-of-life initiative as a successful illustration of order-mainte
nance policing.47 According to Dan Kahan, the success of New
York City's strategy can be explained in terms of the social influ
ence conception of deterrence. Kahan relies heavily on the broken
windows theory,48 suggesting that it is social influence in action.49
B.
The

The

Broken Windows

Broken Windows

Essay

essay is premised on the idea that "disor

der and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of develop44. Wiison & Kelling, supra note 2.
45. See William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of
Quality -of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & PoLY. 447 (1995); see also Cullen, supra note 3, at 12; Fred
Kaplan, Looks Count, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1997, at El.
46. See, e.g., Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2488; Kahan, Social Influence, supra note
12, at 368-73; see also Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1173, 1200 -02, 1247-48 (arguing that a city's

best approach to dealing with panhandlers and skid rows is to have an informal zoning sys
tem that is informally enforced by the police - "that is, to employ trustworthy police officers
and to give them significant discretion" -in effect, similar to the quality-of-life initiative); cf.
Livingston, supra note 16, at 581-91 (advocating implicitly measures to manage police discre
tion in the context of the quality-of-life initiative).
4 7. See, e.g., Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2488; Kahan, Social Influence, supra note
12, at 368-73.
48. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 368-73. Other social norm proponents
also rely extensively on the broken windows theory. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 16, at
1171-73, 1177-79, 1182; Livingston, supra note 16, at 581-91.
49. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 369.
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mental sequence."50

According to Wilson and Kelling, minor

disorders (like littering, loitering, public drinking, panhandling, and
prostitution) if tolerated, produce an environment that is likely to
attract crime. They signal to potential criminals that delinquent be
havior will not be reported or controlled - that no one is in charge.
One broken window, left unrepaired, invites other broken windows.
These progressively break down community standards, leaving the
community vulnerable to crime.
In the essay, disorder breeds crime in a highly scripted manner:
A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind
each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders
can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable
and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds
grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children;
the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out,
unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the comer
store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur.
Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in
time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off.
Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.
At this point it is not inevitable that serious crime will flourish or
violent attacks on strangers will occur. But many residents will think
that crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, and they will mod
ify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and
when on the streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving with
averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps....
Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not
inevitable, it is more likely that here . . . drugs will change hands,
prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks will
be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prostitutes' customers
will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps violently.51

This script privileges order over disorder and this hierarchy is
refracted throughout the essay. A typical community, for instance,
is composed of citizens or "decent folk" on the one hand, and
criminals and "disorderly people" on the other.52 The disorderly
people include "disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable peo
ple: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loi
terers, the mentally disturbed."53 They are closely associated with
vices, like drinking, prostitution, littering, and begging: the "ill
smelling drunk" or the "importuning beggar."54 They are also often

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Wtlson & Kelling, supra note
Id. at 31-32.
See id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 34.

2,

at 31.
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associated with youth: the rowdy children, the fighting teenagers,
the "unattached adults."55
This opposition of orderly and disorderly people cuts across a
further, pervasive insider-outsider dichotomy, in effect producing
two categories of troublemakers, the disorderly insiders, who need
to be controlled, and the disorderly outsiders, who need to be ex
cluded. Schematically, the essay can be represented as follows:

ORDERED
DISORDERED

REGULARS

ST RANGERS

decent folk
drunks and derelicts

criminals

visitors

According to the essay, it is "outsiders"56 or "strangers"57 who
commit crimes. "Regulars,"58 on the other hand, tend not to cause
real problems. So, for instance, the essay recounts the views of a
patrol officer, fictitiously named Kelly, who is assigned a beat in
downtown Newark in a controlled experiment regarding commu
nity policing:
The people were made up of "regulars" and "strangers." Regulars
included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were
always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, stran
gers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer
- call him Kelly - knew who the regulars were, and they knew him.
As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make
certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but
widely understood rules. Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops,
but could not lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at
the main intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to,
bothering, or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly
forbidden. If a dispute erupted between a businessman and a cus
tomer, the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the cus
tomer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, Kelly would ask him if he
had any means of support and what his business was; if he gave unsat
isfactory answers, he was sent on his way.59

Kelly's task, as he saw it, was to regulate the disorderly regulars and
exclude the disorderly strangers.
The insider-outsider dichotomy is also reflected by the recurring
notion of "criminal invasion,"60 reinforcing the idea that crime
comes from outside the community. The essay manages to sustain
·

55.
56.
5 7.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3 2.
at 36.
at 30.

at 3 2-33.
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this fiction by excluding delinquents. The insider_ teenager, for in
stance,who lives in a housing project and becomes. a gang member,
simply loses his insider status. Though he may continue to live in
the projects,he is no longer a "project resident,"no k>nger a "citi
zen," and no longer has a legitimate voice. 1
6 He no longer has a
claim to membership in the community - especially in the face of
competing claims by orderly residents who are struggling to "reas
sert control over [their] turf. "2
6

Broken Windows is premised, then,on a number of shared un
derstandings about the privilege of order over disorder,and insider
over outsider; about the likelihood of criminal invasion in disor
derly neighborhoods; and about the suspicious nature of the unat
tached adult. It is premised on categorical distinctions between
disorderly people and law abiders. It reflects an aesthetic of order
liness,cleanliness,and sobriety. And,on the basis of these catego
ries, it weaves a theory of deterrence.

The message is clear:

fighting disorder will deter serious crime.
C.

The Social Influence Conception of Deterrence

The social influence conception of deterrence owes a lot to the
broken windows theory. It borrows much of the sociological expla
nation. It also adopts the underlying categories of the disorderly
and law abiders,and of order and disorder. To fully appreciate this,
however, it is worth reviewing the social influence conception of
deterrence in slow motion, so that all of its terms - social norm,
social meaning, social influence, social construction - do not run
into each other. Kahan writes that "[t]he effect of disorder on
crime can be understood in terms of the effect that
has on the mechanisms of

social influence.

social meaning

"3
6 Let's take this frame

by frame.

1.

Social Meaning

The social meaning in question is the meaning of order and dis
order. Order means that the community cares abo11t its neighbor
hood and is prepared to enforce norms of orderliness. The
corollary is that disorder means no one cares. So, for instance,
Kahan writes that "[ d]isorder is . .. pregnant with meaning: Public

61. See id. at 35.
62. Id. at 33. "What the police in fact do," the essay reads, "is chase known gang mem
bers out of the project." Id. at 35. The authors do the same when they exclude gang mem
bers from the category of "project residents."
63. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 370 (emphasis added).
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drunkenness, prostitution, aggressive panhandling and similar be
havior signal...that the community is unable or umvilling to en
force basic norms."64
Social norm proponents suggest that "[s]ome social meanings
are constructed. "65 Those that are,are socially constructed through
the interrelationship of action and context -the context being cer
tain expectations or understandings that are often un questioned.
Social meanings are "the frameworks of understanding v\ ithin
which individuals live;a way to describe what they takeor under
standvarious actions,or inactions,or statuses to be; and a way to
understand how the understandings change. "66 When these under
standings are uncontested, the related social meanings ac quire
more power and appear unavoidable.67
2.

Social Influence

Social meanings can have social influence, which is to say that
they can influence the behavior of individuals in society. In the
broken windows context,the social meaning of disorder influences
the disorderly to commit crimes and law abiders to leave the neigh
borhood. Conversely, the social meaning of order influences the
disorderly not to follow their inclination to commit crime and law
abiders to walk more freely in the streets at night. It is in this sense
that Kahan writes, "Visible disorder ... tellsindividuals that their
own forbearance is unlikely to be reciprocated.... The meaningof
disorder can also influencethe behavior of committed law-abiders
in a way that is likely to increase crime."68 Conversely, Kahan ex
plains that "[w]hen citizens obey norms of orderliness -and when
authorities visibly respond to those who don't -onlookers see that
the community is intolerant of criminality. This message counter
acts the inferences that point social influence in the direction of
crime."69
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Lessig, supra note 16, at 949; see also id. at 949 n.19.
66. Id. at 952 (emphasis omitted). Social meaning is somewhat similar, then, to what
Clifford Geertz refers to as culture - the code through which we interpret each others'
actions. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Cul
ture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 10-13 {1973).
67. "When these understandings or expectations become uncontested and invisible, social
meanings derived from them appear natural, or necessary. The more they appear natural, or
necessary, or uncontested, or invisible, the more powerful or unavoidable or natural social
meanings drawn from them appear to be." Lessig, supra note 16, at 960-61 (internal citations
omitted).
68. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 371 (emphasis added and omitted).
69. Id.
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Social Norms

To take advantage of social influence,the social norm of orderli
ness has to be enhanced. The idea is, as the previous passage sug
gests, that social influence may sway citizens to "obey norms of
orderliness. "70 The norm of orderliness operates through social
meaning to influence the kind of good behavior on the part of dis
orderly and honest people that will reduce crime. Social influence
then has a feedback effect on social norms,influencing people to
act in a more orderly manner. In this way,changing a social mean
ing may change social norms.
Lawrence Lessig illustrates this point in his discussion of New
York City's various approaches to panhandling. D uring the late
1980s and early 1990s,the city sought to ban panhandling by pass
ing a law prohibiting loitering for the purpose of begging.71 That
law was struck down by the federal courts under the First Amend
ment and, as a result,was not given the chance to change the social
meaning associated with giving to panhandlers.72 The transit au
thority then took a different tack and,through an advertising cam
paign,communicated to passengers that it was wrong to give money
to panhandlers because it made them less likely to go seek help.
That campaign, Lessig reports, was effective and succeeded in
changing the social meaning associated with giving to beggars.
Lessig writes:
Before the Transit Authority started this poster campaign, the refusal
of a passenger to give any money to a panhandler had a relatively
unambiguous meaning - identifying the passenger as coldhearted, or
cheap, or uncaring. Thus, the refusal to give was costly for the pas
senger. But the Authority's poster campaign ambiguated this mean
ing. Now, the refusal could either be because the passenger is cold
hearted, etc., or because the passenger is concerned to do what is best
for the panhandler. What is best for the panhandler is for the passen
ger to say no to the panhandler. Thus the posters succeeded in mak
ing it less costly for the passeri �er not to give to the panhandler by
ambiguating the social meanin0 of a refusal to give.73
70. Id. ( emphasis added).
71. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1039.
72. This account is somewhat simplified. In fact, there was a ban on panhandling in the
subways. The federal courts upheld that ban, and it continued in effect throughout the pe
riod. See Supreme C'lurt Refuses to Hear Challenge to Anti-Begging Law, N.Y . L.J., Nov. 27,
1990, at 1. Lessig, does recognize this in a footnote. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1040 n.329.
What it suggests, though, is that a full account of the change in social meaning would have to
take into consideration whether it was the prohibition or the education campaign that af
fected the amount of panhandling. This fuller account would have to look at arrest rates for
panhandling in the subways, deployment of police force in the subways and the effect of that
deployment on the behavior of subway riders.
73. Lessig, supra note 16, at 1040.
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By changing the social meaning (through ambiguation), the transit
authority attempted to change the patterns of giving to panhandlers
and thereby reduce the number of panhandlers.74
The relationship between social meaning, social influence and
social norms is illustrated in the following :figure:
FIGURE 1 :

THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE CONCEPTION O F DETERRENCE

orderliness

+--

social nonn

--

honest persons feel safe &
criminals don't commit crimes

social influence

social meaning

�

community is in control &
criminals are in check

In

the context of order-maintenance policing, this suggests that,

by encouraging the social norm of orderliness, major crime may de
cline because (a) the social meaning of orderliness is that the disor
derly cannot get away with crime and (b) this social meaning will
favorably influence the behavior of the disorderly and law abiders.
According to Kahan, this is the best explanation for the success of
New York City's quality-of-life initiative.
II.

THE LACK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE

The broken windows theory and the social influence conception
of deterrence - the two theoretic justifications underlying order
maintenance policing and, more specifically, the quality-of-life initi
ative - rest on a claim of deterrence. The theories suggest that, by
eliminating minor misdemeanors and disorderly behavior, a neigh
borhood can deter serious crime.

Claims of deterrence are, of

course, empirical in nature. P roponents of order-maintenance po
licing principally deploy two arguments in support of the deterrence
claim. The :first is Wesley Skogan's study,

Disorder and Decline:

74. In conversation, Toni Massaro suggested, correctly I believe, that the social meaning
was always ambiguous, as evidenced by the fact that few people gave money before the me
dia campaign anyway.
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Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods.75
Kahan relies heavily on Skogan's study, arguing that it "supplies
empirical support for the 'broken windows' hypothesis."76 George
Kelling, the co-author of Broken Windows and Fixing Broken Win
dows, similarly states that Skogan "empirically verif[ied] the 'Bro
ken Windows' hypotheses."77 According to Kelling, Skogan
demonstrated "a direct link between disorder and crime: in other
words, 'disorder and crime problems go together in a substantial
way.' "78 The second argument in support of the deterrent effect is
that crime in New York City has declined at a far greater pace than
most anywhere else in the country, and, therefore, that the differ
ence must be attributable to the new policing strategy. "The forces
conventionally assumed to drive crime rates don't explain much,"
Kahan argues. "What has changed significantly is New York's law
enforcement strategy."79 Neither of these two arguments, however,
is persuasive. Skogan's study does not verify the broken windows
hypothesis, and the causes of the decline in crime in New York City
are far too contested to lend themselves to such simplistic analysis.
A.

Replicating Skogan's Study

Working with Skogan's data, which is available through the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at
the University of Michigan, I was able to assess his data and repli
cate his analysis.80 I found that his data do not support the claim
that crime is related to disorder. The data in fact suggest that cer
tain crimes, like purse snatching, pocket-picking, and rape are not
related to disorder at all. Certain crimes, like physical assault and
burglary, are significantly related to disorder; however, the statisti
cal relationship vanishes when neighborhood poverty, stability, and
race are taken into account. Finally, robbery is also significantly
75. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE supra note 9, at 75; Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder
and Community Decline in Forty Neighborhoods of the United States, 1977-1983, in lNTER
UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR PoL AND Soc. REs. (ICPSR No. 8944) (1988) [hereinafter
lCPSR Codebook]; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22.
76. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 369. See also Kahan, New Path, supra note
.

12, at 2488 & n.62.
77. KELLING & CoLES, supra note 10, at 24.
78. Id. at 25.
79. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 368.
80. I thank and commend Wesley Skogan for making his data publicly available through
the ICPSR, without which it would be nearly impossible to replicate his work. See Wesley G.
Skogan, Disorder and Community Decline in Forty Neighborhoods of the United States, 19771983 (last modified Apr. 20, 1998) <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi/ab.prl?file=8944> [herein
after Skogan's Data].
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related to disorder, but that statistical relationship disappears when
the five Newark obserirations are set aside and the same explana
tory variables are held constant. Overall, my reservations about the
data set and certain design decisions undermine my confidence in
Skogan's conclusions.
1.

Skogan's Study: Method and Findings

On the basis of data collected in five separate studies between
1977 and 1983, Skogan found,

inter alia,

that neighborhood disorder

had a statistically significant relationship with the level of neighbor
hood robbery victimization.

Skogan discusses and verifies a

number of other hypotheses in his work - for instance, that there
is a link between disorder and fear of crime victimization81 as well
as a link between disorder and perception of crime problems82 but in this Article I will treat exclusively the disorder-crime nexus.
Skogan's data come from five previously existing studies, which
Skogan aggregates and merges to produce neighborhood-level data
of disorder, crime levels, and socioeconomic factors.83 The five ex
isting data sets consist of 13,000 personal and telephone interviews
conducted between 1977 and 1983.84 The respondents were resi
dents of forty different neighborhoods in the following six cities:
Chicago, Newark, Houston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and
Atlanta. The respondents were selected at random, using random
digit-dialing telephone techniques for the telephone interviews and
random selection from address lists for the personal interviews. 85
Skogan performs two analyses to assess the disorder-crime
nexus. First, he regresses the rate of robbery victimization on the
level of disorder. Second, he regresses the rate of robbery victimi81. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 77. Skogan acknowledges,
however, that fear of crime is more strongly correlated with crime than with disorder and
that, when levels of crime are controlled for, "the relationship between disorder and fear no
longer is significant." Id. at 77.
8 2. See id. at 74. Skogan also argues that this "document[s] that disorder and crime
problems go together in a substantial way." Id. The reliability of this finding and the validity
of the conclusion are somewhat questionable given that the data for both variables were
obtained by interviewing the same people. The same residents were asked if there is disorder
in their neighborhood and if they perceive that there is a crime problem in their neighbor
hood. It seems, though, that residents who believe there is a crime problem in their neigh
borhood will also perceive their neighborhood as disorderly. Perception of crime problems
and disorder seem to go hand-in-hand. The fact that there is a strong correlation may be due
to the fact that the data were collected from the same individuals.
83. See Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 8.
84. See id. at 6, 9 7.
85. See SKoGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 190; Skogan, Fmal Report,
supra note 22, at 99 fig.25 (listing random-digit-dialing for at least two of three phone inter
view surveys).
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zation on the level of disorder taking into account the level of pov
erty, residential stability, and the racial composition of the
neighborhoods.
a.

The Disorder-Robbery Regression Analysis

With regard to the simple regression of robbery victimization on
the level of disorder, Skogan finds that "levels of crime victimiza
tion were strongly related (+.80) to levels of disorder in the 30 areas
for which robbery victimization was measured."86 Skogan does not
report his coefficients, but does include a graph showing the regres
sion line running through the observations on a scatter-plot (x-axis
level of disorder; y-axis percent victims of robbery).87 The scatter
plot communicates a positive relationship between disorder and
robbery victimization.
b.

The Other-Explanatory-Variables Analysis

Skogan then conducts further analysis to take into account the
effect of neighborhood poverty, stability, and race. The measures
of poverty and stability are indices composed of weighted factors
like average length of residence, percent rental dwellings, and per
cent incomes over $20,000.88 Race is measured by the variable cor
responding to respondents' answers about their race, and reflects
the percentage of minorities in the community.89 Skogan finds that
the correlation between robbery victimization and disorder remains
high (+.54) even when these three other explanatory variables are
taken into account.9o
c.

Skogan's Conclusion

Skogan prefaces his findings with a significant caveat. In effect,
he begins by saying that the data shed little light on the causal rela
tionship. He writes:
Ironically, the data from the 40 neighborhoods cannot shed a great
deal of light on the details of the relationship between disorder and
crime, for the measures all go together very strongly. With only 40

86. Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 53; see also SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 73.
87. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 74 fig.4-2. I replicate and
reproduce this scatter-plot infra.
88. See id. at 192 tbl.A-3-1; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 22 fig.4.
89. See ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 14; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at
25-29.
90. See SKoGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 73-74; Skogan, Fmal Report,
supra note 22, at 53.
·
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cases to untangle this web, the high correlation between measures of
victimization, ratings of crime problems, and disorder make it difficult
to tell whether they have either separate "causes" or separate "ef
fects" at the area leveI.91

But, in response to the broad question "Does Disorder Cause
Crime?, " Skogan ultimately concludes: "These data support the
proposition that disorder needs to be taken seriously in research on
neighborhood crime, and that both directly and through crime it
plays an important role in neighborhood decline. 'Broken win
dows' do need to be repaired quickly."92
Despite his initial caveat, then, Skogan asserts that there is a
causal relationship between levels of neighborhood disorder and
rates of crime, and so concludes:
The evidence suggests that poverty, instability, and the racial compo
sition of neighborhoods are strongly linked to area crime, but a sub
stantial portion of that linkage is through disorder: their link to area
crime virtually disappears when disorder is brought into the picture.
This too is consistent with Wilson and Kelling's original proposition,
and further evidence that direct action against disorder could have
substantial payoffs.93

Not surprisingly, Skogan's study has been consistently interpreted
by the order-maintenance proponents as establishing the disorder
crime nexus.
2.

Skogan's Findings: A Replication

Before turning to a critique of Skogan's study, I will first set
forth his :findings in greater detail. In order to do this, it is neces
sary to replicate the study because Skogan does not provide most of
the quantities of interest in either the more technical Final Report
or in his book Disorder and Decline.94
a.

The Disorder-Robbery Regression

Although Skogan does not share his regression coefficients or
standard errors, it is possible to estimate them by replication, and
verify them by comparing the scatter-plot that he published in Dis
order and Decline (Figure 4-2 at page 74) with the one that I obtain
using his data. The scatter-plot that I obtain is, in all pertinent re91. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 73; see also Skogan, Final Report,
supra note 22, at 49.
92. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 75; see also Skogan, Final Report,
supra note 22, at 53 {finding "a strong tendency for crime and disorder to 'go together"').
93. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 75.
94. See Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 52-53; SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE,
supra note 9, at 73-75.
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spects, identical to Skogan's Figure 4-2.95 The replicated graph is
reproduced below:
FIGURE 2:
REPLICATION OF SK OGAN'S FIGURE 4-2
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Given that the scatter-plots are identical, I am comfortable us
ing my replication to estimate the coefficients and standard errors
of Skogan's analysis. What the regression reveals is that, for every
one unit i ncrease in the level of disorder (where a unit is one of
three unit measures of the level of disorder felt by the respondents
(discussed below)), the proportion of victims of robbery in the
neighborhood can be expected to increase by .05 (five percent) on
average, with a standard error of plus or minus 0.007. The ninety
five percent confidence interval has, as a result, a small range,with
a lower bound of 0.036 and an upper bound of 0.066. The p-value
(which is the probability of observing a t-statistic of 6.953, assuming
that the null hypothesis is true) is extremely small in this case less than 0.001 - which means that it is extremely unlikely that
95. There are only two differences: first, I have labeled the y-axis "Proportion Victims of
Robbery," rather than "Percent Victims of Robbery," as Skogan does on his Figure 4-2.
"Proportion" seems more accurate since the robbery victimization variable in the data is
measured by the proportion of respondents that answered "yes." ICPSR Codebook, supra
note 74, at 13. Thus, in the data, the values of robbery victimization range from 0 to 0.07 (or
0 to 7%) for the neighborhoods surveyed, not from 0 to 0.07 of 1 % as Figure 4-2 might
suggest. Second, I use letters in the graph for abbreviations of the neighborhood locations by
city (A for Atlanta, C for Chicago, H for Houston, and N for Newark).
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there is no statistical relationship. As a result, we can conclude
from this that there is a near-zero probability that an estimate of .05
could have arisen by chance alone if there truly were no linear rela
tionship between Skogan's variables for disorder and crime.96
b.

The Other-Explanatory-Variables Analysis

Skogan's second analysis takes account of the level of poverty,
stability and racial composition of the neighborhoods. In this case,
Skogan did publish his coefficients and levels of significance, and I
have been able to substantially reproduce them.97 Skogan's and my
results compare:
TABLE 1: REPLICATION OF SKOGAN's TABLE A-4-1:
ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION
Skogan
Measure
Poverty Score
Stability Score
Percent Minority
Disorder

Replication

Standardized
Coefficient

Significance

Coefficient

Standardized
Coefficient

Significance

.05
-.04
.23
.58

.78
.82
.20
.008

.00
-.00
.01
.04

.04
-.04
.23
.60

.78
.79
.19
.004

Skogan interprets his results as follows: "The correlation be
tween

residual values

for robbery victimization and disorder, once

the effects of poverty, stability, and racial composition had been
removed statistically from each, was still high (+.54)."98 He con
cludes that "ignoring these demographic factors, there still was
quite a strong tendency for crime and disorder to 'go together.' "99
96. It is important to get a sense of these findings. All of the values for Skogan's index of
neighborhood disorder were located between 1.20 and 2.20 on a 1 to 3 scale - where a score
of 1 would have meant that respondents indicated that disorder was "no problem," a score of
2 would have meant that respondents indicated that disorder was "some problem,'' and a
score of 3 would have meant that respondents indicated that disorder was "a big problem."
See Skogan, Final Report, supra note 22, at 106; ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 6. In
other words, the entire spectrum of observations of neighborhood disorder was located be
tween something slightly more than "no problem" and something slightly more than "some
problem" - a one unit increase in level of disorder. Therefore, what the analysis suggests is
that, going from the lowest observed level of disorder in 30 neighborhoods all the way to the
highest observed level of disorder in those 30 neighborhoods - neighborhoods which inci
dentally were chosen to reflect both disorderly and orderly neighborhoods, both high·crime
and low-crime neighborhoods - the expected increase in the proportion of robbery victimi
zation is on average five percent. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 188
("All of the areas were in the nation's largest cities. They were selected for a variety of
reasons - among them, because they were high or low-crime areas, because programs were
about to be started in them, and because they were stable or undergoing racial transition."),
97. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 193 tbl.A-4-1.
98. Id. at 73.
99. Id. at 74; see also Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 53.
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The replication confirms that Skogan's disorder index remains
statistically significant when multiple regression is conducted with
Skogan's indices for poverty, stability, and race. The replicated re
gression indicates that, holding those three other variables constant,
for every one unit increase in the level of disorder, the proportion
of victims of robbery in the neighborhood can be expected to in
crease by .038 on average (3.8 percent), with a standard error of
plus or minus .012. The ninety-five percent confidence interval has,
as a result, a small range, with a lower bound of .014 and an upper
bound of .062.
3.

The Problems with the Data and Certain Design Decisions

Nevertheless, certain problems with the data and some design
decisions undermine my confidence in Skogan's findings and con
clusions. I will begin with the issue of missing values.
a.

Missing Values

A number of the underlying surveys are missing values for most
of the important variables relating to the disorder-crime nexus. For
instance, the Skogan and Maxfield study from 1981100 - which is
the only study that covers neighborhoods in Philadelphia and San
Francisco - does not have any values for the variables "noise,"
"litter," "trash," "gangs," "public drinking," and "insults," which
are several of the main variables in Skogan's index of physical and
social disorder.101 With a few rare exceptions, missing values actu
ally plague all of the studies and all of the relevant variables to
different degrees, as evidenced in the following table:

100. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MICHAEL G. MAxFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME 91-98 (1981)
101. See Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 18; Skogan's Data, supra note 80.
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T ABLE 2: MISSING VALUES IN SKOGAN'S DATA SET
PHYSICAL DISORDER
number missing
percent missing

noise

abandon

litter

trash

total

20
50

0
0

24
60

16
40

60
37.5

SOCIAL DISORDER
loitering

drugs

vandalism

gangs

public
drinking

insults

total

8
20

6
15

24
60

24
60

24
60

10
25

96
40

number missing
percent missing

CRIME VICTIMIZATION
number missing
percent missing

purse-snatcliing

assault

burglary

robbery

rape

total

24
60

10
25

0
0

10
25

16
40

60
30

As this table reflects, the data are missing values, on average, for
between thirty and forty percent of the variables, which is a high
percent given the small sample size (forty neighborhoods in all).
The more traditional way of dealing with this problem of miss
ing values would be to disregard completely the neighborhoods that
have missing values. But that is not possible with this data set. In
the case of Skogan's indices of physical and social disorder, it is
impossible because there is not one single neighborhood that has all
the values for the relevant variables. As a result, Skogan does not
disregard any neighborhood, but rather constructs his indices "by
summing the component items which were available for each area
and then dividing that sum by the number of available items."102 In
other words, Skogan simply averages the values that are avail
able.103 Aggregation, however, does not resolve the problem of
missing values.

It is equally difficult to disregard the observations where crime
victimization data are missing because it would leave us with only
sixteen neighborhoods - only forty percent of our original small
sample. This, however, is essentially what Skogan does with regard
to victimization, using only the robbery victimization variable and
therefore narrowing his study to just thirty available observa
tions.104 The result is that, at least with regard to the disorder-crime
102. ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 8; see also Skogan, Final Report, supra note 22,
at 108.
103. This decision raises another problem discussed infra section 11.A.3.b.
104. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 73-75; Skogan, Final Report,
supra note 22, at 50-53.
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nexus, Skogan's is a study of only thirty neighborhoods with many
missing values of disorder.
b.

Selecting the Independent Variable

The independent variable that Skogan employs is also problem
atic and may include, in my opinion, elements of the dependent va
riable. Skogan's independent variable is called "disorder" and it is
constructed by averaging two multi-item scales, "social disorder"

and "physical disorder."105 "Social disorder" and "physical disor
der" are both constructed by averaging the values of a number of
variables, each of which corresponds to respondents' answers (on a
scale of one to three) to a question assessing the extent to which a
certain type of disorder is perceived by them as a problem in their
neighborhood.106 The variables included in the two multi-item
scales are the following:

Social Disorder107

Physical Disorderlos

Loitering
Drug Use & Sale
Vandalism
Gang Activity
Public Drinking
Insulting Language

Noise
Abandoned Buildings or Vehicles
Litter
Trash in Vacant Lots

So, for instance, in the case of the variable "litter," respondents
would have been asked to assess the extent to which "garbage or
litter on the streets and sidewalks" is a problem in the neighbor
hood.109 For all of these variables, the possible values range from 1
("no problem"), to 2 ("some problem"), to 3 ("a big problem").11°
The two multi-item scales were constructed "by summing the com
ponent items which were available for each area and then dividing
that sum by the number of available items."111
Using respondents' assessment of drug trafficking or gang activ
ity, however, presents a significant problem given that the depen105. See ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 7-8.
106. See id. at 6-8.
107. See id. at 7. Skogan's treatment of these variables is inconsistent. Compare Skogan,
Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 16 (gangs and insults variables not listed as part of index) with
id. at 107 (gangs and insults variables included in the index). I believe that the ICPSR
Codebook and the Fmal Report at 107 are correct.
108. See ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 8.
109. See id. at 7.
110. See id. at 6.
111. Id. at 8.
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dent variable is supposed to be the level of serious criminal activity.

In effect, the analysis may

be slightly tautological, because some of

these disorderly activities - like drug trafficking or certain gang
activities - would be considered by respondents to be major
crimes in themselves and are likely to trigger responses that assess
the level of crime in the neighborhood. It is important to eliminate,
as much as possible, the overlap between the independent and the
dependent variable.
To be precise, the broken windows theory suggests that minor
disorder, both physical (in the sense of litter and broken windows)
and social (in the sense of minor misdemeanor offenses) is causally
related to serious crime. Therefore, the independent variable (dis
order) should not include - or should minimize as much as possi
ble - serious criminal activity.

Some degree of overlap is

inevitable, given that the respondents may be thinking about crimi
nal activity when they assess, for instance, the problem of aban
doned buildings which today are a symbol of the crack house. It is
crucial, however, to reduce the overlap as much as possible. Ac
cordingly, it would probably be best to eliminate drug trafficking
and gang activity from the independent variable.
A second problem with Skogan's independent variable results
from missing values. Creating the index by simply averaging the
existing values for the set of variables may produce bias. For in
stance, the mean for the variable "noise" is 1 .3. 112 The mean for the
variable "public drinking" is 1.8. 1 13 As a result, neighborhoods for
which there is no value for "noise" may end up having higher values
for the index "disorder" than they would otherwise, whereas neigh
borhoods for which there is no value for "public drinking" may end
up having lower values for the "disorder" index than they would
otherwise. This presents the possibility of potential bias and could
be resolved by standardizing the variables on their means.
Thirdly, Skogan excluded from his indices of disorder four
measures of disorder that were available from the data - these
measures were the variables "smut" (adult movies and bookstores);
"prostitution"; "dogs" ("barking loudly or relieving themselves
near your home"); and "garbage" ("[p]eople not disposing of gar
bage properly or leaving litter around the area").1 14 Skogan com
piled these four

variables under

the heading

112. See Skogan's Data, supra note 80.
113. See id.
114. See ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 6-7.

"Measures of
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Disorder,"but did not include them in his index for two reasons.
First,with regard to the commercial sex variables, Skogan discov
ered that they were independent measures of disorder . Skogan
writes :
At the individual level, reactions to these problems [prostitution and
smut] formed a separate factor in every area in which they were in
cluded. A separate index of the extent of commercial sex problems
was formed, but - as the status of the items as a separate factor hints
it was correlated only +.18 with the summ ary disorder measure and
was not related to other neighborhood factors in the same fashion as
either social or physical disorder. . . . As a result, this cluster of (very
interesting) problems will not be considered in any detail in this
report.115
-

Second, Skogan suggests that the questions were asked in too few
cases. Neither of these reasons for exc ul ding the commercial sex
variables from the index of disorder is compell ni g . The fact that the
commercial sex variables are independent of the other indices of
disorder is not a reason to ignore those variables. The broken win
dows theory inc ul des prostitution in its conception of disorder. In
fact,the Broken Windowsessay repeatedly refers to prostitutes and
street prostitution -they are an integr alpart of the disorderly and
of disorder. The fact that these very interesting - I wou dl say,
fascinating 116 -findings about commercial sex are at odds with the
broken windows theory is not a reason to discard the variables,par
ticularly when testing the theory's validity. Moreover,the "smut "
and "prostitution " variables contain s xi teen observations each,
which is the same number as, for instance, "litter," "public d rink
ing "or "vandalism." The "dogs "and "garbage "variables are only
missing two more values.117 I therefore would not exc ul de those
va riables .
c. Selecting the Dependent Variable
Another reserva tion conce rns the selection of the dependent va
riable. Skogan is interested ni measu ring the impact of disorder on
crimeand,throughout his book,he claims to be study n
i g the rela115. Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 19.
116. This is a fascinating finding. What Skogan found was that there is an independent
commercial sex factor distinct from social and physical disorder: that these measures of dis
order do not hang together. Using the data, I find that the correlation between prostitution
and robbery victimization is -.10; and that there is no statistically significant relationship (p
value of .712). Smut and robbery victimization are correlated at -.27 and the regression
produces a p-value of .304. This is a fascinating challenge to the broken windows theory and
puts into serious question the essay's emphasis on prostitutes.
117. See Skogan's Data, supra note 80.
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tionship between disorder and

crime. The passage in his book is,
Crime, and Fear. " 11 8 The principal
paragraph is captioned "Disorder and Common Crime. "11 9 The re
peated reference to the statistical findings are to the "crime

after all, entitled "Disorder,

disorder connection " or the "relationship between disorder and
crime."120 Another caption reads "Does Disorder Cause Crime?"121
It would appear from all this that Skogan's study relates to general
crime levels. However, Skogan selects as the dependent variable
only one crime, namely robbery - even though the data contain a
number of other crimes, such as purse snatching, physical assault,
burglary, and sexual assault. This is especially troubling because
robbery victimization, it turns out, is one of the crime victimization
variables with the

highest

relationship to neighborhood disorder,

and, even more importantly, is the

only crime victimization variable

that remains statistically significantly related to disorder when
neighborhood poverty, stability, and race are held constant.
With regard to the crime-disorder regression, robbery, burglary
and physical assault have extremely low p-values, which suggests
that they are statistically significantly related to disorder. Sexual
assault has a very high p-value (0.66), which signifies that in all like
lihood it is not related to disorder; purse-snatching/pocket-picking
appears to be only marginally related to disorder, but in an inverse
relationship, suggesting that, if anything, it might be inversely re
lated to disorder. This is demonstrated in the following table:
TABLE 3; COEFFICIENTS FOR SKOGAN'S INDEX OF DISORDER
AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMES
SKOGAN'S INDEX OF DISORDER
CRIME
Purse snatching
Physical Assault
Burglary

Robbery
Sexual Assault

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-value

-0.025
0.055
0.076
0.051
0.001

0.017
0.014
0.025
0.007
0.003

0.16
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.659

95% Conf. Interval
-0.06
0.027
0.026
0.036
-0.005

0.01
0.083
0.126
0.066
0.008

What is even more troubling, however, is that the statistical rela
tionships regarding physical assault and burglary

vanish if neighbor

hood poverty, stability, and race are held constant.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Robbery

See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 73 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 73-74 (emphasis added).
See id. at 75.
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victimization is the

only

variable that remains related to disorder if

we take socioeconomic factors into account. The coefficients are
reproduced in the following table:
TABLE 4: COEFFICIENTS FOR SKOGAN'S INDEX OF DISORDER
AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMES HOLDING CONSTANT NEIGHBORHOOD
POVERTY, STABILITY, AND RACE

:

SKOGAN'S INDEX OF DISORDER
CRIME
Purse snatching
Physical Assault
Burglary
Robbery
Sexual Assault

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-value

-0.013
0.014
-0.006
O.D38
0.006

0.027
0.019
O.D35
0.012
0.006

0.639
0.459
0.875
0.004
0.341

95% Conf. Interval
-0.072
-0.025
-0.078
0.014
-0.007

0.046
0.054
0.066
0.062
0.019

As this table demonstrates, it would be improper to conclude

from the data that, as a statistical matter, general levels of crime or common crime - and disorder are related. Even setting aside
all the problems with the data set, the data suggest that one particu
may be statistically related to disorder.

lar crime, namely robbery,

Skogan justifies using robbery victimization exclusively as an in
dex of local levels of crime for the following reasons: "methodolog
ical research suggests it is reliably measured; it tends to correspond
better than many other victimization measures with comparable of
ficial crime statistics; aggregate city-level studies indicate it is linked
to fear of crime; and comparable measures of robbery victimization
were included in 30 of the areas surveyed."122 On close scrutiny,
however, these reasons are not entirely persuasive. The reasons, in
part, touch on a hotly contested area in criminology and it is some
what daunting, in this respect, to criticize Skogan given that he is a
recognized expert in the area of victimization surveys. As Gove,
Hughes, and Geerken suggest in their 1985 article, "[t]he person
who has perhaps done the most work with the victimization surveys
is Skogan." 123 Nevertheless, there are reasons to be skeptical of the
arguments.
First, robbery victimization is not the only measure that corre
sponds well with comparable official crime statistics. Burglary does
122. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 195 n.1 (Ch. 4) (internal cita
tions omitted); Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 52 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
123. Walter R. Gove et al., Are Uniform Crime Reports a Valid Indicator of the Index
Crimes? An Affirmative Answer with Minor Qualifications, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 468
(1985).
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too.124 This is generally explained by the fact that the most power

ful predictor of whether a crime is reported to the police appears to
be the seriousness of the offense.125 Second, with regard to rape
and physical assault, victimization surveys substantially underreport
incidences among acquaintances, friends, and relatives,126 and they
therefore measure very different things than the Uniform Crime
Reports.127 But this does not address the cross-jurisdictional relia
bility of victimization surveys for rape or physical assault. The same
biases might affect cross-jurisdictional comparisons of victimization
surveys and of official crime statistics.128 In sum, the issue
presented here is not the comparability of victimization surveys and
official crime statistics, which is what Skogan discusses. The issue is
the comparability of victimization surveys across neighborhoods. It
is the cross-jurisdictional reliability of victimization surveys.129
Moreover, as a technical matter, there are

no missing values for

burglary victimization in the data, whereas there are ten missing
values for robbery - and there are as many missing values for rob
bery as there are for physical assault.130 This would militate in
favor of using burglary as the dependent variable. This is especially
true given that it appears, from the Final Report and the
that the measure of robbery victimization is

not

Codebook,

neighborhood

specific. Whereas the typical purse-snatching question131 and as
sault question132 specifically referred the interviewee to acts com
mitted "in the neighborhood where you live now," and whereas the
typical burglary question is by definition neighborhood specific, the

124. See id. at 479.
125. See id. at 468.
126. See id. at 464-65.
127. See id. at 465.
128. See id. at 466.
129. Skogan's 1981 article, On Attitudes and Behaviors, does not address the cross
jurisdictional reliability of victimization surveys either. See Wesley G. Skogan, On Attitudes
and Behaviors, in REACTIONS TO CRIME 19 (Dan A. Lewis ed., 1981).
130. See Skogan's Data, supra note 80.
131. "During the past year, in the neighborhood where you live now, has anyone picked
your pocket or taken a bag or package directly from you without using force or threatening
you?" ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 13 (emphasis added); Skogan, Fmal Report, supra
note 22, at 115 (emphasis added).
132. "During the past year, in the neighborhood where you live now, has anyone physi
cally attacked you or has anyone threatened or tried to hurt you even though they did not
actually hurt you?" Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 115; ICPSR Codebook, supra
note 75, at 13.
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robbery question133 and the rape question134 apparently did not
specify the location of the attack. In other words, it is possible that
the robbery and rape questions could have been interpreted by the
interviewee as referring to incidents that happened outside their
"
neighborhood. This militates even more in favor or using the bur
glary variable.
Skogan's arguments do not fully address these concems.135 In
my opinion, if we are going to draw conclusions about the effect of
disorder on common crime or general levels of crime, it may be
more conservative to look at each substantive crime for which we
have data and make a more nuanced assessment of the disorder
crime relationship.136
d.

The Newark Effect

As noted above, all of the statistically significant relationships
between disorder and the individual substantive crimes vanish when
neighborhood poverty, stability, and race are held constant, except

robbery.

The only reason robbery remains statistically significant, it

turns out, is Newark. If you look at Skogan's Figure 4-2, you will
notice that the five Newark neighborhoods, in contrast to the other
city neighborhoods, are clustered together.137 If you put your hand
over those five Newark observations and look only at the other
twenty-five neighborhoods, the relationship between disorder and
robbery victimization seems much less obvious. And, in fact, it is.
Holding constant the same three explanatory variables (poverty,
stability, and race), there is no

significant relationship between disor
der and robbery victimization when the five Newark neighborhoods
are excluded. I call this the Newark Effect and it is summarized in
the following table:13s

133. "Since the first of this year, has anyone stolen something directly from you by force
or after threatening you with harm? PLUS: Other than that, has anyone tried to take some
thing from you by force even though they did not get it?" ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75,
at 13; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 115.
134. "Has anyone sexually attacked you, or tried to, since the first of this year?" ICPSR
Codebook, supra note 75, at 13; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 115.
135. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
136. This is, incidentally, what Sampson and Cohen do. See infra note 146 and accompa
nying text. They look at both burglary and robbery and publish their findings about burglary,
even though those findings do not support their position. See Robert Sampson & Jacqueline
Cohen, Deterrent Effects ofthe Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22
L. & SoCY. REv. 163, 175-79 (1988).
137. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 74 fig.4-2.
138. I am indebted to Mike Gottfredson for this insight. Gottfredson eye-balled
Skogan's Figure 4-2 and immediately suggested to me that the correlation likely was almost
entirely due to Newark.
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TABLE 5: THE NEWARK EFFECT: COEFFICIENTS FOR SKOGAN'S
INDEX OF DISORDER AND ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION EXCLUDING
NEWARK NEIGHBORHOODS AND HOLDING POVERTY, STABILITY,
AND RACE CONSTANT
ROBBERY
EXPL. VARIABLES
Disorder
Poverty
Stability
Race

Coef

SE

P-val

95% Conf. Interval

.011
.001
-.002
.014

.025
.003
.003
.008

.670
.741
.517
.109

-.042
-.006
-.008
-.003

.063
.008
.004
.03

In fact, without the Newark neighborhoods, the relationship be
tween robbery victimization and disorder vanishes if race alone is
held constant:
TABLE 6: THE NEWARK EFFECT: COEFFICIENTS FOR SKOGAN'S
INDEX OF DISORDER AND ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION EXCLUDING
NEWARK NEIGHBORHOODS AND HOLDING
ONLY RACE CONSTANT
ROBBERY
EXPL. VARIABLES
Disorder
Race

Coef

SE

P-val

95% Conf. Interval

.02
.015

.017
.007

.256
.056

-.016

-.ODO

.058
.03

As Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate, the statistically significant rela
tionship between disorder and robbery in the data is principally due
to the five Newark neighborhoods that are all clustered together.

In contrast, the other neighborhoods from the three other available
cities (Atlanta, Chicago, and Houston) are pretty well distributed in
the remaining group of observations. What this means is that, when
all five Newark neighborhoods are included in a data set that con
tains only twenty-five other neighborhoods, Newark has a signifi
cant impact on the equation. Is it fair then to exclude the Newark
neighborhoods, given that there are only thirty observations in all?
I think so. Given the small number of observations, it is especially
important to eliminate cases that exert too much influence on the
findings.139 Newark seems to do just that. The point here is that it
is not an individual neighborhood

per se,

but the Newark cluster

139. Skogan recognizes this and writes, in his methodological appendix, that "[t]he small
size of the neighborhood and project-level samples examined here raises the spectre that a
few cases exerted excessive influence on the statistical findings." SKOGAN, DISORDER AND
DECLINE, supra note 9, at 191; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 117. Skogan ran a
number of tests to defend against this problem, see Skogan, Final Report, supra note 22, at

November

1998]

Policing New York Style

325

that excessively influences the results. What would it mean to have
the relationship between disorder and robbery depend entirely on
whether Newark is in or out of the data set? In my opinion, it sug
gests that the neighborhoods in Newark are skewing the results.14o
Alternatively, it may suggest that there is a city effect, rather than a
neighborhood effect, but that would stretch the theory too far. In
the end, it is more conservative to exclude the Newark neighbor
hoods than it is to conclude from this data that disorder and crime
are causally related.141
4.

Making the Best of the Data

I will attempt here to redress some of the design decisions that I
disagree with - at least those that can be corrected - in order to
test the broken windows hypothesis. With regard first to the in
dependent variable, disorder, I propose to create a new multi-item
index of neighborhood disorder that incorporates only those vari

ables that are not serious criminal activities (in other words that are

not part of the dependent variable) . I will therefore exclude the

variables related to drug trafficking and gang activity. I will follow
Skogan's lead and create a corrected index for social disorder and
one for physical disorder and then average the two.142 I will refer
to the new multi-item index as "corrected disorder." In addition, I
will include the four other measures of disorder that were available
from the data but that Skogan omitted from his indices - the first

117-18, but may have focused excessively on single observations rather than city-wide clusters
like Newark.
140. The five Newark neighborhoods have the highest levels of disorder of the thirty
observations. Excluding those five neighborhoods could be interpreted as selecting on the
explanatory variable. That, however, should cause no inference problems. See GARY KING
ET AL., DESIGNING SoCIAL INQUIRY 137 (1994) ("By limiting the range of our key causal
variable, we may limit the generality of our conclusion or the certainty with which we can
legitimately hold it, but we do not introduce bias."). Since the five neighborhoods do not
have the highest levels of robbery victimization, their exclusion does not amount to selecting
on the dependent variable, which in contrast would be problematic. See id. at 129.
141. I have one final reservation - though it is something that could be tested by going
back to the data tapes. The study relies on self- reporting by the same people for the vari
ables of disorder and crime victimization. In other words, the same people were asked to
give their impression of the level of disorder in their neighborhood and to indicate whether
they had been victimized by crime. The question I have is whether this might bias the study.
After all, there is good reason to believe that persons who have been the victim of crime in
their neighborhood are likely to perceive their neighborhood as disorderly. In fact, this is
something that Skogan himself recognizes in another context. See Skogan, supra note 129, at
20-23. It is possible that the correlation Skogan identifies is due in some part to the fact that
an individual's assessment of neighborhood disorder will be affected by that person's experi
ence as a victim of crime - even though non-victimized respondents constituted more than
90% of the interviewees. Again, this is something that could be tested and controlled for.
142. I am following Skogan's lead and weighing equally physical and social disorder. See
ICPSR Codebook, supra note 75, at 8; Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 19.
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two ("smut" and "prostitution") in the social disorder index and the
second two ("dogs" and "garbage") in the physical disorder index.
The variables included in the two corrected multi-item scales thus
consist of:

Social Disorder

Physical Disorder

Loitering
Vandalism
Public Drinking
Insulting Language
Smut
Prostitution

Noise
Abandoned Buildings or Vehicles
Litter
Trash in Vacant Lots
Dogs
Garbage

With regard to the problem of missing values, I propose to
standardize these twelve variables on their respective means.143
This will avoid the problem of bias resulting from missing values
(discussed supra). It is, of course, impossible to determine what the
missing values would really have been.

In

this case, I am not en

tirely comfortable imputing values by means of multiple imputation
because of the large number of missing values. I hesitate to possi
bly inject additional biases into this already weak data set.144 Stan
dardizing the variables on their means is a more conservative
approach.
In effect, what standardizing the variables does is to turn them
into

comparable

measures of relative disorder. Let's take, for in

stance, two variables in the social disorder index, "public drinking"
and "insults." At present, the values for each observation corre
spond to

the respondents' perception

of whether

these

are

problems in the neighborhood on a scale of 1 to 3. The mean for
the variable public drinking is 1.8. The mean for the variable insults
is 1.3. A neighborhood for which there is no data on public drink
ing, but data on insults, is likely to have a lower value for social
disorder because of the missing data. However, by standardizing
the two variables on their means, we create, instead of an absolute
value for the variable, a relative weight of disorder. So, a neighbor
hood for which there is no data on public drinking will have a value
for social disorder equal to the relative order or disorderliness of
the neighborhood in terms of insults. Each variable will become a
comparable relative indicator of the level of disorder. By averaging
143. In order to standardize the values for each variable, I will (1) calculate the mean of
the variable; and (2) conduct the following calculation: standardized value = (value - mean) I
mean.
144. I surmise that Skogan i:nay have felt the same way, which may explain why he did
not impute values for the missing data.
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the available values, we will obtain a good ili.dicator of the relative
level of disorder in each neighborhood. In addition, the use of stan
dardized values essentially substitutes for multiple imputation, inso
far as it does similar work as the algorithms commonly used for
imputation.
5.
a.

The Corrected Results Using Skogan's Data

The Corrected D isorder-Crime Regression Analysis

Looking only at "corrected disorder" and the various crimes, it
appears that the corrected disorder variable continues to be statisti
cally significantly related to three of the five crimes: physical as
sault, burglary, and robbery. At this preliminary stage, however,
we can already conclude that purse-snatching/pocket-picking and
rape are not significantly related to disorder. This is reflected in the
following table:
TABLE 7: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR CORRECTED
DISORDER AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMES
CORRECTED DISORDER
CRIME
Purse snatching
Physical Assault
Burglary
Robbery
Sexual Assault

b.

Coef

SE

P-val

95% Conf. Interval

-.05
.11
.14
.11
.001

.03
.03
.05
.01
.007

.126
.001
.011
.000
.901

-.125
.053
.033
.077
-.013

.017
.17
.24
.137
.015

The Other-Explanatory-Variables Analysis

With the single exception of robbery, however, these statistically
significant relationships between individual crimes and disorder
simply disappear when the socioeconomic factors are taken into
account.145

Physical Assault:

using Skogan's indices for poverty, stability,

and race, and holding these variables constant, neighborhood disor
der is no longer statistically significantly related to the number of
residents victimized by physical assault in their neighborhood.
When we hold these three variables constant, a one unit increase in
corrected disorder tends to increase physical assault by .007 on av
erage, with a standard deviation of .04. The ninety-five percent
confidence interval therefore has a lower bound of -.08 and an up145. With regard to purse-snatching, if stability alone is held constant, the p-value is
0.978.
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per bound of .09

-

suggesting that a good portion of estimated

values will be inversely related to increases in disorder. The p
value is very high, standing at .873. This is reflected in the following
table:

TABLE 8: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PHYSICAL ASSAULT
AND OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
PHYSICAL ASSAULT
EXPL. VARIABLES
Corrected Disorder
Poverty
Stability
Race

Burglary:

Coef

SE

P-val

95% Conf. Interval

.007
.013
-.013
-.002

.042
.005
.005
.013

.873
.014
.009
.856

-.08
.003
-.024
-.028

.09
.022
-.004
.024

the relationship between burglary victimization and

corrected disorder also disappears when neighborhood poverty, sta
bility, and race are taken into account. Holding these variables
constant, neighborhood disorder is no longer significantly related to
the number of residents victimized by burglary in their neighbor
hood. This is reflected in the following table:
TABLE 9: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR BURGLARY AND
OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
BURGLARY
EXPL. VARIABLES
Corrected Disorder
Poverty
Stability
Race

Coef

SE

P-val

95% Conf. Interval

-.059
.022
-.029
-.009

.069
.007
.007

.401
.004
.000
.636

-.2
.008
-.043
-.05

.02

.081
.036
-.014
.031

As a result, it is only robbery that remains significantly related
to disorder holding constant Skogan's other explanatory variables.
However, when we exclude the five Newark neighborhoods and
hold constant the explanatory variables, even the robbery relation
ship vanishes. This is reflected in the following table:
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TABLE 10: THE NEWARK EFFECT: COEFFICIENTS FOR ROB BERY

AND OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES EXCLUDING
NEWARK NEIGHBORHOODS
ROBBERY
Coef
EXPL. VARIABLES
Corrected Disorder
Poverty
Stability
Race

.06

SE

P-val

95% Conf. Interval

.04

.141
.988
.794
.089

-.022
-.006
-.006
-.002

.003
.003
.008

-.ODO

.001
.014

6.

.141
.006
.008
.03

Conclusion

My findings using the corrected disorder index essentially track
my earlier replication using Skogan's index for disorder. They sug
gest that, in the final analysis, there are

no

statistically significant

relationships between disorder and purse-snatching, physical as
sault, burglary, or rape when other explanatory variables are held
constant, and that the relationship between robbery and disorder
also disappears when the five Newark neighborhoods are set aside.

In the end, the data do not support the broken windows hypothesis.
.

B.

The Sampson and Cohen Study

When pushed on the details of Skogan's analysis, social norm
proponents cite one other quantitative study, Robert Sampson and
Jacqueline Cohen's Deterrent Effects of the Police

lication and Theoretical Extension. 146

on Crime: A Rep

This study, however, is by no

means a silver bullet for the social influence conception of deter
rence. To the contrary, the study takes a far more nuanced ap
proach and, in the end, supports the argument that the social
scientific evidence for the broken windows theory is still lacking.
Sampson and Cohen acknowledge that research on the relation
ship between disorder and crime is "sparse"147 and that the results
thus far have been "mixed."148 Their study focuses on two possible
mechanisms - only one of which is the broken windows hypothesis
- by which aggressive, proactive policing strategies might relate to
lower crime rates. The first mechanism, which they refer to as "in
direct," operates by increasing the arrest/offense ratio.149 Aggres146. Sampson & Cohen, supra note 136. Tracey Meares brought this study to my atten
tion; Dan Kahan also refers to the study in his work. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note
12, at 372 & n.82-83.
147. See Sampson & Cohen, supra note 136, at 167.
148. See id. at 166.
149. See id. at 164.
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sive, proactive policing results in a greater number of police-civilian
exchanges, during which the police are more likely to solve crimes.
"By stopping, questioning, and otherwise closely observing citizens,
especially suspicious ones, the police are more likely to find fugi
tives, detect contraband (such as stolen property or concealed
weapons), and apprehend persons :fleeing from the scene of a
crime. "150 Under the first hypothesis, aggressive policing affects
crime "by changing the actual probability that an arrest is made
(e.g., by increasing the arrest/offense ratio). "151 The second mecha
nism, which they refer to as "direct, " operates by influencing com
munity perceptions regarding the certainty of punishment. 152 The
heightened police presence and interventions that accompany
proactive policing communicate to potential criminals that they are
more likely to be caught if they commit a crime. This second mech
anism is the one that is explicitly linked to the broken windows the
ory and the social influence conception of deterrence. The authors
make this link by using, as the measure of aggressive policing, "the
number of arrests per police officer for disorderly conduct and driv
ing under the influence (DUI). "153
Sampson and Cohen report the following results. With regard
to the indirect effect, proactive policing appears to have a signifi
cant effect on robbery and burglary arrest certainty rates. Robbery
arrest certainty appears to have a significant inverse effect on the
rate of robberies - second only to that, believe it or not, of the
divorce rate.154 Burglary arrest certainty has only a marginally sig
nificant effect on burglary rates. With regard to the direct effect,
proactive policing appears to have a very weak effect on burglary
and, for that reason, the authors focus the remainder of their study
on robbery, where there appears to be, in contrast, a significant in
verse effect. 155 With regard to robbery, " [t]he magnitude of the ef
fect is clearly much less than that of divorce, but it is similar to that
150. Id. {quoting James Q. Wtlson & Barbara Boland, The Effect ofthe Police on Crime,
12 L. & SoCY. REv., 367, 373 {1978)).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 165.
153. Id. at 169 (emphasis omitted).
154. See id. at 176. The authors do not explain why the divorce rate would have such an
important effect, see id. at n.10, but it does, not only here, but also with regard to the next
findings.
155. The authors acknowledge that other studies have found no relationship between in·
dices of aggressive policing (number of traffic citations issued) and robbery rates, see id. at
167 (referring to Herbert Jacob & Michael Rich, The Effects of the Police on Crime: A Sec·
ond Look, 15 L. & SoCY. REv. 109, 113 (1981)), although Sampson and Cohen join Wilson
and Boland in criticizing these findings.
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of region, income, and size."156 The direct effect also varies by age
and race of the offender. "[P]olice aggressiveness has a much larger
(inverse) effect on black adult robbery offending than on white
adult robbery offending . . . . Similarly, the effect of police aggres
siveness on white juvenile robbery is insignificant, while the corre
sponding effect for black juvenile robbery is significant and almost
double in magnitude."157
However, in the end, the authors acknowledge that their study
does not establish whether aggressive policing affects the robbery
rate by means of the direct or the indirect mechanism:
It is true, however, that our analysis was not able to choose defini
tively between the two alternative scenarios [indirect or direct] posed
by Wilson and Boland (1978). One cannot determine empirically the
direct effects of both police aggressiveness and the arrest/offense ratio
on crime in a simultaneous equation model because such a model is
unidentified.158

Sampson and Cohen favor the direct mechanism interpretation, in
large part because of the sharp criticisms that have been leveled
against the indirect deterrence literature. But, in the final analysis,
the study is inconclusive.
C.

New York City's Falling Crime Rates

Social norm proponents marshal still other evidence in support
of the quality-of-life initiative. This consists of the remarkable fact
that crime rates in New York City have plummeted in recent years
- years that have coincided, in large part, with the implementation
of the quality-of-life initiative. Kahan tallies the numbers as fol
lows: "Since 1993, the murder rate [in New York City] has come
down nearly 40 percent, the robbery rate more than 30 percent, and
the burglary rate more than 25 percent."159 Former Police Commis
sioner William J. Bratton also emphasizes "the turnaround that has
been accomplished in New York City. Crime is down by more than
50 percent from 1990. Murders are down by 63 percent." As a re
sult, Bratton observes, "[t]here will be 200,000 fewer victims of ma156. Sampson & Cohen, supra note 136, at 176.
157. Id. at 177.
158. Id. at 185. The authors explain how a model can be unidentified by defining the
alternative: "[t]he crime function in such a model is 'identified' when an instrumental varia
ble is selected (e.g., police aggressiveness) that is both highly correlated with the sanction
variable (e.g., arrest certainty) and at the same time does not have a direct effect on crime."
Id. at 165 n.l. In their case study, the model is unidentified because the instrumental variable
(police aggressiveness) apparently has a direct effect on crime. See id. at 175-76.
159. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 367.
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jor crimes this year than there were in 1990." 160 Moreover, the
crime rates in New York City have fallen much more than in other
large cities. Kahan emphasizes that " [t]hese drops are more than
double the national average, "161 and, he argues, the only thing that
can account for this difference is the quality-of-life initiative.
Kahan reports, though citing only Bratton and Kelling, that "[c]ity
officials and at least some criminologists credit the larger reduction

in crime rates to [the] recent emphasis on 'order maintenance. ' "162
Here again, though, the devil is in the details. Criminologists
have suggested a number of possible factors that may have contrib
uted to the declining crime rates in New York City. These include a

significant increase in the New York City police force, a general
shift in drug use from crack cocaine to heroin, favorable economic
conditions in the 1990s, new computerized tracking systems that
speed up police response to crime, a dip in the number of eighteen
to twenty-four-year-old males, an increase in the number of hard
core offenders currently incarcerated in city jails and state prisons,
the arrest of several big drug gangs in New York, as well as possible
changes in adolescent behavior.1 63 Many of these factors are signif
icant. None may single-handedly account for the trend. But each
one must be taken seriously.
Kahan suggests, for instance, that "New York City has increased
its investment in law enforcement over the course of a decade, but
no more so than other cities around the country, none of which has
160. Bratton, supra note 8. The statistics regarding the drop in the crime rate in New
York City are from the FBl's Uniform Crime Reports and the FBl's numbers are compiled
using local police data. See generally Gove et al., supra note 123. Police statistics are more
susceptible to human manipulation than are victimization surveys. It is important to keep
this in mind, particularly during periods of intensive policing initiatives. See, e.g., For One
NYC Captain, Crime Reductions Are a Numbers Racket, LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS (Dec. 15,
1996) <http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/96/15dec/html/6.html> (reporting that the com
mander of a high-crime precinct in the South Bronx is under investigation for falsifying re
ports to show huge reductions in crime); Fox Butterfield, As Crime Falls, Pressure Rises to
Alter Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1998, at Al (reporting that, "[s]o far this year, there have
been charges of falsely reporting crime statistics [in Philadelphia], in New York, Atlanta and
Boca Raton, Fla."). Unfortunately, victimization survey data from the National Crime Vic·
timization Survey are not available at the city level. Telephone Interview with Ann Pastore,
Editor, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, The Hindelang Criminal Justice Research
Center, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany (June 15, 1998).
161. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 367-68.
162. Id. at 368-69.
163. See Fagan et al., supra note 11; Butterfield, supra note 11; Andrew Karmen, What's
Driving New York's Crime Rate Down?, LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS (Nov. 30, 1996) <http://
www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/96/30nov/html/feature.html>. For discussions of the leading expla·
nations of the national drop in crime rates, see generally Campbell, supra note 24, at 24;
Alexis Chiu, Crime Rate at 29-year Low in City, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 1997, at Al;
Kaplan, supra note 45, at El; Witkin, supra note 7, at 30-37.
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seen reductions in crime as dramatic as New York's."164 Kahan
notes, in the margin, that "[i]n the decade ending in 1994, New
York increased its spending on police by 74% ; the nation's nine
largest cities excluding New York increased police spending by 70%
on average."165 The difference between seventy-four and seventy
percent may not, at first blush, seem very important. However, it
has had a significant impact on the number of police officers per
capita in New York City. A close inspection of the number of po
lice officers per capita in the ten largest cities in the country reveals
that, whereas New York City was among the top players in the pre
vious decades, New York City has jumped in front of the pack in
the mid-1990s. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, New York
City was elbow-to-elbow in a close cluster among the top-ranked
largest cities in terms of its police force. This is illustrated in the
following table:166
TABLE 11: POLICE OFFICERS PER 10,000 CITIZENS IN THE FIVE

(

)

LARGEST CITIES RANKED BY ORDER

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1960

1970

1980

1990

Chicago (33)
New York (32)
Philadelphia (30)
Detroit (28)
Los Angeles (24)

Chicago (47)
Philadelphia (44)
New York (44)
Detroit (37)
Los Angeles (32)

Philadelphia (49)
Chicago (45)
New York (38)
Detroit (38)
Los Angeles (31)

Detroit (50)
New York (50)
Chicago (49)
Philadelphia (48)
Dallas (36)

However, in the last few years for which data are available, New
York City has led its peers. The sustained additional spending over
many years, plus the accelerated investment in police officers since
1994, has had a significant impact on the numbers. This is reflected
in the following table:167
164. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 368.
165. Id. at 368 n.68.
166. The number of police officers are derived from FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvEsTIGA
TION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN TiiE UNITED STATES
("UCR") for each respective year. See UCR-1960 (Table 36); UCR-1970 (Table 57);
UCR-1980 (Table 71); and UCR-1990 (Table 72). The population numbers are derived
from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Time Series of Population Estimates, I991 to 1996, and
1990 Census Population for Places (last revised August 20, 1998) <http://www.census.gov/ftp/
pub/population/www/estimates/cityplace.html> [hereinafter Annual Time Series] for the pop
ulation figure for 1990; and, respectively, the U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1960 CENsus OF
POPULATION, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, and 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING for the years 1960, 1970, and 1980.
167. See UCR-1993 (Table 78); UCR-1994 (Table 78); UCR-1995 (Table 78); and
UCR-1996 (Table 78) for the number of police officers. See Annual Time Series, supra note
166, for the population estimates for 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996.
.•
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TABLE 12: POLICE OFFICERS PER 10,000 CITIZENS IN THE FIVE

(

)

LARGEST CITIES RANKED BY ORDER

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1993

1994

1995

1996

New York (54)
Chicago (51)
Philadelphia (45)
Detroit (43)
Houston (39)

Chicago (55)
New York (54)
Philadelphia (46)
Detroit (44)
Houston (41)

New York (66)
Chicago (57)
Philadelphia (49)
Detroit (43)
Houston (42)

New York (66)
Chicago (58)
Philadelphia (50)
Detroit (45)
Houston (42)

Former Mayor Dinkins hired thousands of new police officers
under the Safe Streets, Safe City program in 1992, and, since then,
Mayor Giuliani has hired another four thousand officers and
merged about six thousand Transit and Housing Authority officers
into the ranks of the NYPD .1 68 The increased investment in law
enforcement, it appears, has had a tangible effect on the number of
police officers per capita.
Kahan also argues that "[s]imilarly, demographic shifts - in
cluding changes in the size of the teenage male population - are
far too small to account for New York's drop in crime and are no
different from those in other cities."169 The raw numbers do indeed
suggest that demographics may not account primarily for the drop
in crime or for the difference in the rate of the drop in New York
City. According to Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin Zimring, and June Kim,
the highest at-risk population for homicides - non-white males
ages fifteen to twenty-nine - has been declining since the mid1980s and the decline therefore does not correspond to the trend in
overall homicides.170 "Accordingly," they write, "it is tempting to
dismiss demography as a correlate of the homicide decline. How
ever, the relationship of population to a changing behavioral pat
tern may be nonlinear."171

Researchers of youth violence and

epidemiologists have suggested that long-term population declines
may not affect rates of violence until certain thresholds or tipping
points have been reached.

The question that such a hypothesis

would pose is "did the population decline reach a threshold where
it could lead to a decline in the incidence of firearm homicides ?" 172
168. See Bratton, supra note 8.
169. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 368.
170. See Fagan et al., supra note 11. When Fagan, Zimring, and Kim distinguish between
firearm homicides and nonfirearm homicides, see infra text accompanying notes 191-97, they
do find a strong relationship between the at-risk population decline (including white and
black males) and the long-term decline in nonfirearm homicides. See Fagan et al., supra note
11.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Further research would need to be conducted to answer this ques
tion. Fagan and Zimring suggest that this hypothesis is unfalsifiable
and conclude, with regard to the demographic contribution, that
"the contraction in the highest risk population is an important but
unknowable influence on the decline in firearm homicides [in New
York City] from 1992-1996."173 I am not entirely persuaded that
the hypothesis is unverifiable and believe that further research
needs to be conducted on this contributing factor.
There are other reasons too that may account for the sharp drop
in crime in New York City. For instance, the substitution by drug
users of heroin for crack cocaine may have contributed to the de
cline. One of the more authoritative studies on the relationship be
tween crack cocaine and homicides in New York City found that, in
the late 1980s, crack dealing significantly contributed to the homi
cide rate.114 In fact, twenty-six percent of the homicides in New
York City in 1988 were estimated to have been crack-related sys
temic events - systemic to crack dealing.175 During an eight
month period in 1988, 52.7 percent of homicides in New York City
were projected to have been drug related, and, of those, sixty per
cent involved the use or trafficking of crack.176 In contrast, only
three of the 414 homicides in the study were primarily related to the
use or trafficking of heroin.111
The study suggested that the contribution of crack to the homi
cide rate was primarily through trade-related, or systemic, effects,
including territorial disputes among crack dealers.178 Of the 118
homicides that were traced primarily to crack involvement, 100
(eighty-five percent) were attributed to the crack trade.179 Three of
the crack-related homicides were attributed to the
psychopharmacological consequences of ingesting crack, i.e. in
creased violence, excitability, and irrationality produced by crack;
and eight homicides were attributed to economic compulsion, i.e.
persons feeling compelled to engage in crime in order to subsidize
drug use. The fact that the crack homicides were predominantly
related to the crack trade, rather than to the psychopharmacologi173. Id.
174. See Paul J. Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Conceptually Based Event Analysis, 16 CoNTEMP. DRUG PRoBs. 651, 681-82 (1989).
175. See id. at 682.
176. See id. at 681.
177. See id. at 683.
178. See id. at 656 (describing hazards of the drug trade).
179. See id. at 656, 664 tbl.2.
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cal consequences of using crack, however, does not minimize the
contrast between crack-related and heroin-related homicides in
New York City during that period: 118 to three. The stark contrast
is illustrated well in the following table:180
TABLE 13: DRUG-RELATED HOMICIDES IN F OUR
REPRESENTATIVE PATROL ZONES IN NEW Y oRK CITY
(MARCH 1, 1988 - OCTOBER 31, 1988)
Psycho- Economic
MultiNumber pharm. compulsive Systemic dimension
Total number of homicides:
181
Primarily Drug-related Homicides
Primary drug:
Crack
Cocaine
Alcohol
Marijuana
Heroin
Combinations (non-heroin)
Combinations (with heroin)
Unknown

414
218

31

8

162

17

118
48
21
7
3
18
0
3

3
1
21
1
0
5
0
0

8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

100

7
3
0
0
1
6
0
0

44
0
6
2
7
0
3

The important corollary is that cocaine use is down sharply in
New York City, and some suggest that it is being substituted with
heroin. Since the early 1990s, the consumption of cocaine in large
cities, including New York, has been waning.182 In Manhattan, "the
proportion .[of youthful arrestees testing positive for cocaine] fell
from 70 percent in 1987 to 21 percent in 1996."183 In addition, "a
variety of studies also suggest that today's crack market is increas
ingly dominated by an older, mostly male group of heavy users. "18 4
This may result in fewer homicides "because this age group is less
prone to violence, and many of these users have long-term, stable
relationships with their suppliers."185
180. See id. at 663-64 (Table 1 and 2).
181. This is a conservative estimate. Any case for which there was not sufficient evidence

was classified "not drug-related" even if the police suggested that the case probably was drug
related. See id. at 662.

182. See Study by Andrew Golub and Bruce Johnson of the National Development and
Research Institutes in New York (showing steep decrease in crack use among people being
sent to jail in Manhattan), discussed in Fox Butterfield, Drop in Homicide Rate Linked to
Crack's Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A12 (documenting these trends in other cities);
Witkin, supra note 7, at 36; see also generally Neal Kumar Katya!, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95
MlcH. L. REv. 2385, 2402-08 & nn.63-65 (1997) (citing studies). Bill see Fagan et al., supra
note 11 (suggesting that the incidence of drug-positive arrestees has been stable and is unre
lated to homicide trends).
183. Witkin, supra note 7, at 36; see also Butterfield, supra
& Johnson, supra note 182).
184. Witkin, supra note 7, at 36.
185. Id.

Golub

note

182,

at

A12

(discussing
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In contrast to New York City, mid-size cities - cities with popu
lations of several hundred thousand, like Louisville, Kentucky, or
Nashville, Tennessee - are now suffering from the effects of in
creased crack use and, as a result, are defying the national down
ward trend in crime rates. These smaller cities are apparently going
through the urban crisis that hit the bigger cities in the 1980s and
are experiencing a resulting crime wave. In Louisville, for instance,
according to federal and local authorities, homicides in 1997
jumped to a seventeen-year high.1 86
Another important factor contributing to declining crime rates
in New York City is the use of new computer technology to compile
crime statistics and to convert the data into maps and charts that
inform the police about crime patterns in different precincts. The
data allow the police to target their enforcement to changing crime
trends. A sergeant at the NYPD explains: "Let's say we're having
a problem with Laundromat robberies in Brooklyn. I can pull from
the CD all the listed Laundromats in Brooklyn, map them, shade in
color the ones that are already robbed and see if we can spot a
pattern. There's a lot of possibilities." 187 According to experts like
David Kennedy, senior researcher with the Program in Criminal
Justice at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, these
new technologies have contributed to the falling crime rates in New
York City.1 88
The most thorough analysis to date on the relationship between
New York City's policing initiative and serious crime is the forth
coming study by Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin Zimring, _and June Kim en
titled

Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two
Trends. 189 In their study, the authors analyze a large number of

potential explanations for the sharp, fifty-two percent drop in homi
cides in New York City during the five-year period 1992-1996. As a
186. See Michael Janofsky, Missing Trend, Some Cities See Murders Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1998, at Al; see also Witkin, supra note 7, at 36 ("Experts believe that the link between
crack, guns, and crime can also be demonstrated in places where crime hasn't dropped smaller cities in the heartland where crack has only recently arrived.").
187. Tod Newcombe, Crime Drops 38 Percent in New York City, GoVERNMENT TECH
NOLOGY (Mar. 1997) <http://www.govtech.net/1997/gt/mar/march97-crimedropsinnyc/
march97-crimedropsinnyc.shtm> (quoting Sgt. John Yohe, NYPD).
188. See id; see also Peter C. Dodenboff, LEN salutes its 1996 People of the Year, the
NYPD and its Compstat process, LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS (Dec. 31, 1996) <http://www.lib.
jjay.cuny.edu/len/96/31dec/html/feature.html>; Eli Silverman, Mapping Change: How the
New York City Police Department Re-engineered Itself to Drive Down Crime, LAW ENFORCE
MENT NEWS (Dec. 15, 1996) <http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/96/15dec/html/12.html> ("Per
haps the most significant aspect of the department's organizational changes within the past
few years has been the process known as Compstat.").
189. Fagan et al., supra note 11.
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preliminary matter, the authors observe that New York's decline in
homicides is the third highest decline for major cities in the United
States, behind the decline in Pittsburgh and equal to that in
Houston.19° The major finding of the study is that the trend in
homicide rates has been different for firearm and nonfirearm homi
cides. Whereas firearm homicides first increased in the late 1980s
and early 1990s and then declined sharply, non:firearm homicides
have steadily declined since 1987.191
The study suggests that the new policing initiative in New York
City may not have affected the category of nonfirearm homicides.
The authors indicate that the explanation for the long-term decline
in nongun killings may lie elsewhere than in post-1990 interven
tions.192 It is worth emphasizing that non:firearm homicides is not a
trivial category of major crime. In 1995, there were 675 nongun
killings, in contrast to 834 firearm homicides,193
With regard to firearm homicides, the study is less conclusive.
The authors observe that "[t]he temporal fit between policing
[strategy] changes and gun homicide declines is a good one."194
The authors suggest a number of factors that may also have contrib
uted to the decline, including a certain amount of regression from
peak rates in 1990, an increase in the police force, and social trends.
The primary competing explanation for the sharp decline in gun
killings is regression from abnormally high rates.195 Nevertheless,
the authors write, "while the entire gun homicide drop of 1991 to
1996 is within the boundaries of regression possibility, the more
prudent view is to regard the convergence of cyclical variation, so
cial trends in risk and exposure, and law enforcement changes as
jointly responsible" for the decline.196 Overall, the authors con
clude on a cautionary note:
190. See id.
191. See id. {"What the gun trends obscure is the steadiest long-term trend in New York
City - a downward movement in homicides by all means other than gun that begins after
1986 and gathers momentum steadily throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.").
192. See id. ("Changes in policing were unrelated to the long-term decline in non-gun
homicides. This is a secular trend whose explanations lie beyond the hypotheses raised here
about post-1990 interventions."); id. ("The consistent decline in nongun homicide
starts
too early and continues too evenly throughout the period under study to have any plausible
linkage to changes that come into the city two or three years into the 1990s."); id. {"The
nongun declines are in all probability not the consequence of policing changes or any other
process that was not in effect until the 1990s.").
.

.

•

193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Id. A further complication, the authors point out, is that there have been many
changes in policing, not just aggressive enforcement. Other changes include "gun interven-
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We have already learned that attributing nongun homicide declines to
law enforcement changes was premature and unjustified. Rather than
risk more precipitous error in the interpretation of the city's homicide
trends, our current understanding of the period from 1985 to 1996
suggests caution. If the downward trend in gun killings continues far
past the 1978 and 1985 levels, the probable role of the mid-1990s
changes will loom larger with each further decline. If the nongun
homicides also continue in their post-1986 pattern, however, even the
best statistical views about New York homicide will not yield easy
answers on causation.197

In sum, there are a number of significant factors pushing down
the crime rate in New York City. Criminologists, public policymak
ers and legal scholars are engaged in a hotly contested debate about
the causes of the decline in New York City and nationally.19s Some
experts, including Dean James Alan Fox of the College of Criminal
Justice at Northeastern University, argue that the crime rate in New
York City would have dropped regardless of the quality-of-life initi
ative.199 Kahan may be right that no one force conventionally as
sumed to drive down crime rates in New York City is solely
responsible for the drop in crime; however, the combined effect of
numerous causal factors - like increased police, shifting drug use,
new computerized tracking systems, demographics, and other fac
tors - may account for the rate of the decline. Our present under
standing of the causes of the decline is too tentative - and
contested - to suggest that the quality-of-life initiative accounts
for the difference in New York City's rates.
D. An Alternative Mechanism of Order-Maintenance Policing:
Enhanced Surveillance

This is not to suggest that the quality-of-life initiative has had no
effect whatsoever on crime rates in New York City, nor that it has
had no deterrent effect whatsoever. The turnstile jumper who is go
ing to commit greater offenses once he is in the subway is certainly
tions, general increases in police enforcement resources, strategic targeting of police efforts
through computer mapping, and precinct-level management accountability for crime trends."

Id.
197. Id.
198. See 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMmoLoGY, supra note 11 (consisting of articles from con
ference focusing on declining crime rates); see also Witkin, supra note 7, at 28-33 (discussing
the numerous proposed causes for the decline in crime nationally, and advocating the crack
explanation).

40.

199. See Vmce Beiser, Why the Big Apple Feels Safer, MACLEAN's, Sept. 11, 1995, at 39-
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deterred when he is arrested and detained.200 What is missing from
the social influence explanation, however, is the brute fact that mis
demeanor arrests in the city of New York have increased dramati
cally since Mayor Giuliani took office. As of

1996,

misdemeanor

arrests in New York City were up by more than fifty percent from

1993 levels: misdemeanor arrests in New York City reached
205,277 in 1996, up from 133,446 in 1993 .201 The upward trend con
tinued in 1997, with arrests for the first six months of 1997 standing
at 117,698 .202 In contrast, the number of misdemeanor complaints
recorded for this period has remained remarkably stable - with

421,116
424,169

misdemeanor complaints recorded in

in 1 996.203

1993

compared to

Misdemeanor arrests have increased, not only in number, but
also in severity. The quality-of-life initiative has changed the proce
dures for those arrested. "Previously, most people accused of mi
nor offenses were given desk appearance tickets, which included a
court date, and then released. "204 Under Mayor Giuliani's adminis
tration, desk appearance tickets became less common. The practice
shifted to detaining, in jail, persons accused even of minor misde
meanor offenses for purposes of checking their identity and deter
mining whether any outstanding warrants existed.205 Most recently,
the New York City Police Department has implemented a new pol
icy of detaining anyone arrested for even a minor misdemeanor of
fense "until a computerized fingerprint check verifies the person's
identity."206 An apparently valid form of identification - like a
driver's license

-

will no longer suffice: the police in New York

City are now going to verify each person's identity by means of his
or her fingerprints. This is "a process that takes up to eight hours in

many cases. "207

200. See E.J. Dionne Jr., A Broken-Windows Approach to Crime,
1996, at Cl.

WASH. PosT, Dec. 29,

201. See Letter from Michael J. Farrell to Jenna Karadbil, supra note 36; see also Purdy,
supra note 11; Criminal Justice Indicators, New York City: 1992-1996 (last modified Dec. 10,
1997) <http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/areastat/areastat.cgi>.

202. See Letter from Michael J. Farrell, Deputy Commissioner, City of New York Police
Department to Author (Apr. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
203. See Letter from Michael J. Farrell to Jenna Karadbil, supra note 36.
204. Purdy, supra note 11; see also Cooper, supra note 11.
205. See Cooper, supra note 11; Purdy, supra note 11.
206. David Kocieniewski & Michael Cooper, Police to Tighten the Scrutiny ofAll Suspects
Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at Al ("Police Commissioner Howard Safir said
yesterday that anyone arrested for even minor offenses, such as fare beating or drinking in
public, must now remain in police custody until a computerized fingerprint check can verify
the person's identity.").
207. Id.
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An alternative mechanism of order-maintenance policing then
may be the enhanced power of surveillance offered by a policy of
aggressive misdemeanor arrests and identification. What order
maintenance policing gives law enforcement is a legitimate reason
to seize, search, and run checks on persons committing or suspected
of committing minor offenses, which may have important conse
quences for the detection and prevention of crime. This was
powerfully demonstrated in the now-famous case of John Royster.
Royster is accused of fatally beating a flower shop owner on Park
Avenue - as well as several brutal assaults on women, including an
infamous assault on a piano teacher in Central Park that left her
severely impaired. Royster was fingered, literally, when he was ar
rested for turnstile jumping in the New York subways. Upon arrest,
Royster was fingerprinted and a computer matched his prints with
fingerprints left at the scene of the Park Avenue murder.208
The first quality-of-life experiment in the New York subways
demonstrated early on the benefits of aggressive misdemeanor ar
rests. "As it turned out, many of those caught committing these
small crimes were also guilty of larger crimes. One out of seven
fare evaders had prior warrants out for their arrest. One out of 21
was carrying a handgun."209 With misdemeanor arrests up more
than fifty percent in New York City and with routine fingerprinting
and record checking, order-maintenance policing has "led to a
percent increase in arrests on outstanding warrants."210

39

Misdemeanor arrests may also be used as a way to take custody
of a suspicious person where there may not'otherwise be sufficient
cause. This occurred recently when police officers arrested a suspi
cious person for jaywalking. Since he was not carrying identifica
tion, he was transported back to the police station, where he was
put in a lineup and identified by two robbery victims.211
Order-maintenance policing also enhances surveillance by facili
tating the transfer of information. Having patrol officers walk a
beat makes it easier for citizens to pass information on to them.
208. See Purdy, supra note 11, at Al (Royster "was identified by a fingerprint taken when
he was arrested for jumping a subway turnstile.").
209. Kaplan, supra note

45, at El.

210. Purdy, supra note 11. Mayor Giuliani in fact recalls this well. "Very shortly into our
program of dealing with squeegee operators - and I remember this - after the first group
of arrests, Police Commissioner Bratton came back to me and said that some very large
percentage - I don't remember the exact percentage - of the squeegee operators had war
rants for other crimes, a number of them being violent crimes." See Onishi, supra note 11
(quoting Mayor Giuliani at a press conference on February 20, 1998).
211. See Onishi, supra note 11.
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This is the sense in which, as Wilson and Kelling observed, "[t]he
essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the
informal control mechanisms of the community itself. "212 Wilson
and Kelling wrote:
Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer.
Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them with
the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what
is worrying them . . . . You approach a person on foot more easily,
and talk to him more readily, than you do a person in a car. More
over, you can more easily retain some anonymity if you draw an of
ficer aside for a private chat. Suppose you want to pass on a tip about
who is stealing handbags, or who offered to sell you a stolen TV. In
the inner city, the culprit, in all likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to
a marked patrol car and lean in the window is to convey a visible
signal that you are a "fink. "213

Order-maintenance policing not only facilitates communication, it
may also create more potential informants by criminalizing more
people.
In the final analysis, New York City's quality-of-life initiative
has probably contributed to the decline in crime. But the mecha
nism may not be primarily a reduction in litter, fixing broken win
dows, or beautifying neighborhoods - though all of these may
have some positive neighborhood effects. The primary engine of
community policing in New York may be the enhanced power of
surveillance offered by a policy of aggressive misdemeanor arrests.
To be sure, this alternative hypothesis is also based, in large part, on
anecdotal evidence, and it is essential that it too be operationalized
and empirically verified. Like the broken windows theory, it is at
present an untested hypothesis. But the empirical evidence does
suggest that the quality-of-life initiative enables the police to collect
more identifying information; that the policing strategy increases
the opportunity for checking records, fingerprints, DNA, and other
identifying characteristics; and that it also facilitates information
gathering from informants. These mechanisms have little to do
with fixing broken windows and much more to do with arresting
window breakers - or persons who look like they might break win
dows, or who are strangers, or outsiders, or disorderly.

212. Wiison

& Kelling, supra note 2, at 34.

213. Id. at 34.
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THE CATEGORIES UNDERLYING

ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING

The disorderly are, after all, the usual suspects under a regime
of order-maintenance policing. The squeegee man, the panhandler,
the homeless person, the turnstile jumper, the unattached adult, the
public drunk - these are apparently the true culprits of serious
crime. Wilson and Kelling refer to them as "disreputable or ob
streperous or unpredictable people."214 They are the ones, Wilson
and Kelling argue, who turn a stable neighborhood into "an inhos
pitable and frightening jungle."215 Skogan refers to them as
"[u]nattached males, the homeless, and the aimless [who] live in
boarded up buildings, seedy residential hotels and fiophouses."216
Kahan rehearses the same categories. He writes:
Disorder is . . . pregnant with meaning: Public drunkenness, prostitu
tion, aggressive panhandling and similar behavior signal not only that
members of the community are inclined to engage in disorderly con
duct, but also that the community is unable or unwilling to enforce
basic norms . .. In this environment, individuals who are otherwise
inclined to engage in crime are much more likely to do so.
.

The meaning of disorder can also influence the behavior of com
likely to increase crime. If they
to leave a neighborhood that is
pervaded by disorder. Their departure increases the concentration of
law breakers, thereby multiplying their interactions with each other
and accentuating their mutually reinforcing propensities to engage in
crime. Law-abiders who stick it out, moreover, are more likely to
avoid the streets, where their simple presence would otherwise be a
deterrent to crime. .. . The law-abiders' fear of crime thus facilitates
even more crime.217

mitted law-abiders in a way that is
can, law-abiding citizens are likely

These categories divide the world into two distinct realms. But the
line may not be so clear.
A.

Who Are the Disorderly?

The Broken Windows essay betrays itself. Look closely at the
essay. How do the police deal with the disorderly person? "In the
words of one officer," the authors report, " 'We kick ass . "'218 Or, as
Wilson and Kelling explain elsewhere, the police "rough up" young
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-32.
Skogan, Fmal Report, supra note 22, at 86.
Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 370-71 (emphasis added, second emphasis

in original).

218. Wtlson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 35.
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toughs, and arrest on suspicion.219 On close inspection, the desired
order and regularity depend on irregularity and brutality.
" 'We kick ass.' Project residents both know and approve of
this," the essay contends. "None of this is easily reconciled with
any conception of due process or fair treatment,"220 the authors
concede. It is, however, vital to the order-maintenance function.
That function, after all, harkens back to the 1950s, when police of
ficers assisted neighborhoods in asserting control over delinquency
"sometimes violently."221 It looks back to a time when "[y]oung
toughs were roughed up, people were arrested 'on suspicion' or for
vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed. 'Rights'
were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the
serious professional criminal, who avoided violence and could af
ford a lawyer.''222
The order-maintenance strategy also depends on arresting peo
ple on meaningless charges. What makes the system work is the
availability of broad criminal laws that allow the police to take
someone off the streets because they look suspicious. "Until quite
recently in many states, and even today in some places, the police
make arrests on such charges as 'suspicious person' or 'vagrancy' or
'public drunkenness' - charges with scarcely any legal meaning,"
Wtlson and Kelling write. "These charges exist not because society
wants judges to punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an
officer to have the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a
neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets
have failed. "223 In these situations, the desire for order excuses the
questionable legality of the arrests. Returning to police officer
Kelly on the Newark beat, the authors state: "Sometimes what
Kelly did could be described as 'enforcing the law,' but just as often
it involved taking informal or extralegal steps . . . . Some of the
things he did probably would not withstand a legal challenge.''224
These are, after all, euphemisms for the word "illegal."
The essay refers to many rules, especially the "informal but
widely understood rules" of police-civilian encounters.225 The text
seems to privilege regularity, but, in fact, it is irregularity that un219. See id. at 33.
220. Id. at 35.
221. Id. at 33.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 35.
224. Id. at 31.
225. Id. at 30.
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dergirds the analysis, because it is precisely the application of uni
versal rules that most clearly undermines the order-maintenance
function. The rigidity of rules, even rules that may be perfectly ap
propriate in individual cases, deprives police officers of needed flex
ibility. "[N]o universal standards are available to settle arguments
over disorder,"226 the essay contends. This explains why "a judge
may not be any wiser or more effective than a police officer" in
resolving street disputes.227 In fact, the text goes on to say, "[a]
particular rule that seems to make sense in the individual case
makes no sense when it is made a universal rule and applied to all
cases. "228

In effect, regularity on the street rests on irregularity in police
practice - mixed, of course, with the regularity of the persons
targeted. The need for irregularity, in tum, triggers a demand for
police discretion and expertise. Instead of burdening the police
with rules of engagement, the article relies on training and selec
tion. "[H]ow do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin
or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distin
guishing the undesirable from the desirable? " the essay asks.229
The response: "We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this
important question. We are not confident that there

is

a satisfac

tory answer, except to hope that by their selection, training, and
supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the
outer limit of their discretionary authority. "230
Brutality and irregularity are inscribed in the

Broken Windows

essay. They are linked to order, rules, and regularity. And, ironi
cally, they operate at cross-purposes. For if, as the essay suggests,
there is such a clear line separating order from disorder, then why
do the police need so much discretion? Wouldn't disorder be im
mediately apparent to anyone? To a review board? To a court?
Order-maintenance policing embraces an aesthetic of order,
cleanliness, and sobriety. But it also embraces irregularity, illegal
ity, and brutality. Perhaps this is no accident. To borrow a phrase
from Wilson and Kelling, "disorder and crime are usually inextrica
bly linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. "231 The authors
were referring, of course, to disorder in the streets, not disorder in
226. Id. at 35.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.

230. Id.
231. Id. at 31.
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the police station house; yet the disorder that the authors seek to
repress may return to haunt them.
Ultimately, order-maintenance policing rests on categories that
are misleading. After all, who are the disorderly? Speeding is a
crime. So is avoiding sales tax by paying cash, underestimating
taxes, paying a housekeeper under the table, or taking office sup
plies home. The category of the disorderly is unstable. It triggers
an aggressive response to the disorderly - reflected in the idea of
"cracking down" on disorderly people - despite a lack of empirical
evidence.232
At the same time, the categories self-deconstruct. This is illus
trated well, in both Kahan's and Wilson and Kelling's articles, by
their discussion of a particular social science experiment conducted
in 1969 by Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford University psychologist.
Both Kahan and Wilson and Kelling rely heavily on this study.
Zimbardo arranged to have an abandoned automobile placed in a
public space to see whether it would be vandalized. Zimbardo con
ducted the study twice, placing the automobile once on the campus
of Stanford University and once in the Bronx in New York City. In
the Bronx, the car was promptly vandalized. At Stanford, the aban
doned car remained intact for a week. After a week, Zimbardo
smashed the windshield, whereupon passers-by then began vandal
izing the car.
Yet the vandals in Zimbardo's study did not fit the bill of "disor
derly persons." Wilson and Kelling describe the Bronx suspects as
follows:
The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of
its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family - father,
mother, and young son - who removed the radiator and battery.
Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been re
moved. Then random destruction began - windows were smashed,
parts tom off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a
playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, appar
ently clean-cut whites.233

These vandals do not seem to fall in the category of the "disreputa
ble or obstreperous or unpredictable people."234 They do not seem
to be drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, or unattached adults. Dan
232. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 351 ("Cracking down on aggressive
panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity and other visible signs of disorder may be justi
fiable on this ground, since disorderly behavior and the law's response to it are cues about
the community's attitude toward more serious forms of criminal wrongdoing.").
233. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 31.
234. Id. at 30.
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Kahan describes the vandals as "clean-cut passersby, many of
whom gratuitously inflicted damage upon [the car]."235 Similarly,
Wilson and Kelling describe the experiment at Stanford University:
"The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then
Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, pass
ersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned
upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the 'vandals' appeared
to be primarily respectable whites."236 Kahan writes:
Zimbardo placed the car, hood up, on the campus of Stanford Univer
sity, where it remained in pristine condition for over a week.
Zimbardo then smashed the windshield with a sledgehammer. At
that point, passersby spontaneously joined in the carnage, gleefully
visiting further destruction upon the car and (over time) stripping it of
valuable parts. The sight of others openly pillaging the car, Zimbardo
concluded, had released passersby from their inhibitions against van
dalism and theft.237

In what category do we place these "vandals"? Wilson and Kel
ling characterize them as "people out for fun or plunder," and even
"people who ordinarily would, not dream of doing such things and
who probably consider themselves law-abiding."238 Are they "indi
viduals who are inclined to commit crime"? Or are they respecta
ble "law-abiders"? The point is, of course, that these may be the
wrong questions. The proper question may be, why have these cat
egories in the first place?

B.

Tracing the Problem Back to Social Theory

It is somewhat jarring to uncover what appears to be a straight
forward policy of aggressive misdemeanor arrests masquerading as
a neighborhood beautification program or as an innocent phenome
non of social influence. It is especially jarring given, first, that so
cial norm proponents want to find alternatives to the traditional
devices of arrest and incarceration, and second, that the social sci
ence evidence does not support the policy. Where did we go off
track?
The difficulty, in my opinion, traces back to these categories of
honest persons and the disorderly, of order and disorder. These
categories were borrowed from a traditional sociological approach
developed in the work of Emile Durkheim. It is there, I would sug235. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 356 n.27.
236. Wilson

& Kelling, supra note 2, at 31.

237. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 356.
238. Wilson

& Kelling, supra note 2, at 31.
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gest, that we need to return in order to work our way out of the
difficulty. I applaud the social influence conception of deterrence
for enriching the discussion of public policy with sociology; how
ever, what is still missing is a more theorized discussion of the soci
ology. Public policy and sociology need to be supplemented by an
inquiry into social and political theory.

C. Emile Durkheim on Legitimation and Legal Regulation
The categories along the new path of deterrence resemble cer
tain categories in the work of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim's discus
sion of criminal sanctions, especially his legitimation theory, rests
on a similar distinction between honest and disorderly persons.
Durkheim's discussion of anomie and, more generally, of the role of
law in society, also reflects a similar privileging of order over disor
der. These similarities are not entirely coincidental. The social
norm scholarship in fact claims Durkheim as an intellectual prede
cessor, especi ally in relation to punishment and s o cial
construction.239
Durkheim's theory of legitimation receives its most lucid treat
ment in his early work,

On the Division of Labor in Society.24°

Durkheim explores there the issue of social solidarity - that is, the
issue of the moral cohesiveness of society. He argues that repres
sive criminal sanctions play a declining role in the production of
social solidarity in modernity.

In

their place, legal regulations in

the private law context - restitutionary principles in contract,
property, and commercial law - increase in modem times and
eventually offer the prospect of a healthy, in fact more robust, so
cial solidarity.
Although criminal sanctions contribute less to the formation of
social cohesion in modem times than in earlier periods, it is never
theless the moral dimension of punishment that remains central to
Durkheim's analysis. It is, in fact, this moral dimension of social
cohesion that Durkheim identifies as the function of criminal pun
ishment. According to Durkheim, criminal sanctions in modern so
ciety play the role of legitimating social norms and reinforcing
solidarity within the community. Writing against the tradition of
239. Dan Kahan's discussion of the expressive dimension of punishment and his argu
ment for shaming penalties explicitly trace back to the work of Emile Durkheim. See Kahan,
supra note 18, at 594-96. See also Lessig, supra note 16, at 949 n.19 (placing Durkheim at the
start of the tradition of constructivism that underlies social meaning).
240. EMILE DURKHEIM,
Press 1984) (1893).

THE DIVISION

OF LABOR

IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., Free
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utilitarian theories of punishment, Durkheim argues that criminal
punishments play a very small role in deterring crimes and an
equally minimal role in rehabilitating offenders. It is, instead, legiti
mation of society that criminal sanctions achieve.241
Despite the fact that Durkheim was writing

against the tradition

of punishment theory that gives rise in part to the social influence
conception of deterrence, Durkheim's work shares certain catego
ries with social norm proponents. Underlying Durkheim's theory
of legitimation are honest persons, the disorderly, and criminals.
This is reflected most poignantly in the now-famous passage on le
gitimation from the

Division of Labor:

[The role of punishment] is not the one commonly perceived. It does
not serve, or serves only very incidentally, to correct the guilty person
or to scare off any possible imitators. From this dual viewpoint its
effectiveness may rightly be questioned; in any case it is mediocre. Its
real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sus
taining the common consciousness in all its vigour. If that conscious
ness were thwarted so categorically, it would necessarily lose some of
its power, were an emotional reaction from the community not forth
coming to make good that loss. Thus there would result a relaxation
in the bonds of social solidarity. . . . This is why it is right to maintain
that the criminal should suffer in proportion to his crime, and why
theories that deny to punishment any expiatory character appear, in
the minds of many, to subvert the social order. . . . Thus, without
being paradoxical, we may state that punishment is above all intended
to have its effect upon honest people. Since it serves to heal the
wounds inflicted upon the collective sentiments, it can only fulfil this
role where such sentiments exist, and in so far as they are active.242

The characters are all here: the honest person, the disorderly, the
imitator. They play an integral role in Durkheim's analysis. For
Durkheim - as well as for social norm proponents - the criminal
sanction exerts social influence on the honest person and on the
disorderly

in different ways.

Honest persons bond, develop richer

social solidarity, a thicker social fabric. Criminal imitators, the dis
orderly, are deterred and sent on their way. These are the very
characters that reappear along the new path of deterrence and
these are their pathways.
There is also a striking parallel between Durkheim's emphasis
on legal regulation and the new path's emphasis on order. For
241. For an extensive and comprehensive review of Durkheim's writings on punishment,
see DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SocIETY 23-46 (1990); David Garland,
Durkheim's Theory ofPunishment: A Critique, in THE POWER TO PUNISH (David Garland &
Peter Young eds., 1983); Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull, Introduction to DURKHEIM ON THE
LAW 1-27 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds.,1983).
242. DuRirnEIM, supra note 240, at 62-63 (emphasis added).
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Durkheim, the social cohesion of modern society is at its optimal
level when there is proper and sufficient legal regulation of com
mercial transactions on the basis of restitutionary principles. In
contrast to societies that achieve healthy social solidarity by means
of legal regulation, societies that become pathological suffer either
from insufficient legal regulation - a state of

anomie

- or from

the wrong kind of legal regulation - a state of forced division of
labor. The categories of healthy social solidarity versus pathologi
cal anomic conditions bear a sharp resemblance to the privileging of
order over disorder in the social influence conception of deterrence.
This interpretation

of Durkheim

emphasizes

substance

over

method,243 and his earlier work over his later work.244
At the substantive level, law, regularity, and order reign in
Durkheim's enterprise. Not just any law, but an "iron law . . .
against which it would be absurd to revolt."245 The primacy of legal
regulation is clearly reflected in Durkheim's diagnosis of the patho
logical condition which he calls "the anomic division of labor." An
omie - from the Greek anomia, without law246 - represents for
243. In sharp contrast to Durkheim's substantive argument discussed in the body of this
Article, Durkheim's method treats law as an evidentiary fact that is entirely derivative of the
social phenomenon of the division of labor. At the methodological level, law is merely an
effect, a consequence of social phenomena. This is the core of Durkheim's methodological
insight: to use positive law as the measure 'vith which to evaluate his dual hypotheses that (a)
the function of the division of labor is to produce social solidarity, and (b) that the organic
solidarity produced by the division of labor in modern societies is more robust than the
mechanical solidarity produced by collective consciousness in ancient societies. Durkheim
states this explicitly in the first chapter of the Division of Labor, which is dedicated to
method. See DURKHEIM, supra note 240, at 24. He there refers to positive law as an "exter
nal" datum which "symbolizes" the phenomenon of social solidarity. Law is the "perceptible
effects" of social solidarity. It is "nothing more than this very organisation [the organisation
of social life] in its most stable and precise form." Id. at 24-25. To use Durkheim's words,
law symbolizes, reproduces, mirrors, corresponds, and provides an external interpretation of
the moral phenomenon of social solidarity. See id. at 24-25, 27-28. Thus, at the methodologi
cal level, law is portrayed as a pure consequence: the collective consciousness and similari
ties of "lower" societies produce repressive laws and a mechanical form of solidarity, whereas
the division of labor in modern society produces restitutionary laws and a more robust, or
ganic solidarity. Law has no real autonomy and is not a force for change. And so Durk
heim's principal texts on punishment - On the Division ofLabor in Society and his article in
L '.Annee Socio/ogique (1899-1900) entitled Dew: /ois de l'evollltion penale - recite a story
about the declining role of repressive law in modern society. This is in sharp contrast to
Durkheim's substantive argument about the modern regulation of society through private
law principals.
244. Durkheim's later works, in particular his work on Moral Education, can be inter
preted as placing greater emphasis on repressive sanctions - and expressive punishment as necessary for social solidarity. See EMILE DURKHEIM: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND
APPLICATION OF THE SocIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (Everett K. Wilson ed., Free Press 1961)
(1925); JoHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 178 (1989); Thomas J,
Scheff, Review Essay: A New Durkheim, 96 AM. J. Soc. 741, 743 (1990).
245. DURKHEIM, supra note 240, at 122.
246. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN·
GUAGE UNABRIDGED 89 (1986).
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Durkheim the primary pathology of modem society. It may take
the form of the complete lack of regulation resulting in economic
crises and bankruptcies. Or, it may take the form of inappropriate
regulation, as in the case of the forced division of labor and the
resulting class war. But in all events, it is the lack of regulation that
" does not allow the functions to perform regularly and
harmoniously. "247
Under normal circumstances, human exchange produces "a
body of rules":248 "[T]he division of labour gives rise to rules en
suring peaceful and regular co-operation between the functions that
have been divided up."249 The lack of such rules
anomie
is
pathological, and arises only in "exceptional and abnormal circum
stances."250 Thus, for Durkheim, the division of labor takes on a
heavily regulated nature. His is an idea of social organization based
on the paradigm of ·rulemaking and obedience - what we might
call today the rule of law.251
Durkheim posits a hierarchy between modem society and more
primitive societies.252 Throughout his work, Durkheim disparages
premodem societies, even borrowing from the discipline of phre
nology to support his speculations about the greater homogeneity
of early peoples.253 According to Durkheim, non-pathological
modem societies demonstrate not only more robust social solidar-

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

DURKHEIM, supra note

-

240, at 303.

Id. at 304.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 307.

This was foreshadowed by Durkheim's use of metaphor. At the level of metaphor,
law reigns in Durkheim's enterprise. Throughout the Division ofLabor, Durkheim refers to
social phenomena using metaphors of laws and duties. Durkheim describes the increase of
organic solidarity in modernity as structural, necessary and universal. He writes, "this phe
nomenon is linked not to some accidental cause . . . but to what is most vital in the structure
of our societies . . . . So the law we established in the preceding chapter proves doubly useful
to us. Besides confirming the principles on which our conclusion is based, it enables us to
establish its universality.'' Id. at 102 (emphasis added). From the first page of his introduc
tion onward, Durkheim characterizes the division of labor as a "law," as "the higher law of
human societies," a "law of nature," and as necessary. Id. at 1, 3.
Law plays an equally important metaphoric role in Durkheim's essay - as evidenced by
the very title - Deux lois de ['evolution penale. The project of that essay is precisely to
establish and explain certain "laws" about law - "deux lois qui nous paraissent dominer
!'evolution du systeme repressif." See Emile Durkheim, Deux lois de l'evolution penale, in
L'.ANNEE SocIOLOGIQUE 1899-1900, at 65 (1901). These two "laws" are (a) that the intensity
of punishment increases in lower societies, as well as in authoritarian societies; and (b) that
deprivation of liberty alone is tending to become the normal type of punishment. See id. at

65, 78.
252. See DURKHEIM, supra note 240, at 92. He calls the latter "les societes tout a fait
inferieures." EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION ou TRAVAIL SoCIAL 108 (4th ed.,
Quadrige 1996) (1893).
253. See DURKHEIM, supra note 240, at 89-92.
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ity, but also greater individualism. Individual personality "develops
with the division of labour,"254 which is one of the reasons that spe
cialization becomes a moral duty. This hierarchy of modern over
ancient societies reflects Durkheim's preference for legality and
regulation.

With regard to

the

enforcement

of morals,

for

Durkheim, cooperation trumps coercion.
There is, consequently, a strong similarity between Durkheim
and the social influence conception of deterrence - beyond merely
the shared categories of honest persons and disorderly. Durkheim
privileges regulation and minimizes repressive sanctions. Similarly,
the new path of deterrence presents itself as an "alternative[ ] to the
severe punishments that dominate contemporary criminal law. "2ss
Rather than punish severely to deter, the new path seeks to en
force, in part, order or rules of civilian conduct that are geared to
producing a more harmonious social environment with stronger
moral bonds.

In

sum, the new path similarly endorses a form of

social solidarity based on ordered relations.
D.

The Problem of Subject Creation

The problem with Durkheim's distinction between honest and
disorderly persons is that it fails to take into account that the cate
gories themselves may be the product of the very processes that are
supposedly being legitimated and that are legitimating society. The
practices of punishment may participate in creating the categories
of law abider and disorderly. But if, in fact, the processes of punish
ment not only create social solidarity among honest people, but si
multaneously create the very category of honest people, then the
legitimating effect on society is undermined. The same is true of
the social solidarity produced by extensive legal regulation. Under
Durkheim's theory, ordered legal regulations serve and uphold the
natural division of labor, which in tum produces social solidarity.
But what if the legal regulations, instead of merely upholding the
social division of labor, actually divide society into the different so
cial strata and create the division of labor that marks modern soci
ety? Certainly the division of labor would be less "organic, " to use
Durkheim's terminology. It would be less natural and healthy, and
would instead resemble far more the "mechanical," imposed social
solidarity achieved by pre-modem systems of repressive criminal
sanctions.
254. Id. at 335.
255. Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2478.

November 1998]

Policing New York Style

353

Similar questions arise in the context of social influence theory.
Under the social influence conception of deterrence, order
maintenance policing influences the behavior of individuals who are
inclined to engage in crime and of committed law abiders. It
reduces law abiders' fear of crime and thereby induces them to en
gage in conduct that discourages crime - like walking the streets at
night. At the same time, it dissuades the disorderly from engaging
in crime by communicating that offenses will be punished. But
what if order-maintenance policing, instead of merely influencing
these categories of individuals, actually helps shape or create these
categories? What if the order itself - the order privileged by
order-maintenance policing - not only upholds the community
norms that result in greater moral cohesion and lower crime rates,
but instead creates those community norms? What if the order im
poses norms on the community?
These challenges to Durkheim's hypotheses and, similarly, to
the social influence conception of deterrence, have surfaced on a
number of different occasions, in different guises, during the course
of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They are most often
associated with the en/ants terribles of their epoch. Friedrich Nietz
sche, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Foucault challenged, in d�erent
ways, the causal reasoning underlying Durkheim's sociology. They
excavated and exposed, underneath the commonly accepted frame
work of causal explanations, other histories and processes.
Nietzsche attacked, among other things, the ideal of progress
embodied in Christian morality, vociferously arguing that, rather
than ennobling modem man, Christian morality had enfeebled man
to a condition of vile servitude. Were God not dead, Nietzsche
would have had him cry out to modem men: "O you dolts, you
presumptuous, pitying dolts, what have you done! Was that work
for your hands? How have you bungled and botched my beautiful
stone! What presumption! "256 Nietzsche evoked here the plasticity
of human nature - the way in which human nature is shaped like a
work of art or, alternatively, a work of adultery. Nietzsche's genea
logical enterprise aimed precisely at tracing the mechanisms, con
flicts, and deceptions that produced the formidable changes in
human nature from the original, forgetful, robust animal to the cal
culable, regular, and promise-keeping individual of modernity.257
256. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GooD AND EVIL 75 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vm
tage Books 1966) (1886).
257. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 58-60 (Walter Kauf
mann trans., Vintage Books 1967) (1887).
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Nietzsche did not accept the commonplace categories of virtuous
and disorderly. Instead, he challenged the value of those catego
ries, and attempted to unearth how processes, like punishment or

sociability, shaped the modem soul.258 Sartre also exposed the
brute and nauseous plasticity of the subject, perhaps nowhere bet
ter than in his first novel,

La Nausee.259

For Sartre, there could be

no :fixed categories of disorderly and law abider, since human be
ings have the radical ability to redefine themselves at any moment
in time.260 In their different ways, Nietzsche and Sartre opened a
space for an alternative vision of the human subject, in each case a
vision that emphasized the malleability of the human subject and
pointed to different forces that shaped the subject.261

IV.

MICHEL FOUCAULT

AND

SUBJECT CREATION

In relation to Durkheim, though, it is Michel Foucault's work
that presents the most direct challenge. Foucault wrote Discipline
and Punish against Durkheim's sociology.262 In the very first pages
258. On punishment, see, e.g., id. at 61 and 82 (punishment as a mnemotechnic device;
and as hindering the feeling of guilt); on sociability, see, e.g., id. at 84-85 (socialization disval
ued the instincts and turned man against himself, creating the modem soul).
259. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, LA NAUSEE 178-81 (1938).
260. See generally JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, L'EXISTENTIALISME EST UN HUMANISME 58 {1958)
("Ce que nous voulons dire, c'est qu'un homme n'est rien d'autre qu'une serie d'entreprises,
qu'il est la somme, !'organisation, !'ensemble des relations qui constituent ces entreprises.").

261. This is not to suggest that they were the first to offer such challenges. Others pre
ceded them. They were foreshadowed, for instance, in the eighteenth century, by thinkers
like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Contrary to popular opinion, Rousseau argued passionately, the
flowering of the arts and sciences in eighteenth-century Europe had eviscerated man's natu
ral virtue. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First Discourse, in THE FIRST AND SECOND D1s
COURSES 36-38 (Roger D. Masters & Judith R. Masters trans., Roger D. Masters ed., 1964).
By exposing man's natural goodness, Rousseau offered an alternative vision of unalloyed
freedom through participation and assent in the general will. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On
the Social Contract, in ON THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr 52-54 (Judith R. Masters trans., Roger D.
Masters ed., 1978). Rousseau's vision was, to be sure, marred by prescriptions for an authori
tarian civil religion and, perhaps to a lesser extent, for an all-knowing legislator. See id. at
124-32 (on Civil Religion); id. at 67-70 (on the Legislator). However, Rousseau thereby initi
ated a genealogical project that exposed the historical stages of human nature and revealed
the ways in which society could transform the subject - though Rousseau ultimately held on
to a fixed notion of genuine human nature corresponding to man in his natural state.
262. I think that the extent to which Foucault's work on punishment is a reaction against
Durkheim's is underestimated in the secondary literature. Even David Garland, who pro
vides a thorough and comprehensive review of Foucault's theory of punishment in Punish
ment and Modem Society does not, I believe, give adequate emphasis to this interpretation of
Foucault. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 241, at 132 ("Foucault's analysis of punishment is
quite distinct from Durkheim's, appearing to contradict it at a number of points, and, for the
most part, dealing with phenomena which hardly appear in Durkheim's work."). The result
is that the conventional readings of Foucault overestimate the place of power in the analysis
and focus on social construction rather than subject creation. I believe that even Garland, to
a certain extent, overemphasizes the theme of power in his discussion of Foucault and under
emphasizes subject creation. See id. at 134-36. By focusing on the critical relationship be-
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of his genealogy of the prison, Foucault defines his project in oppo
sition to Durkheim's. It is really only Durkheim he criticizes:

This book is intended as a correlative history of the modem soul
and of a new power to judge. . . .
But from what point can such a history of the modem soul on trial
be written? . . . By studying only the general social forms, as
Durkheim did (cf Bibliography), one runs the risk of positing as the
principle of greater leniency in punishment processes of individualiza
tion that are rather one of the effects of the new tactics of power,
among which are to be included the new penal mechanisms.263
Foucault appropriates Durkheim's celebrated concepts the better to
distance himself from Durkheim's method. Foucault's reference
point is Durkheim; and so, immediately following the preceding
passage, Foucault writes (I will italicize the words that refer to
Durkheim's thought):

This study obeys four general rules:
1. Do not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on
their 'repressive' effects alone, on their 'punishment' aspects alone,
but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects,
even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard
punishment as a complex social function.
2. Analyze punitive methods not simply as consequences of legis
lation or as indicators ofsocial structures, but as techniques possessing
their own specificity in the more general field of other ways of exer
cising power. Regard punishment as a political tactic.
3 . . . . [M]ake the technology of power the very principle both of
the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man.
4. Try to discover whether this entry of the soul on to the scene of
penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a whole
corpus of 'scientific' knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation
of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations.264
As this passage makes clear, Foucault sets out to reinterpret
the emergence of what Durkheim called

"la personalite in

dividuelle,"265 and which Durkheim attributed to the increasing so
cial division of labor, by exploring the modern reconfiguration of
the human body, the birth of the soul ("l'ame"), and the correlative
tween Foucault and Durkheim, this Article highlights Foucault's concern with subject
creation.
263. FouCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNisH, supra note 34, at 23 (emphasis added) (transla
tion of FouCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, at 27-28). In contrast, Foucault affiliates himself
somewhat with the Frankfurt School, especially Rusche and Kirchheimer's Punishment and
Social Structures (1939), see FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 24, and
with the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
264. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 23-24 (translation of
FouCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 28).
265. DURKHEIM, supra note 252 at 399.
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changes in the way that we judge others. Whereas Durkheim treats
punishment as evidence of the function of other social phenomena,
like the social division of labor, Foucault instead sets out to explore
discipline as the object itself of a Durkheimian functional analysis.
By explicitly citing only D urkheim and by appropriating
Durkheim's concepts, like the "repressive" and the "social func
tion," Foucault readily acknowledges Durkheim's preeminent place
in the tradition. But when Foucault prescribes, as the first tenet of
his method, "regard punishment as a complex social function," Fou
cault is essentially claiming to turn Durkheim's enterprise on its
head.266 The principal deficiency of Durkheim's work, according to
Foucault, is the failure to take account of the enabling effects of
punishment on the subject. This critique may apply with equal
force to the social influence conception of deterrence.
A.

Foucault on the Categories

Foucault's genealogy of the prison addresses both strands of
Durkheim's analysis. With regard first to the categories, Foucault's
discussion of the role of the delinquent in the modern carceral soci
ety illuminates, by analogy, the role of the disorderly in the social
influence conception of deterrence. The delinquent and the disor
derly have much in common and it is, for this reason, crucial to
rehearse Foucault's analysis. But the categories are also different in
important ways. Whereas delinquency correlates with treatment,
psychotherapy, and correction, the category of the disorderly is
more closely associated with a militaristic method of rectification.
The broken windows theory by no means advocates the more reha
bilitative or psychotherapeutic remedies that characterize certain of
the institutions described in

Discipline and Punish.

The broken

windows theory borrows instead from the classical method of deter
rence through excessive punishment, as well as the drill sergeant
model of discipline.
266. Recall that Durkheim was very careful to differentiate the concept of function from
that of effects or results and that he set out to investigate the function of the division of labor.
See DuRI<HEIM, supra note 240, at 11. He writes:
We cannot use "aim" or "purpose", and speak of the goal of the division of labour,
because that would suppose that the division of labour exists for the sake of results that
we shall determine. To use "results" or "effects" cannot satisfy us either, because no
idea of correspondence is evoked. On the other hand, the term "role" or "function" has
the great advantage of implying that idea, but in no way prejudges the question of know
ing how that correspondence has been established, or whether it arises from some in
tended and preconceived adaptation or from some adjustment after the event.

Id. Durkheim realizes his project - to investigate the function of the division of labor - by
treating law (and punishment) within the category of effects. Foucault flips this by treating, as

his principal object of study, the function of punishment.
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For this reason, the category of the disorderly offers an opportu
nity to refine Foucault's diagnosis of the modem carceral society.
Insofar as we are living today - inescapably, at present - within a
paradigm of the penitentiary, the differences between the delin
quent and the disorderly open a window into the different subtypes
of possible disciplinary practices. The social influence theory at
tempts to normalize the offender along the axis of order and disor
der.

However, if there is no evidence to support this axis of

normalization, then it might be better to reform along a different
axis,

such

as, for instance, poverty

or stability.

By refining

Foucault's analysis, we may be able to draw its policy implications.
Foucault's description of the modem carceral society draws on a
number of different mechanisms of disciplinary practice - for in
stance, discipline in the hospital, army, workplace, school, court, or
home - and his discussion benefits from grouping these strategies
together and highlighting their kinship. However, the consolidation
may detract from a more nuanced discussion of the different modal
ities of discipline that characterize modem penalty - the differ
ences precisely between discipline in the hospital and discipline in
the workshop. By selecting from those different approaches within
the larger rubric of discipline, we can begin to differentiate between
ways of disciplining, between techniques of punishment. This may
allow us to evaluate the quality-of-life initiative.
First, however, let me tum to the details of Foucault's analysis.
In

Discipline and Punish,

Foucault explores three very different

ways in which punishment has created the subject - how punish
ment has fundamentally altered the subject's self-understanding,
habits, emotions, and desires. The three different modalities corre
spond to three different stages in the history of punishment: first,
the brutal, torturous corporal punishments of the seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries; second, the representational and theatri
cal aspirations of the eighteenth century reformers; and third, the
disciplinary mechanisms of spatial, temporal, and bodily control
that capture the modem carceral system. Foucault suggests that
these three modalities are not entirely distinct. Certain techniques
from earlier historical periods are incorporated into later modali
ties.267 Foucault also suggests that the three mechanisms share im
portant features. They each operate on the body of the convicted:
the body is the intermediary between society and the subject.268
They each relate, idiosyncratically, to truth formation: they each
267. See infra note 283 (discussing Mettray).
268. Foucault writes:

358

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

97:291

help constitute the truth. "The truth-power relation, " Foucault sug
gests, "remains at the heart of all mechanisms of punishment. "269
And they each seek to induce obedience among subjects270 - but
through very different operations on the body.
The severe, brutal techniques of dismembering, quartering, or
branding convicts that characterize the seventeenth and early eight
eenth centuries - what Foucault refers to as

"/es supp/ices" - in

scribed the sovereign's power on the body of the condemned. The
mark of punishment on the body of the convict served to confirm
the truth of the crime and to rectify sovereign power.271 It signified
to the people that the convicted subject, who was often led by tor
ture to confession, had committed the crime, and it expressed the
consequence of that crime.272 It also served to reconstitute the sov
ereign's power. The dissymmetry between the criminal act and the
torturous punishment reflected the gross imbalance of power be
tween the subject and the sovereign, and served as a spectacle of
that very imbalance and excess. Punishment functioned as an ex
ample that demonstrated both the crime's existence, but also the
sovereign's ability to master it.273

In

terms of prevention, it oper

ated through terror.
In contrast, the eighteenth century reformers dreamt of another
modality of punishment - one that, ultimately, would not be real
ized except through its faint reflections in the modern carceral sys
tem.

D r awing first on themes of the eighteenth-century

Enlightenment period - themes of equality, humanity, lenience,
autonomy, and universality - and, second, on utilitarian principles
of prevention and correction, the reformers imagined a system of
coded penalties that would speak directly to the general public.
(I]n our societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain "political
economy" of the body: even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment,
even when they use "lenient" methods involving confinement or correction, it is always
the body that is at issue - the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their
distribution and their submission.
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PumsH, supra note 34, at 25 (translation of FOUCAULT,
SuRVEILLER ET PuNIR, supra note 34, at 30).

269.
270.
132).
271.
272.

Id. at 55 (translation of FouCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 59).
See id. at 129 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at
See id. at 47 (translation of FouCAuLT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 50).
See id. at 43 (translation of FoucAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 47)

("It was the task of the guilty man to bear openly his condemnation and the truth of the
crime that he had committed. His body, displayed, exhibited in procession, tortured, served
as the public support of a procedure that had hitherto remained in the shade; in him, on him,
the sentence had to be legible for all.").

273. See id.
96).

at 93 (translation of FoucAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 95-
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Punishment was to be effectuated through countless different sym
bolic or "picturesque"274 sanctions scattered throughout all walks of
life. Each penalty was to represent to the observer, in a more
muted way than the classical model, the lesson to be learned. The
idea was that of a "punitive city":

At the crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired
or bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that
may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment. . . . It
will be a visible punishment, a punishment that tells all, that explains,
justifies itself, convicts: placards, different-coloured caps bearing in
scriptions, posters, symbols, texts read or printed, tirelessly repeat the
code.275
This humanized spectacle was to serve, primarily, as a constant mo
rality play, intended to teach a lesson to schoolchildren and adults
about the consequences of vice.276 By reaching into all facets of
everyday life, the reformist ideal sought to extend the reach of the
example of punishment throughout the social body in a more egali
tarian, regular, effective, constant, yet economic manner.211 Their
project depended on publicity as a way to deeply reinforce the im
mediate association of crime and punishment - to "reactivat[e] the
signifying system of the code. "278
The modem carceral system operates by training the body with
an arsenal of coercive techniques. These techniques include the
strict control of time and space; the ranking of individuals and activ
ities; the forced repetition of exercises; the examination and its ac
companying comparisons, measures, hierarchies, and classifications;
and the forced internalization of control through panoptic mecha274. Id. at 114 (translation of FoucAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 116).
275. Id. at 113 (translation of FouCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 115).
Foucault's description of the reformers' dreams bears some resemblance to the contemporary
efforts to introduce shaming penalties into the law. It would be a fascinating project to ex
plore the eighteenth-century debates concerning representational punishment in light of the
contemporary debate over the use of emotions in criminal law. See James Q. Whitman, What
Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998); Toni M. Massaro, The
Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Refonn, 3 PsYCHOL. PUB. POLY. & L. 645 {1997);
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1996); Kahan, supra note 18; Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and
American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 {1991).
276. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 113 (translation of
FouCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 115) ("[T]he essential point, in all these

real or magnified severities, is that they should all, according to a strict economy, teach a
lesson: that each punishment should be a fable. . . . Around each of these moral 'representa
tions,' schoolchildren will gather with their masters and adults will learn what lessons to teach
their offspring.").
277. See id. at 80 (translation of FoucAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PuNm, supra note 34, at 83).
278. Id. at 128 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 131).
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nisms of surveillance.279 Unlike the reformers' emphasis on signs,
the modality of modem punishment focuses on exercises like "time
tables, compulsory movements, regular activities, solitary medita
tion, work in common, silence, application, respect, good habits. "28°
These exercises alter the subject's behaviors and habits, but also
operate on the subject's desires and self-understanding. They cor
respond to the emergence of the subject as an object of knowl
edge.281 It is here, in the words of Foucault, "in these 'ignoble'
archives " that can be found "the birth of the sciences of man. "282
Discipline is a multi-faceted phenomenon composed of several
different subsidiary clusters of techniques, corresponding to at least
six primary social structures: the family, the school, the military,
the workshop, the hospital, and the court.283 The modem carceral
techniques are premised on the idea that subjects need to be
trained in order to be improved; subjects need to be "normalized "
- to be made more like the norm that society aspires to - rather
than selected, with pre-existing habits and behaviors, from a fixed
pool of individualities.284 By improving the subject, the techniques
279. See id. at 141-67, 167 (translation of FouCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PuNIR, supra note
34, at 143-69, 169) ("(Discipline] operates four great techniques: it draws up tables; it
prescribes movements; it imposes exercises; lastly, in order to obtain the combination of
forces, it arranges 'tactics."').
280. Id. at 128 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 13132).
281. See, e.g., id. at 251 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34,
at 255) ("[T]he offender becomes an individual to know. This demand for knowledge was
not, in t!Ie first instance, inserted into the legislation itself, in order to provide substance for
t!Ie sentence and to determine t!Ie true degree of guilt. It is as a convict, as a point of applica
tion for punitive mechanisms, that the offender is constituted himself as the object of possible
knowledge.").
282. Id. at 191 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 193).
283. Foucault illustrates this point by means of a detailed discussion of Mettray, a juve
nile center opened in 1840 that housed not only juvenile delinquents, but also juveniles ac·
quitted for mental health reasons and boarders. Mettray was a combination of prison,
mental institution, and boarding school - what Foucault called "the carceral archipelago,"
id. at 297, or, elsewhere, "t!Ie first training college in pure discipline," id. at 295. Foucault
characterizes Mettray as the crowning moment of the carceral system: "[T]he date of com·
pletion of the carceral system." Id. at 293. "Why Mettray?" Foucault asks. "Because it is the
disciplinary form at its most extreme, the model in which are concentrated all the coercive
technologies of behavior." Id. Mettray combined several disciplinary clusters, replicating the
authority of t!Ie big brot!Ier, the inspections of the military superior, t!Ie supervision of the
factory foreman, t!Ie examination of the school instructor, and the punishment meted out by
the judge. The authorities at Mettray combined all these features: "They were in a sense
technicians of behavior: engineers of conduct, orthopaedists of individuality." Id. at 294.
Mettray is the picture perfect illustration of t!Ie carceral system. It is important to note, for
our purposes here, that the juridical model formed a part of the disciplinary model - that it
was incorporated as one element of the larger carceral system and not entirely discarded. See
id.

284. See id. at 170 (translation of FoucAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNm, supra note 34, at
172).
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serve not only the negative function of preventing crime, but also
the positive function of increasing utility and social wealth. This is
the "functional inversion of the disciplines": "At first, they were
expected to neutralize dangers, to fix useless or disturbed popula
tions, to avoid the inconveniences of over-large assemblies; now
they were being asked to play a positive role, for they were becom
ing able to do so, to increase the possible utility of individuals. "285
These techniques reflect a fundamental shift in the object of judg
ment. Whereas in the classical period a crime was judged, in the
modem period something else is being judged: "the passions, in
stincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environ
ment or heredity."286 The judge no longer passes judgment on the
criminal act, but on the soul of the convicted criminal and on his
delinquence.287 These techniques are all embodied in the prison,
the institution that colonized punishment during the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.288
What differs then in the three modalities of punishment - the
monarchical law, the reformers' dreams, and the carceral society is not the theoretic basis of the right to punish, nor the leniency of
the punishment, nor even its effectiveness on the subject. It is, in
stead, the way in which the punishment operates on the body and
shapes the subject.

The difference is to be found in the procedure of access to the individ
ual, the way in which the punishing power gets control over him, the
instruments that it uses in order to achieve this transformation; it is in
the technology of the penalty, not in its theoretical foundation; in the
relation that it establishes with the body and with the soul, and not in
the way that it is inserted within the legal system.289
285. Id. at 210 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 211);
see also id. at 24 (translation of FouCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 29).
286. Id. at 17 (translation of FoucAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 23).
287. See id. at 18-19 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at
23-24).

288. Foucault argues, in Discipline and Punish, that the triumph of the prison in the mod
ern period is a symptom of larger disciplinary processes that have infiltrated all aspects of
life. See, e.g., id. at 231 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at
233) ("At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was, it is true, a penality
of detention; and it was a new thing. But it was really the opening up of penality to mecha
nisms of coercion already elaborated elsewhere."). In effect, then, it is discipline, not just the
prison, that colonized punishment in the modern period. See, e.g., id. at 209 (translation of
FouCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 211) ("The movement [to the prison]
rests on a historical transformation: the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the whole so
cial body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society.").
289. Id. at 127 (translation of FouCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 130).
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The three modalities differ as techniques, as arts of punishment.290

In their trilogy, they comprised:

" [T]he sovereign and his force, the

social body and the administrative apparatus; mark, sign, trace; cer
emony, representation, exercise; the vanquished enemy, the juridi
cal subject in the process of requalification, the individual subjected
to immediate coercion; the tortured body, the soul \vith its manipu
lated representations, the body subjected to training. "291

It is within this framework that we can begin to assess New York
The policy of aggressive misde

City's quality-of-life initiative.

meanor arrests bears a close resemblance to the juridical model in a
number of respects. First, it bears the mark of sovereign excess .
The idea of subjecting someone who has been, for instance, drink
ing in a public space to several hours in a cramped police van, to a
strip search, to overnight detention, and to a criminal record bears
the trappings of that imbalance between the subject and the sover
eign that marked the more brutal punishments of the seventeenth
century. The theory of punishment mirrors the early seventeenth
century reliance on dissymmetry. Second, it has the trappings of
the juridical - rather than normalizing - judgment: an all or
nothing, guilty or innocent dichotomy. Discipline and normaliza
tion operate by creating a spectrum of comparison along which in
dividuals can be differentiated, classified, and compared.

In

contrast, the classical juridical model was binary. As Foucault ex
plains, the essential function of classical juridical penalty

is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of
laws and texts that must be remembered; [it] operates not by differen
tiating individuals, but by specifying acts according to a number of
general categories; not by hierarchizing, but quite simply by bringing
into play the binary opposition of the permitted and the forbidden;
not by homogenizing, but by operating the division, acquired once
and for all, of condemnation.292
The quality-of-life initiative is, in this sense, the quintessential penal
mechanism at the core of the disciplinary process. It is the juridical
element in the panoply of disciplinary techniques, the juridical
model embedded in a cluster of discipline. Foucault writes, "At the
290. See, e.g., id. at 257 (translation of FoucAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34,
at 261) ("The transition from the public execution, with its spectacular rituals, its art mingled
with the ceremony of pain, to the penalties of prisons buried in architectural masses and
guarded by the secrecy of administrations, is not a transition to an undifferentiated, abstract,
confused penality; it is the transition from one art of punishing to another, no less skilful one.
It is a technical mutation.").
291. Id. at 131 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 134).
292. Id. at 183 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 185).

November 1998]

Policing New York Style

363

heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mecha
nism."293 The quality-of-life initiative is precisely that mechanism.
At the same time, however, the quality-of-life initiative feeds
into the disciplinary project by producing a subject to normalize the disorderly. By normalizing along the axis of disorder, the qual
ity-of-life initiative breaks down and blends together the line be
tween disorder and crime. Disorder becomes a degree of crime:
breaking a window, littering, jumping a turnstile become grades
along a spectrum that leads to homicide. The analogy, from Fou
cault, is to the penitentiary technique:

This vast mechanism established a slow, continuous, imperceptible
gradation that made it possible to pass naturally from disorder to of
fence and back from a transgression of the law to a slight departure
from a rule, an average, a demand, a norm. . . . You will end up in the
convict-ship, the slightest indiscipline seems to say; and the harshest
of prisons says to the prisoners condemned to life: I shall note the
slightest irregularity in your conduct.294
Just like the category of the delinquent, the category of the disor
derly breaks down the lines between minor infraction, minor disor
der, and major offense. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the quality-of
life initiative also feeds into the disciplinary project of surveillance.
To say, however, that the quality-of-life initiative is part of the
disciplinary project is to say too little - everything is today, since
we live, according to Foucault, in a disciplinary society. Until such
time as another paradigm presents itself, what we have to do today
is compare the different genres of discipline. It is here that we can
refine Foucault's analysis for there are many things that the quality
of-life is not. It is not modeled on the rehabilitative ideal central to
many disciplinary projects, especially that of the mental hospital,
welfare, and social work institutions. It does not feed into the psy
chotherapeutic. It does not coddle the disorderly. It does not aim
so much to reform the disorderly as it does to punish them and to
exclude them in the sense of getting them off the street. Insofar as
the strategy does seek to influence their behavior, it does not em
ploy the traditional rehabilitative methods. Nor does the quality
of-life initiative incorporate the concept of examination - the call-

293. Id. at 177 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 180).
294. Id. at 298-99 (translation of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET l'uNIR, supra note 34, at
306).
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ing card of school discipline. These are different subtypes of disci
plinary techniques.29s
New York's order-maintenance policing seems to draw more
heavily both on the juridical model and the military form of disci
pline: the juridical insofar as it utilizes punishment that may seem
somewhat excessive; military in the sense that it is normalized along
an axis of disorder with a type of military observation, inspection,
and exercise. Military discipline is captured in the ideal model of
the military camp:

"In

the perfect camp," Foucault writes, "all

power would be exercised solely through exact observation."296
The military space is designed "to act on those it shelters, to pro
vide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to
them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them."297
Under this analysis, the weakness of the quality-of-life initiative
is that it normalizes in a militaristic way along an axis of disorder
even though there is inadequate empirical support. The disorderly
may be the wrong target - or at least, there is not sufficient evi
dence to suggest that they are the right target. As we saw earlier,
Skogan's data suggests that poverty, stability, and race - rather
than disorder - may account for the discrepancies in neighbor
hood crime levels. This hypothesis needs to be further operational
ized and verified. If it is true, however, then our normalizing,
disciplinary practices should be reoriented along the axes of in
come, employment, and stability - and the issue of race should be
directly addressed. If true, our policing and enforcement strategies
should focus on workshop discipline, rather than on the juridical or
military models - regardless of the fact that workshop discipline is
a target of Foucault's critique.
Foucault's contribution is to shed light on how the techniques of
punishment associated with the quality-of-life initiative create the
category of the disorderly. The quality-of-life initiative focuses on
the biography of the disorderly, rather than on the criminal act. It
too judges the soul of the disorderly. It shapes the subject not sim
ply by giving the individual a criminal record, and not simply by
convicting the person. It shapes the subject by turning the individ
ual into someone that needs to be policed, surveyed, watched, relo295. See Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 449, 455 (1996), for a somewhat similar interpretation of the different disciplinary tech
nologies that Foucault deploys.
296. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 171 (translation of
FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 173).
297. Id. at 172 (translation of FouCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 174).
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cated, and controlled. It is in this sense that Foucault writes,
regarding the analogous delinquent, that

[i]t is said that the prison fabricated delinquents; it is true that it
brings back, almost inevitably, before the courts those who have been
sent there. But it also fabricates them in the sense that it has intro
duced into the operation of the law and the offence, the judge and the
offender . . . the non-corporal reality of the delinquency that links
them together and, for a century and a half, has caught them in the
same trap.298
To say that the quality-of-life initiative shapes the disorderly subject
is not to say that it promotes more disorderly conduct by labeling
the individual as disorderly - whether or not that is true. It is,
instead, to suggest that the theory of deterrence and punishment
focuses on the whole biography of the disorderly person, rather
than the criminal act; and thereby facilitates a policy of surveillance,
control, relocation, and exclusion of the · disorderly.299 In other
words, the category of the disorderly is the product of the quality
of-life initiative and it promotes and facilitates a policy of aggres
sive arrest and detention.
B.

Foucault on Law

Foucault's writings also offer an alternative interpretation of the
role of legal order - an antithesis to the second prong of
Durkheim's work. Whereas, for Durkheim, ordered legal regula
tion produces healthy moral cohesion (through the intermediary of
the division of labor), for Foucault it is the disciplines that enforce
moral cohesion under the cover of legal order.

As a result,

Foucault's writings on law are critical to appraise the social influ
ence conception of deterrence.3oo
298.

Id.

at 255 (translation of FouCAULT,

SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 258).

299. The relationship and important differences between labeling theory in criminology
and subject creation theory are complex and, clearly, beyond the scope of this Article. For
present purposes, it is enough that subject creation theory, in contrast to labeling theory,
does not necessarily suggest that the category of the disorderly creates more disorderly be
havior on the part of the disorderly persons. Cf. HowARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES
IN THE SoCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 34 (1963) ("Treating a person as though he were generally
rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. It sets in motion several
mechanisms which conspire to shape the person in the image people have of him."). The
focus of my deployment of subject creation theory here is instead on the apparatuses of
punishment and discipline that naturally flow from the category of the disorderly. For a
classic expression of labeling theory, see id. at 31-35; THE OnmR SIDE (Howard Becker ed.,
1964).
300. A number of scholars suggest that Foucault lacks a theory of law. Duncan Kennedy,
in his essay The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, criticizes Foucault for not taking law
seriously enough. He argues that Foucault has an antiquated, pre-realist view of juridical
power - "a typically European but utterly misconceived picture of the legal system as a
domain governed by rules (as opposed to standards), by individualist (as opposed to altruist)
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For Foucault, law and discipline are very different from each
other, and the tension between them gives rise to the modern
carceral system and a new form of law, le pouvoir normalisateur.
Discipline is a form of counter-law,301 of dissymmetry and inequal
ity, that operates beneath the discourse of juridical power to make
possible claims of equality and universal rights. Just as the disci
pline of the workshop molded men into workers and thereby ena
bled the industrial revolution to take place,302 general discipline
shapes individuals into ordinary citizens, non-delinquents, and
thereby makes it possible to speak about universal rights. At the
same time, juridical discourse about human rights serves as a cover
that allows disciplinary power to grow.
The democratization of rights discourse-resulting in claims of
equality, humanity, and universality-has fueled the growth of dis
ciplinary power. Equality permeates the idea of one carceral pun
ishment for all, with different lengths of time measured according to
definitions of legal rights, and by deductive (as opposed to 'policy-oriented') reasoning."
Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes ofLaw, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEA"Y DRESSING, ETC. 83, 118
n.* (1993). According to Kennedy, "law and legal discourse play superstructural and mystifi
catory roles in Foucault's disciplinary society analogous to their roles in Marx's political
economy." Id. at 122. Similarly, Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, in their recent book Fou
cault and Law, charge that "Foucault does not have a theory of law" and that he "tends to
expel law from any major role in modem forms of government." .ALAN HUNT & GARY
WICKHAM, FoucAULT AND LAW viii, 22 (1994). Hugh Baxter agrees. "A straightforward
reading of Foucault's writings on power suggests, as Hunt and Wickham observe, that
Foucault tends to 'expel law from any significant role' in modem society." Baxter, supra note
295, at 461. Baxter continues: "Foucault's conception of law as sovereign command is too
crude a tool for understanding modem law." Id. at 464.
Law, however, is by no means an untheorized concept for Foucault. To the contrary, law
is at the heart of Foucault's project. In fact, in Foucault's stated purpose - "a genealogy of
the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifi
cations and rules," FouCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 23 (emphasis ad
ded) (translation of FOUCAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 27) - law and
knowledge play equally important roles. The discussion in text will bear this point out. See
also id. ("Instead of treating the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences
as two separate series . . . see whether there is not some common matrix or whether they do
not both derive from a single process of 'epistemologico-juridical' formation." Id. (transla
tion of FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUN!R, supra note 34, at 28)).

301. Scholars have suggested that this idea of discipline as counter-law represents the
expulsion of law in Foucault's work. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 295, at 454 ("The opposition
between law-as-sovereign-power, on one hand, and disciplinary power, on the other, is one of
the key themes of Foucault's work on power. It will also tum out to be essential to Foucault's
'expulsion of law' from modernity."). However, as discussed infra, it is precisely this opposi
tion that fuels both legal and disciplinary power. Law thus provides a critical mechanism in
modernity.
302. See FoucAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUN!sH, supra note 34, at 221 (translation of Fou
CAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 222) (discussing the industrial revolution).
Foucault suggests that the infusion of disciplinary power in the industrial complex made pos·
sible the industrial revolution by shaping the modem worker. Foucault refers in a footnote
to Marx's Das Kapital, and thereby indicates some econoinic implications of his study of
disciplinary power.
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the delinquency of the individual. Humanity also permeates the
idea of incarceration as reflected in the notion that "the penalty
must be nothing more than the deprivation of liberty."303 And the
claim of universality justifies the power to punish. Together, these
juridical claims have empowered and facilitated the growth of the
carceral system. Legal discourse has allowed the disciplines to
flourish.
Foucault describes this interplay between juridical and disciplinary power in his

Two Lectures

as follows:

[T]he theory of sovereignty, and the organization of a legal code cen
tred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon
the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual
procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and
to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the
exercise of his proper sovereign rights. The juridical systems - and
this applies both to their codification and to their theorization - have
enabled sovereignty to be democratized through the constitution of a
public right articulated upon collective sovereignty, while at the same
time this democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally deter
mined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.304

Modem society, for Foucault, is defined then by this conjunction
of legal discourse - rights talk - and disciplinary coercion. The
carceral system is constructed within a space constituted by both.305
The confrontation produces a new tendency, a process of normali
zation that simultaneously creates the delinquent and justifies the
power to punish.306 This normalizing power defines and categorizes
303. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuN!sH, supra note 34, at 248 (translation of FOU
CAULT, SURVEILLER ET PuN!R, supra note 34, at 251).
304. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in PoWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECI'ED lNrERVIEWS
AND OTHER WRITINGs, 1972-1977, at 78, 105 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans.,
Pantheon Books 1980) [hereinafter FouCAULT, Two Lectures]. Foucault makes the same
point in FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuN!sH, supra note 34, at 221-22 (translation of FOU
CAULT, SuRVEILLER ET PuNIR, supra note 34, at 223-24). This passage represents the crux of
my difference with Hunt, Wickam, and Baxter. While these scholars dismiss this discussion,
see HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 300, at 61-62; Baxter, supra note 295, at 462-63, I believe
that it is at the center of Foucault's discussion of law.
305. See FOUCAULT, Tivo Lectures, supra note 304, at 104-08. "The powers of modem
society are exercised through, on the basis of, and by virtue of, this very heterogeneity be
tween a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous disciplinary mechanism." Id. at 106.
306. Foucault writes:
With this new economy of power, the carceral system, which is its basic instrument,
permitted the emergence of a new form of "law": a mixture of legality and nature, pre
scription and constitution, the norm. This had a whole series of effects: the internal
dislocation of the judicial power or at least of its functioning; an increasing difficulty in
judging, as if one were ashamed to pass sentence; a furious desire on the part of judges
to judge, assess, diagnose, recognize the normal and abnormal and claim the honour of
curing or rehabilitating. . . . The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in
the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the "social
worker"-judge. . . . The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its
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the delinquent, surveys all aspects of his existence and gives rise to
the human sciences whose object is that individual. This normaliz
ing power is neither wholly disciplinary, nor entirely juridical. It is
a mixture. It contains both elements,307 and it justifies the power to
punish.3os
C.

The Implications for the Social Influence Conception
of Deterrence

This reading of Foucault challenges us to rethink the social in
fluence conception of deterrence. I will summarize here in brute
simplicity the concrete implications. First, the quality-of-life initia
tive may create the category of the disorderly. Second, the category
of the disorderly may facilitate a policy of aggressive arrests, with
the possibility of attendant brutality, even though such a policy is
unlikely to have the slightest effect on crime rates. Third, the inter
play of the norm of orderliness (discipline) and the ideals of justice
(law) may succeed in blinding us to the disorder that accompanies
the quality-of-life initiative.
The social influence theory of deterrence concentrates on the
construction of social meaning,309 but fails to pay enough attention
to the way that social meaning constructs the subject and to the way
that our understanding of the subject fosters certain forms of disci
plinary strategies. It does not pay enough attention to the way that
social meaning allows us to treat the disorderly as deviant and
outside the realm of our legal ideals, or to the way that social meansystems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest sup
port, in modem society, of the normalizing power.
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNisH, supra note 34, at 304 (translation of FOUCAULT,
SURVEILLER ET PuNIR, supra note 34, at 310-11).

307. It is important for Foucault that both juridical and disciplinary power be part of the
new law. Thus, Foucault writes in Two Lectures:
I believe that the process which has really rendered the discourse of the human sciences
possible is the juxtaposition, the encounter between two lines of approach, two mecha
nisms, two absolutely heterogeneous types of discourse: on the one hand there is the re
organisation of right that invests sovereignty, and on the other, the mechanics of the
coercive forces whose exercise takes a disciplinary form. And I believe that in our own
times power is exercised simultaneously through this right and these techniques and that
these techniques and these discourses, to which the disciplines give rise invade the area
of right so that the procedures of normalisation come to be ever more constantly en
gaged in the colonisation of those of law. I believe that all this can explain the global
functioning of what I would call a society of normalisation.
FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, supra note 304, at 107.
308. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 224 (translation
FoucAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 225) {"Ce qui generalise alors

of
le
po_uvoir de punir, ce n'est pas la conscience universelle de la Joi dans chacun des sujets de
droit, c'est l'etendue reguliere, c'est la trame infiniment serree des procedes panoptiques.").

309. See•Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 370-71; Lessig, supra note 16, at 96272.
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ing allows us to implement a policy of aggressive misdemeanor ar
rests without noticing it. This reading of Foucault explains how.
discussing modem society, Foucault writes:

In

[P]erhaps the most important effect of the carceral system and of its
extension well beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in mak
ing the power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering at least the
threshold of tolerance to penalty. It tends to efface what may be exor
bitant in the exercise of punishment.310
This may explain why we so easily ignore what it would actually be
like to be arrested, handcuffed, booked, transported, strip-searched,
jailed, and given a criminal record for a minor misdemeanor of
fense. We have so internalized the norm of orderliness that even
those among us who favor social norms and seek alternatives to
incarceration disregard the fact that the quality-of-life initiative re
lies so extensively on law enforcement, arrest, and incarceration.
We are blinded because, after all, the people being arrested are dis
orderly - they have committed crimes.311
This reading of Foucault differs from that of social norm propo
nents. Lawrence Lessig writes: "Michel Foucault's work is another
example [of the evolution of social meaning], though his is an ac
count focused less on meaning, and more on the 'meticulous obser
vation of detail' constructing structures of power and discipline in
social life."312 Under my reading, Foucault is not so much con
cerned with the evolution of social meaning for its own sake,
though the evolution of social meaning is crucial to his enterprise.
Foucault is primarily concerned with the way that social meaning
shapes the subject; his ultimate focus is not on social meaning, but
on the subject. That is the sense in which he famously stated that
all his writings were not about power, but rather an attempt "to

310. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 301 (translation of
FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 308). "It does this by playing the two
registers in which it is deployed - the legal register of justice and the extra-legal register of
discipline - against one another." Id. at 301-02 (translation of FouCAULT, SURVEILLER ET
PUNIR, supra note 34, at 308).
311. After all, criminals continue to be, today, a class of people that many feel entitled to
hate and exclude. See KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBA'IZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND (1995)
(empirical data regarding public opinion about criminal justice); B oNNIE HONIG, PoLmCAL
THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF PoLmcs 126-61 (1993) (Rawls excludes criminality
from the original position and thereby marginalizes the criminal); Richard Posner, Emotion
versus Emotionalism in Law, Paper Delivered Before the Conference on Emotions and the
Law (May 23, 1998) ("I do not consider it immoral to hate criminals, philanderers, braggarts,
or even beggars (who in today's America are mainly a species of con man).").
312. Lessig, supra note 16, at 962:
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create a history of the different modes by which . . . human beings
are made subjects."313
Now, to be sure, the new path of deterrence does overlap some
what with subject creation. Under the social influence conception,
law and the social environment affect - maybe even shape - the
individual's conduct. "The decisions of individuals to commit
crimes," Kahan writes, "are influenced by their perception of
others' beliefs and intentions; the law shapes information about
what those beliefs and intentions are."314 But social meaning influ
ences persons

differently

depending on their category, and the dif

ference is crucial to the social influence explanation: honest people
leave the neighborhood, whereas the disorderly invade. Social in
fluence operates on pre-existing categories.
The relationship between social influence theory and the cri
tique that I have offered here can be illustrated in the following
diagram. At the heart of the diagram is the social influence theory
(from Fig.

1 supra).

Superimposed over the social influence theory

is my critique, with its three principal moments. Those moments
are

(1) subject creation:

how the norm of order may create the cat

egories of honest and disorderly; (2) facilitation: how the categories
may promote a policy of arrest, despite the lack of evidence of de
terrence; and (3) overpowering: how the interplay between disci
pline and law may blind us to disorder.

313. Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, Aftenvord to HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL
RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 208 (2d
ed. 1983). Foucault makes this point, in fact, in the passage quoted by Lessig, where Foucault
writes:
A meticulous observation of detail, and at the same time a political awareness of
these small things, for the control and use of men, emerge through the classical age
bearing with them a whole set of techniques, a whole corpus of methods and knowledge,
descriptions, plans and data. And from such trifles, no doubt, the man ofmodern human
ism was born.
FOUCAULT, D1sc1PLINE AND PuN1sH, supra note 34, at 141 (emphasis added) (translation of
FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR, supra note 34, at 143).
314. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 351.
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FIGURE

3:

CHALLENGING THE CATEGORIES UNDERLYING THE SOCIAL
INFLUENCE CONCEPTION OF DETERRENCE
The interplay of law
and discipline
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The diagram attempts to incorporate the principal implications
and show how they relate to - and in effect enable - the social
influence conception of deterrence. These implications, of course,
raise a number of questions. Is it true, in fact, that the categories
facilitate a policy of aggressive arrests? Is there evidence of police
brutality? Are there alternatives to arrest?
D.

Subject Creation in Contemporary Criminal Law Scholarship
Before answering these questions and suggesting policy implica

tions, it may be worth pausing, for a moment, to see how this cri
tique of Durkheim's sociological approach - and, correspondingly,
of the social influence conception of deterrence - is reflected in
contemporary scholarship in criminal law. While some scholars ex
plicitly deploy subject creation theory,315 I would like to focus here
315. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1945
(1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Jonathan Simon, Ghosts
of the Disciplinary Machine: Lee Harvey Oswald, Life-History, and the Truth of Crime, 10
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 75 (1998); Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as Cultural Docu
ment: Seeking the Morally Optimal Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 283 (1996); Jonathan A.
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on two articles that rely on different intellectual traditions to show
how pervasive the insight of subject creation is in the criminal law.
The two articles are John Griffiths's Ideology

in Criminal Procedure
or A Third 'Model' of the Criminal Process316 and Carol and Jordan
Steiker's Sober Second Thoughts: Reflection on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment. 317 This discussion

may help illustrate how subject creation theory can be deployed in
the context of the social influence conception of deterrence.

In Ideology in Criminal Procedure,

John Griffiths challenges the

categories of the criminal and the committed law abider. Griffiths
approaches this task from a different intellectual tradition, namely
from the tradition of critical theory of the Frankfurt School. His
article was published in 1970, several years before the publication
of Discipline and Punish, yet it reflects, in a number of ways,
Foucault's critique.31s
Griffiths's article is a critique of ideology in the traditional criti
cal theory sense.319 His challenge to the underlying categories is
framed as an attack on a certain form of ideology in criminal proce
dure.320 Griffiths's project is to expose the prevailing ideology in
order to make possible alternative conceptions that are presently
foreclosed by the operative categories that dominate present think
ing.

"American thought

about criminal procedure,"

Griffiths

writes, "is confined within a prevailing ideology. By describing an
Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After 1lventy
Five Years, 1962-1987, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 41 {1987).
316. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE LJ. 359 (1970).
317. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 1lvo
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 357 (1995).
318. This discussion touches upon the larger issue of the relationship between Foucault
and Critical Theory, a fascinating and complex topic that is beyond the scope of this Article.
For entry into that discussion, see Habermas's dialogue with Foucault in CRITIQUE AND
PoWER: RECASTING TiiE FoUCAULTiHABERMAs DEBATE (Michael Kelly ed., 1994); see also
AxEL HoNNETH, THE CRITIQUE OF PowER (Kenneth Baynes trans., 1991).
319. See Griffiths, supra note 316; see also RAYMOND GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL
THEORY: HABERMAS AND TiiE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 22-26 (1981).
320. Griffiths explains:
I use the word (ideology] to refer to that set of beliefs, assumptions, categories of under
standing, and the like, which affect and determine the structure of perception (not only
of physical phenomena, like causation, which has consumed the interest of philosophers,
but also, and most particularly here, of social facts, relationships and possibilities). Ideo
logical beliefs are pre-logical because they determine the structure of perception and
consciousness and therefore are enmeshed in the factual and linguistic premises of argu
ment. It is only self-consciousness concerning the existence and nature of ideology
which permits an appreciation of the extent to which it determines the contents of the
world of experience and possibility. Self-consciousness is therefore the primary intellec
tual virtue.
Griffiths, supra note 316, at 359 n.1.
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alternative, I shall seek to illustrate that our present assumptions
are not the inevitable truths they often seem to be."321
Griffiths describes the prevailing ideology of criminal procedure
as premised on the assumption of an irreconcilable conflict between
the state and the individual defendant. He calls this the "Battle
Model" and suggests that it encompasses both of Herbert Packer's
famous models of criminal process - both the Due Process Model,
which insists on the priority of the individual and the limits on offi
cial power, and the Crime Control Model, which privileges law en
forcement and speedy and efficient resolution of charges.

The

Battle Model, though, has built-in constraints. Like any other ide
ology, it reinforces certain categories that ultimately limit possible
outcomes. So Griffiths writes:

[W]e can clearly see the ideological limits within which [Packer's]
conception of two Models is confined: despite his intention to lay
bare the entire spectrum of procedural possibility, the two Models in
fact give us only that which is relevant to a particular and limited
conception of the substantive function of criminal law - prevention
and retribution.322
As an alternative to the Battle Model, Griffiths offers an approach
to criminal procedure based on the ideology of the family.323 In
stead of assuming, as Packer does, "disharmony, fundamentally ir
reconcilable interests, a state of war" between the individual and
the State, Griffiths proposes to "start from an assumption of recon
cilable - even mutually supportive - interests, a state of love."324
Under a "Family Model," Griffiths suggests, there would be an
entirely different conception of the criminal. Rather than the crimi
nal being viewed as someone to be deterred or incapacitated, the
Family Model would look upon him or her as a wayward son or
daughter in need of guidance. The Family Model would trigger

acceptance of the idea that criminals are just people who are deemed
to have offended - that we are all of us both actual and potential
criminals - that "criminals" are not a special kind and class of people
with a unique relation to the state. So adherents to the Family Model
would not talk (or think) about "offenders," or "criminals," or "peo
ple who commit crimes," as if these words referred to people in any
other aspect than their exposure to the criminal process.325
321. Id. at 359·60.
322. Id. at 366.
323. Griffiths's writings on the Family Model resonate strongly in contemporary criminol
ogy. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 244, at 56-57; see generally MICHAEL R.
GoTIFREosoN & TRAVIS Hmscm, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME (1990).
324. Griffiths, supra note 316, at 371.
325. Id. at 374.
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Griffiths draws attention to a number of implications. For example,
the role of the criminal defense attorney would fundamentally
change. Defense counsel would no longer stop representing their
clients at sentencing, but would instead remain involved throughout
the incarceration and during the transition back into the free
world.326
Griffiths's article shares two central theses with subject creation
theory: first, he suggests that, in the traditional Battle Model, the
categories of criminals and honest persons are unexamined and pre
logical conceptions that have broad and, again, unexamined, conse
quences for policymaking; and, second, that these categories are
themselves constructed and reinforced by legal ideology. There is a
self-reinforcing nature to the relationship between the categories
and public policies. The public policies assume the categories, rein
force the categories, but also follow from the categories.
There are, of course, significant differences between Griffiths
and Foucault, not the least of which concern the method of exposi
tion. As noted earlier, Griffiths proposes, but disavows the Family
Model. He claims to deploy it merely as a technical device.327 The
underlying assumption is that, confronted with an alternative way
of conceptualizing the world, the reader will become conscious of
the limitations of the prevailing ideology. It is, in a sense, a shock
therapy. The juxtaposition is supposed to jump-start our imagina
tion.328 His method differs from Foucault's intricate genealogical
enterprise, but his critique of the categories plays a very similar
role.
Griffiths's work is not primarily concerned with the interrela
tionship between discipline and law.329 This concern is reflected in
326. See id. at 380, 383.
327. See id. at 359-60 ("By describing an alternative, I shall seek to illustrate that our
present assumptions are not the inevitable truths they often seem to be. The alternative
presented is not especially novel, nor is it one to which I necessarily subscribe. My purpose is
merely to explore the problem of ideology in criminal procedure, and to that end the self
conscious posing of an alternative is justified by its heuristic value."). One does get the im
pression, though, that Griffiths favors the Family Model. This is perhaps most clear in his
conclusion. See id. at 410-17.

328. Griffith explains:
This brings me to my ultimate conclusion, which is that speculation about fundamental
change in criminal procedure must begin with the development of ideological self
consciousness and speculation about the possibilities of ideological change. . . . [I]t seems
to me that very little substanial [sic] progress is to be made in thinking about criminal
procedure until we address ourselves to the ideological underpinnings of our thought.
The first step in doing that is simply to set our minds free to wonder.
Id. at 417.
329. Griffiths does, though, address the disciplinary aspects of legal ideology, in particu
lar the effect of criminal procedure on the different classes in society. See id. at 414-16.
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Carol and Jordan Steiker's work on capital punishment, especially
their most recent article, Sober Second Thoughts.330 The authors
explore there the development of death penalty law over the past
two decades. They suggest that today's intricate Eighth Amend
ment jurisprudence is deeply flawed in that it fails to offer substan
tive protection against arbitrariness or to fulfill the original
aspirations of fairness, individualization, reliability, and just desert.
They question why such a deeply flawed body of law would persist,
despite its tragic failure as a regulatory mechanism, and come up
empty handed. Ultimately, the authors conclude that they were
simply asking the wrong question:

"Instead of asking why the

Court's doctrine has persisted despite its failure as regulation, per
haps we should be asking whether that doctrine has any effect be
its failure as regulation."331 The effect, it turns out, is

sides

legitimation.332 The authors explain:

Perhaps the Justices have retained current death penalty doctrine de
spite its failings as a house because at some level they appreciate its
success as a facade. The Court's doctrine can be said to work as a
facade to the extent that it is successful - and we argue below that it
is - at making participants in the criminal justice system and the pub
lic at large more comfortable with the death penalty than they other
wise would be or should be. 333
Drawing on the Weberian tradition of legitimation and the writ
ings of Antonio Gramsci, Carol and Jordan Steiker explore how
legitimation theory might explain, as an unintended consequence,
the persistence of death penalty jurisprudence. The authors con
clude that "[t]he Supreme Court's death penalty law, by creating an
impression of enormous regulatory effort while achieving negligible
regulatory effects, effectively obscures the true nature of our capital
sentencing system" and thereby "legitimates the imposition of capi330. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 317.
331. Id. at 437.
332. Duncan Kennedy has contributed importantly to the tradition of legitimation theory.
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE sl:ECLE) (1997), where Ken
nedy develops what he calls "Pink Theory," or a chastened version of legitimation. See id. at
293 ("What is legitimated is the status quo, rather than capitalism or the relations of produc
tion understood as a structure. The status quo is an incoherent hodgepodge of heterogene
ous elements, without a system logic. Whatever it may be at any given moment, that's what
gets naturalized by the denial of the ideological element in judicial law making."). For an
earlier contribution, see David M. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order:
Ba/bus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 L. & SoCY. REv. 529
(1977), where Trubek sketches a critical-socio-legal theory premised on a similar concept of
legitimacy. According to Trubek, it is the myth of judicial neutrality that allows the modern
soul to mediate the ideal of equality with the reality of inequality. So Trubek writes, "As
members of a liberal society, we embrace the ideals and yet are aware of their negation. The
idea of Jaw offers the possibility of escape from this contradiction." Id. at 541.
333. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 317, at 429.
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tal punishment both for participants in the legal system and for the
public at large."334
Carol and Jordan Steiker's thesis has a lot in common with Fou
cault's writings on law, even though it traces to a very distinct intel
lectual tradition. In their article, law is a cover for the underlying
micro-processes of politics. Like Foucault, law is the medium that
allows the disciplines to thrive. Law is what reconciles participants
to the reality of inequity despite shared ideals of equality and free
dom.

In

sum, the authors suggest, law serves to bridge the gap be

tween the coercive and inequitable micro-processes of discipline
and the legal ideals of equality and fairness.
The Griffiths and Steiker articles bear a strong family resem
blance to subject creation and, together, they make moves very sim
ilar to the two principal critiques discussed earlier: the critique of
the underlying categories and the critique of law. These examples
of contemporary criminal law scholarship suggest that subject crea
tion is perhaps a more widely shared insight than commonly recog
nized. I have chosen two illustrations, but there are many other
examples of criminal law scholarship that share this insight even
though they may come from entirely different traditions, such as the
emerging field of Therapeutic Jurisprudence335 or the writings of
Elizabeth Schneider on the battered woman syndrome.336 Subject
creation has significant implications for the criminal law. It is to
334. Id. at 436.
335. Therapeutic Jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to law developed by
David Wexler and Bruce Wmick. See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOP·
MENrs IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996)
[hereinafter LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY]. It is premised on the idea that "whether we
realize it or not, law functions as a therapeutic agent, bringing about therapeutic or antither
apeutic consequences." Bruce J. Wmick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra, at 645, 648. The following questions are representative
of the issues that Therapeutic Jurisprudence addresses:
Can a judge's colloquy with a criminal defendant at a plea hearing influence the defend
ant's acceptance of responsibility? Can a judge conduct a sentencing hearing in a man
ner likely to increase a criminal defendant's compliance with conditions of probation? Is
"sentencing bargaining" less likely to interfere with later efforts at offender rehabilita
tion than "charge bargaining"? Can "teen courts" increase empathy in delinquent
youths by having those youths serve as attorneys for victims in teen court proceedings?
Id. at 650. Allison Shiff and David Wexler's discussion of teen courts, a relatively recent
development in the juvenile court system dating back to about 1983, is a good illustration of
the possible overlap of subject creation theory and the Therapeutic Jurisprudence approach.
See Allison R. Shiff & David B. Wexler, Teen Courts: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspec
tive, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra, at 287, 293.
336. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 213, 232-34
(1992) (discussing how the battered woman syndrome can be deployed against women by
placing them in the category of crazy, helpless, or both).
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these implications in the context of order-maintenance policing that
I shall now tum.
V.

REVISITING O RDER-MAINTENANCE P OLICING

We are left with a disarming theory without empirical support

- with a type of aesthetic policing that focuses on the disorderly.

The social influence conception of deterrence and the broken win
dows theory appropriate the ·aesthetic of order and sobriety, and, at

the same time, empower the police as the only rival to the disor
derly. By commandeering the aesthetic categories, the theory

leaves most of its interlocutors speechless. Very few contest the po

licing strategy - even though the broken windows theory, espe
cially as implemented in New York City, leads to a false choice. No

one in their right milld would choose the gangs, the criminals, or the
disorderly. No reasonable person would advocate disorder, litter

ing, panhandling, or prostitution. No one seriously would come out
in favor of breaking windows - even if, as the

Broken Windows

essay playfully suggests, "It has always been fun."337

In the previous sections, I traced the problem back to the under

lying category of the disorderly and suggested how that category is

the product of the punitive strategy and simultaneously facilitates

the law enforcement policy. I suggested that the category of the
disorderly may blind us from seeing the irregularities that accom

pany the quality-of-life initiative - from seeing the disorder in the
order. But what is the order masking?
A.

Complaints of Police Brutality and the NYPD

The aesthetic of order has overshadowed, in New York City, a

sharp increase in complaints of police brutality.

At a theoretic

level, this may not be entirely surprising. After all, the Broken
Windows essay betrays itself. In place of the struggle between or
der and disorder, the text reveals two competing sources of power,

two competing forces of social-control. The "police view," accord

ing to Wilson and Kelling, is that "the cops and the gangs are the
two rival sources of power in the area, and that the gangs are not
going to win. "338

This bears a striking resemblance to former

Commissioner Bratton's statement that "criminals are our competi
tion."339 Bob Herbert of the New York Times reports a chilling ex337. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 31.
338. Id. at 35.
339. See Beiser, supra note 199, at 39.
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change between a police officer from the Bronx and a commission

investigating police misconduct:

"Did you beat people up who you arrested?"
"No. We'd just beat people in general. If they're on the street, hang
ing around drug locations. It was a show of force."
"Why were these beatings done?"
"To show who was in charge. We were in charge, the police."340

In New York

City, complaints of police brutality have been on

the rise since the inception of the quality-of-life initiative. Accord
ing to the

New York Times, "from 1994 to 1996, the city received
8,316 court claims of abuse by officers, compared with 5,983 for the
three previous years." In addition, the Times reports, "from 1994 to
1996, the city paid about $70 million as settlements or judgments in
claims alleging improper police actions - compared \vith about $48
million in the three previous years."341 The

Times also reports that

"accusations of misconduct filed with the Civilian Complaint Re

view Board have risen sharply during much of Mayor Giuliani's
tenure."342 Although the number of complaints filed with the
CCRB fell by twenty-two percent in the first six months of 1997 ,343
the number appears to be on the increase again in

1998.

Com

plaints lodged with the CCRB are up twenty percent for the first
five months of

1998:

the CCRB received

2,176

complaints against

police officers for the period January through May
to

1,818

1998, in contrast

complaints during the same period last year.344 The trend

is reflected in the following table:345
TABLE

Complaints
Allegations

14:

CCRB

COMPLAINTS
1993 - 1998

AND

ALLEGATIONS,

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Jan - May 1988

3580
5597

4877
8060

5618
9356

5550
9390

4816
7183

2176
n/a

340. Bob Herbert, Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, § 4, at 13.
341. Purdy, supra note 11.
342. Id.
343. See id.
344. See Complaints Against Police Rise, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at A25 (Digest: The
New York Region) ("[A]ccording to the statistics released yesterday by the CCRB").
345. See id.; Fax from Sherman Jackson of the CCRB, supra note 38, at 4 (June 17, 1997)
(on file with author); see also New York Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Report: A Fourth
Anniversary Overview of the Civilian Complaint Review Board, July 5, 1993 - July 5, 1997 tbl.2
(1997) [hereinafter NYCLU Report] (presenting data on the CCRB's disposition of com
plaints from July 1993 to December 1996).
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These trends are corroborated by a controversial report issued
by Amnesty International in June 1996 entitled, Police Brutality and
Some
have questioned the accuracy of Amnesty's reporting;347 however,

Excessive Force in the New York City Police Department.346

for the very limited purpose of this Article, Amnesty's report
merely lends further support to the already well documented in
crease in complaints of police brutality. Amnesty reported that
complaints of police brutality in New York City "have been rising
steadily for some years."348 According to Amnesty's statistics, "the
number of people bringing claims for police misconduct against the
City of New York has increased substantially in recent years, from
977 in 1987 to more than 2,000 in 1994."

Furthermore, "[t]he

amount paid out by the city each year in settlements or judgments
awarded to plaintiffs in police abuse cases has also risen," from
around $13.5 million in 1992 to more than $24 million in 1994.349
Amnesty also found an increase in complaints lodged with the
CCRB, as well as racial disparities among complainants.35o
Police officials suggest that the increase in complaints of police
brutality may be due to the increase in the number of arrests associ
ated with the quality-of-life initiative.

Former Commissioner

Bratton minimizes the significance of the numbers, suggesting that
"complaints always rise after there is a large influx of new police
officers."351 Police Commissioner Safir attributes the most recent
upsurge in complaints :filed with the CCRB in 1998 to the fact that
the Abner Louima case has brought increased attention to the
question of police brutality.352 Perhaps these explanations are cor346. Amnesty International, United States of America: Police Bmtality and Excessive
Force in the New York City Police Department (AI Index AMR 51/36/96 1996), available at
<http://www.amnesty.org//ailib/airpub/1996/AMR/25103696.htm> [hereinafter Amnesty
Report].
347. Tracey Meares has suggested to me that the report may be unreliable; however I
have not located any published scholarship challenging the methodology of the report.
348. Amnesty Report, supra note 346, at 14.
349. Id. at 3, 14.
350. See id. ("The CCRB reported that it received 4,920 new complaints in 1994, an in
crease of 37.43% over the previous year. While the CCRB takes complaints covering a range
of alleged abuses from deadly force to discourtesy, 1,670 complaints (the largest proportion)
were for excessive force and these had also risen proportionately from 1993."). Amnesty also
reports that "the large majority of the victims of police abuses are racial minorities, particu
larly African-Americans and people of Latin American or Asian descent. Racial disparities
appear to be especially marked in cases involving deaths in custody or questionable shoot
ings." Id. "Three-quarters (75.9%) of the people who lodged complaints with the CCRB
from January to June 1995 were African-American (50.3%) and Latino (25.6%), while the
remainder were either white (21.2%) or 'other' (2.8% ), including Asian." Id.
351. Bratton, supra note 8.
352. See Complaints Against Police Rise, supra note 344.
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rect; however, there are some reasons to be somewhat skeptical.
The CCRB reported to Amnesty delegates that "most of the com
plaints arose from encounters with patrol officers that did not in
volve arrests or persons receiving summonses."353 Moreover, the
CCRB also reported that "most complainants had no prior com
plaint history, thus discounting suggestions that many of those lodg
ing

complaints

were

'chronic'

complainers."354

In

addition,

although rookie police officers may account, in some part, for the
rise in complaints of police brutality, the complaints seem to have
increased at a greater pace than the rate of increase of incoming
officers.355

In this regard, it

would be crucial to determine empiri

cally whether the increase in complaints involves new police
officers.
I am not arguing, nor have I attempted to establish, that there is
a causal link between the quality-of-life initiative and the increase
in complaints of police brutality. Nor have I argued that there is an
empirical link between order-maintenance policing and police bru
tality. The fact that order-maintenance policing in New York City
has coincided with an increase in complaints of police brutality does
not, in itself, establish a causal relationship. The possible explana
tions for the increase in the number of complaints are far too com
plex to lend themselves to such a conclusion. Moreover, even if
such a causal relationship were empirically verified, it does not nec
essarily militate against order-maintenance policing. It could be
that order-maintenance policing can be implemented without the
attendant increase in complaints of police brutality. Or it could be
that we are prepared to pay the price of police brutality for the
benefits of the policing strategy.
What I am suggesting, though, is that the issue of increased com
plaints of police brutality may be overshadowed by the rhetoric of
order and cleanliness surrounding the quality-of-life initiative. Why
is it, after all, that the issue of police brutality and the causes of
brutality are not on the research agenda along the new path of de
terrence ?356

Why is it that the police disorder within order

maintenance policing is minimized in the

Broken Windows

essay?

353. Amnesty Report, supra note 346, § 2.9.
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., NYCLU Report, supra note 345, at 4 n.6 ("The 27 percent increase in the
NYPD's complement of sworn officers in recent years (from approximately 30,000 to 38,000)
does not begin to explain a 60 per�nt increase in police misconduct complaints.").
356. See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 12, at 367-73 (no mention).
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Other Factors That Are Overshadowed by the Orderliness of
Order-Maintenance Policing
It would be crucial to further investigate the potential link be

tween the policy of aggressive arrests and police brutality. Short of
a causal link, the arrests themselves are a serious ordeal. "Hand
cuffed, fingerprinted and often strip-searched, defendants spend as
much as a day in jail before seeing a judge, who generally considers
that punishment enough."357 According to the New

York Times,

as

recently as November 1996, "some people were lield in cells for
more than 60 hours waiting to see a judge for crimes like fare
beating, sleeping on park benches and drinking beer in public."358
Transportation to the precinct, if by van, can take l1P to four or
more hours.359

In

addition, arrest creates a criminal record that

may haunt people on future job and school applications.
The

New York Times

recently published a short self-help man

ual for dealing with arrest. The article chronicled the likely course
of events and offered some tips. "While being handcuffed, cross
one hand over the other. It's more comfortable." · "Carry valid ID.
It increases your chances of being released with an appearance
ticket, instead of being held overnight." "If you are worried about
being assaulted while in custody, sit near the front of the cell where
guards can see you. "360 The ordeal of arrest can be a harrowing
experience. A sample of cases reported in the papers illustrate this
well. Chris C. was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Looking
for a friend's name on the mailbox in the lobby of an apartment
building in the East Village, Chris fell into the hands of officers
hunting drug activity.

Accused of trespass, Chris was arrested,

handcuffed, taken to jail, strip-searched, and held for nineteen
hours; his case was dismissed two months later.361 Nancy T. was
pulled over and arrested in Chinatown, handcuffed, taken to the
station house, strip-searched, and locked up till early next morning,
for driving without her license and talking back to a police officer

("failure to comply with an order").362 Max M., a twenty-one-year
old college student "was accused of drinking a beer on the street on
357. Purdy, supra note 11.
358. Cooper, supra note 11.
359. See id.

360. Id. Note that, in light of the NYPD's new policy regarding checking ic;lentification
by means of fingerprints, the second recommendation may no longer be that useful.
361. See Purdy, supra note 11.
362. See Sontag & Barry, supra note 11.

·
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the Upper West Side and spent a day in jail."363 To be sure, these
are just stories reported in the

New York Times,

but they help us to

see what we so badly want to ignore. Misdemeanor arrests affect
real people, not just statistics.
Misdemeanor arrests also have a disparate impact on minorities.
The demographic breakdown of misdemeanor arrests reflects that a
disproportionate number of minorities are arrested for misdemean
ors - disproportionate in relation to the percentage of minorities
in the population, though not necessarily in relation to the racial
breakdown of persons committing misdemeanor offenses.

The

point is not that the police are disproportionately targeting black
versus white misdemeanants. The point is that more blacks are ar
rested for misdemeanors than whites given their proportion in the
overall population. The decision to arrest misdemeanants - rather
than not arrest them - is a policy that has a disparate impact on
minorities.

In cities throughout the United States, a high percentage of per
sons arrested for misdemeanors are black. This is reflected in the
following table, which compiles the racial break-down for arrests in
cities in 1995:364
TABLE 15: D EMOGRAPHIC B REAK-DOWN OF MISDEMEANOR
ARRESTS FOR CITIES IN 1995

Population (132,911,000)
Misdemeanor Arrests:
Disorderly conduct
Drug abuse
Drunkenness
Prostitution
Suspicion
Vagrancy
Vandalism

Percent White

Percent Black

61.2%
58.7%
79.4%
59.9%
40.9%
50.9%
71.0%

36.9%
40.3%
17.7%
37.7%
58.7%
46.4%
26.3%

The table reveals how misdemeanor arrests disproportionately
impact blacks. It is particularly striking in the case of arrests for
suspicion - where 58.7 percent of persons arrested are black. It is
also striking in most other categories, give that the 1990 Census re
ported that African-Americans make up only 13 % of the popula363. Purdy, supra note 11.
364. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTics-1996, supra note 39, at 386
tbl.4.12 (listing racial breakdown of arrests in all cities, including cities with less than 10,000
inhabitants, see id., app. 3 at 595). I used the more conservative numbers of total arrests
rather than the numbers for arrests 18 and older. It appears that adult misdemeanor arrests

are even more skewed against blacks.
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tion inside metropolitan areas.365 A policing strategy that targets
misdemeanors is likely to have a disproportionate effect on minori
ties. Such a strategy may also have a disproportionate impact on
the homeless who, almost by definition, violate misdemeanor laws
against loitering and public drinking.366
Moreover, the policy may facilitate an uncomfortable delegation
of the power to define community standards. Recall, for a moment,
police officer Kelly in Newark. One of his rules of order
maintenance was that "[i]f a dispute erupted between a business
man and a customer, the businessman was assumed to be right, es
pecially if the customer was a stranger."367 There is reason to
suspect, however, that this unwritten rule might not reflect the
voice of all members of the community. It may in fact reflect none.
The businessman may himself live in a completely different
neighborhood.
Clyde Haberman of the New

York Times recently asked, slightly

facetiously, "a humble question" on the quality-of-life initiative:
"Whose life is it, anyway, that we're talking about?"368 Referring
to the campaign against squeegee men, Haberman remarked to
himself,

Wait a minute, dummy, you don't own a car. No squeegee man ever
ruined your day. And you know what? The same is true for most
New Yorkers, since the city's Transportation Department says that 56
percent of them do not have access to a car, let alone even occasional
contact with curbside window washers.369
Haberman's amusing comments must be taken in perspective; the
quality-of-life initiative has also targeted the subway system and
other pedestrian venues. But the humble question is still an impor
tant one. How do we define minor disorder? Clearly, we are not
talking about arresting those who pay their house keeper in cash to
knowingly benefit from IRS underreporting, or who pay their nan
nies under the table. The quality-of-life initiative focuses instead on
the type of minor offenses - loitering, fare-beating, and panhan365. See 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, at 7 tbl. 5 (listing racial breakdown inside metro
politan areas, defined as including urbanized areas with a minimum population of 50,000, see
id. at A-8).
366. I thank my colleague Andrew Silverman, who has worked extensively on issues of
homelessness, for alerting me to this problem. See also Barnes, supra note 5, at 24-25 (re
porting on a study in Austin, Texas, that found that "[a] third of the arrests for public order
offenses were of repeat offenders, of whom two-thirds were homeless").
367. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 30.
368. Clyde Haberman, Better Quality of Life Found Behind Whee� N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1998, at Bl.
369. Id.
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dling - that affect the poorer members of society, which, tragically,
include a disproportionate number of minorities. Who gets to de
fine disorder? By handing over the informal power to define devi
ance to police officers and some community members, we may be
enabling the repression of political, cultural, or sexual outsiders in a
way that is antithetical to our conceptions of democratic theory or
constitutional principles.310
Arrests and prosecutions are also very expensive. A typical
prostitution prosecution - one of the offenses targeted by the qual
ity-of-life initiative - costs upwards of $2,000.371 That is a lot of
money for a law-enforcement strategy unsupported by empirical ev
idence. Finally, a policy of arrest may have unintended conse
quences. Someone arrested for turnstile jumping may be fired from
his job for missing work; and strained police-civilian relations can
create friction between the community and the police force that
may be detrimental to solving crimes.372
C.

Alternatives to Arrest

Alternatives to a policy of aggressive misdemeanor arrests may
exist. Instead of arresting turnstile jumpers, for instance, we can and New York City has begun to - install turnstiles that cannot be
jumped. This is an approach similar to "target-hardening" or "ac
cess control," methods of situational crime prevention that are com
monly discussed in criminology.373 Instead of arresting prostitutes,
we could investigate the possibility of licensing prostitution.

It

turns out, in fact, that prostitution may be related to crime in a
more direct way than the broken windows theory immediately sug
gests. Deborah Rhode has recently compiled some relevant statis
tics. "Recent research estimates that two-thirds to three-fourths of
streetwalkers are raped or beaten an average of four to 15 times a
370. This is not to suggest - one way or the other - that African-American communi
ties like or dislike order-maintenance policing. Broken windows proponents rightly mock
liberals who suggest that the black community should be opposed to order-maintenance po
licing, see Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2482; Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 35-36,
although these proponents often fall prey to exactly the same fallacy. See, e.g., Kahan, New
Path, supra note 12, at 2482 (referring to inner city residents as "the very citizens" who sup·
port "public-housing building searches, curfews, and gang-loitering laws"). To suggest any
thing about the position of the black community would be both reductionist and essentialist.
. 371. See Rhode, supra note 40.
372. As my colleague Henry Ruth suggests, "it is witnesses that solve crimes, not police
officers."
373. See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER So.
91 (Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington eds., 1995).
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year."374 Studies suggest that decriminalizing prostitution (in the
case of the Netherlands) and/or legalizing prostitution (in the case

of eleven counties in Nevada) has resulted in lower crime rates

against prostitutes, as well as lower rates of sexually transmitted
diseases.375 A full exploration of these alternatives is beyond the

scope of this Article and, to be sure, decriminalizing or licensing

prostitution may not eliminate an underground black-market in
prostitution. It is, however, an alternative

worth investigating.

Af

ter all, aggressive arrests have not eliminated prostitution in New

York City. The

New York Times

reports that "while prostitution

may be less visible in the city, it is no less prevalent. The Internet,

pagers, cellular phones and subterfuges like escort services have en

abled more discreet forms of prostitution to thrive beyond the

reach of the street-level crackdown, the authorities and prostitutes
themselves say."376
How can we discourage aggressive panhandling and other forms

of street economies? Instead of arrest, perhaps we should explore

the possibility of work programs for people living on the street.

The programs could target cleaning up abandoned buildings, creat
ing public parks out of vacant lots, creating space for public art
projects, or. maintaining public spaces. If the programs were flexi
bly designed to facilitate changing work schedules, they might offer

a substitute to panhandling and window-washing. As for the fi
nancing, we could investigate the possibility of taxing owners of

abandoned property or using proceeds from the sale of abandoned

properties, as well as a tax on emissions, or fines for littering. There
are endless ways of resolving the problem of panhandling if we let
our imaginations roam within a realistic and practical realm.

The mayor of Bogota, Columbia, Antanas Mockus, hired mimes

to follow and imitate jaywalkers crossing the street in an effort to

374. Rhode, supra note 40; see also Charles Clark, Prostitution, CQ REsEARCHER, June
11, 1993, at 514; Jessica N. Drexler, Governments' Role in Turning Tricks: The World's Oldest
Profession in the Netherlands and the United States, 15 DICK. J. INTL. L. 201, 207-08 (1996);
Eleanor M. Miller et al., The United States, in PROSTITUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL HAND
BOOK ON TRENDS, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 300, 320 (Nanette J. Davis ed., 1993).
375. See Drexler, supra note 374, at 228, 230; see also Linda M. Rio, Psychological and
Sociological Research and the Decriminalization or Legalization ofProstitution, 20 ARCHIVES
OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 205, 212-14 (1991); Claire Sterk-Elifson & Carole A. Campbell, The
Netherlands, in PROSTITUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON TRENDS, PROBLEMS,
AND POLICIES, supra note 374, at 191, 200-02; James R. Stout & Thomas S. Tanana, Note,
Could California Reduce AIDS by Modeling Nevada Prostitution Law?, 2 SAN DIEGO JusT. J.
491, 498 (1994).
376. Kit R. Roane, Prostitutes on Wane In New York Streets But Take to Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at Al. It may be fair to say that, in this ca,se, order on the streets has
been achieved by means of disorder in cyberspace.

386

Michigan Law Review

curb jaywalking.377

[Vol. 97:291

Mockus also gave motorists "cards with a

thumb-downs sign that they could hold up, like soccer referees, to
signal that another driver had committed a foul."378 It's a different
approach, but the point is, even if we set out to create order, we
should consider how we are going to go about it. We need to criti
cally examine what effect the policies will have on individuals in
society, how the policies construct the subject and how that con
struction reinforces the very strategies we are justifying.379 The is
sue is not just social influence on behavior. The pertinent questions
are, first, how do our strategies of policing and the mechanisms of
punishment transform the subject? Second, how does our under
standing of the subject influence the policing strategy under consid
eration? And third, how do these effects relate to the goal of
reducing crime? The answer, in the context of order-maintenance
policing is that the quality-of-life initiative creates the disorderly,
which in turn reinforces the policing strategy and overshadows the
costs of that strategy, \vithout sufficient evidence that the order
disorder axis affects crime.
CONCLUSION

Let's return for a moment to January 22, 1840, the official open
ing of Mettray, a juvenile prison

qua

home, school, military com

pound, and factory described in chilling detail by Michel Foucault
Discipline and Punish.38° Consider for a moment the policy at

in

Mettray, as reported by Ducpetiaux in 1852: "The least act of diso
bedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences
377. See John Tierney, Civil Obedience, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
378. Id.
379. The example of prostitution, again, provides a useful illustration. Licensing prostitu
tion might have a very different effect on the subject than aggressively arresting mostly fe
male prostitutes. It would likely have less of a marginalizing effect on the women and men
that engage in prostitution. Persons engaged in sex work would likely receive more protec
tion from our sexual assault laws. Prosecutors' charging decisions may be affected. Sex
workers might acquire a voice in the debate about whether and how to change the social
meaning and social practice of prostitution. Sex workers likely would have a greater amount
of control over their identities. And there may be corresponding effects on persons who are
not engaged in acts of prostitution, on sexual relationships, and on the construction of sexual
ity in society more generally. This is just the very beginning of the type of inquiry that sub
ject creation theory calls for. The point here is not to resolve that inquiry in the case of
prostitution or any other specific misdemeanor offense, but rather to illustrate the type of
questions that we should be asking. Excellent work is being done in this particular area by
Lisa Sanchez. See Lisa E. Sanchez, Boundaries ofLegitimacy: Sex, Violence, Citizenship, and
Community in a Local Sexual Economy, 22 L. & Soc. INOUIRY 543 {1997); see also Kennedy,
supra note 300, at 126.
380. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 293-96.
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is to punish the most minor offences very severely."381 It is eerie
how much this resembles the social influence conception of deter
rence. Perhaps the new path of deterrence is not so new after all.
Order-maintenance policing is extremely popular these days.
With crime rates plummeting in New York City, few if any are fool
ish enough to take issue with the quality-of-life initiative. Most
people praise it, especially elected officials and policy-makers who,
by doing so, can take full credit for the decline in crime.382 But the
new policing in New York City overestimates the role of disorder in
the production of crime. By overestimating disorder, it creates a
false choice between the police and the disorderly - a choice that
may facilitate a policy of aggressive arrests despite the lack of em
pirical evidence supporting the claim of deterrence. The ironic con
sequence is that the social influence conception of deterrence touted as an alternative to "the severe punishments that dominate
contemporary criminal law"383 and presented as an application of
social norm theory - falls back on a law enforcement strategy that
relies principally on arrest and incarceration.
What then is hidden beneath the new path of deterrence? I
think we see it best in the Broken Windows essay. The text suggests
that reducing crime is simply a question of minor details, of fixing
broken windows, of sweeping up litter, of hiding the street people.
It neglects the numerous and complex factors that contribute to
crime. Recall the description in the
neighborhood decline:

Broken Windows

essay about

A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is
smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, embold
ened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults
move in. Teenagers gather in front of the comer store. The merchant
asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates.384
This description may tell us a few things about litter and public
drinking. But there is also lurking in that description a much more
complex story about urban decay, with complicated race, wealth,
class, and ethnic dimensions, to name only a few. The more com
plex story would raise questions about property values, the quality
of neighborhood public schools, racial demographics, environmen
tal pollution, public transportation, access to business loans and
381. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 34, at 294 (quoting Ducpetiaux
1852, 377).
382. See Bratton, supra note 8.
383. Kahan, New Path, supra note 12, at 2478.
384. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 2, at 32.
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mortgages, and zoning laws. The life cycle of a neighborhood is not
as simple as the essay suggests.385
Many readers may simply respond:

"But what about all the

New Yorkers who feel safer in the new, orderly New York? Aren't
their feelings entitled to some weight in the analysis?" The simple
answer is that New Yorkers are feeling safer because they are safer.
Crime rates have tumbled in New York City. There is every reason
to feel safer. The longer response is that their feelings are central
to the analysis presented here - an analysis that focuses, after all,
on the way that subjects are created by means of the norm of
orderliness.
Some readers may nevertheless persist and call attention to the
social scientific studies that suggest that people feel safer in more
orderly neighborhoods.386 "New Yorkers are feeling safer not only
because of the lower crime rates," they may argue, "but also be
cause of the additional order." There are, again, two answers. The
simple answer is that these feelings of safety are most likely ex
plained by the level of crime in the neighborhood.387 The longer
answer is that this come-back is really about aesthetic preferences
- a discussion that is beyond the scope of this Article.
This offers a good opportunity to emphasize what I have not
argued in this Article. First, I have only addressed the social influ
ence justification for order-maintenance policing. I have only ad
dressed the claim that

deterrence justifies the quality-of-life

initiative. There may be other justifications. Some may argue that
we should arrest minor misdemeanants because their conduct is
morally reprehensible. Others may suggest that the conduct is aes
thetically unpleasant. I have not directly addressed those claims of
moral theory or aesthetic preferences. This Article is limited in
scope to the justification based on deterrence. It may have implica
tions for moral theory or aesthetics, but those implications should
not be mistaken for a full-blown discussion. Second, this Article
does not challenge community policing. Community policing
comes in far too many varieties to draw any conclusions here about
community policing writ large. Order-maintenance policing New
York style is just one of many different approaches to community
policing. It focuses on arrests. There are, however, other types of
385. Wesley Skogan acknowledges and discusses this point in his study, see Skogan, Final
Report, supra note 22, at 77, and, I believe, would agree with this criticism of the Broken
Windows essay.
386. See, e.g., SKOGAN & MAxFIELD, supra note 100.
387. See SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE, supra note 9, at 77.

November 1998]

Policing New York Style

389

community policing, some of which even emphasize police coopera
tion with disorderly people.388 Finally, this Article does not address
the strategy of increasing the number of police officers on the
street. There is reason to believe that integrating more police of
ficers into the community will help fight crime. I have limited my
self to the policy of aggressive misdemeanor arrests to deter serious
crime.
In conclusion, the categories of the disorderly and law abiders,
of order and disorder, limit our horizon. When we attempt to think
about reducing violent crime - about, in effect, transforming soci
ety - we need to question these categories and, if we find them
limiting, offer alternative understandings that lead to more innova
tive policies. My goal in this Article has been to dig beneath the
new path of deterrence in order to expose some alternatives. If we
want more order on the streets, there may be alternatives to misde
meanor arrests. Overall, we should refocus our attention on the
numerous forces that contribute to declining neighborhoods, pov
erty, and crime, and that are masked by the aesthetic and rhetoric
of orderliness. The statistical analysis presented here suggests that
disorder may mask the role of neighborhood poverty, stability, and
race in relation to crime. The same may be true of the social influ
ence conception of deterrence.

388. Under some approaches, police officers use their power to withhold enforcement of
misdemeanors as1 a way to integrate into the co=unity. See, e.g., Eig, supra note 43 (dis·
cussing co=unity policing in Chicago). Eig reports that his officer-informant "rarely writes
tickets." Id. at 63. Eig explains:
For one thing, she rarely writes tickets. While we are out on patrol one night, a car rolls
through a four-way stop sign without even pausing. Tue driver sees the police car, puts
an upturned palm out his window and shouts, "Sorry, T-Bone!" Black [the officer] just
shakes her head. Another time, she spots a man who is wanted for a parole violation.
He does not run when Black approaches. . . . [H]e and Black agree that she will pick him
up the next day. . . . Black is confident he'll keep his word. She understands that respect
and goodwill benefit her more than force. Once, when a suspect resisted arrest and
began punching her, neighborhood gang members rushed to her defense and helped
subdue the man.

